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Getting Spending: How to Replace Clear Statement
Rules with Clear Thinking About Conditional
Grants of Federal Funds

BRIAN GALLE*

How much federalism is too much? The answer, of course, depends on
whom you ask. It is no surprise, then, that in both judicial and academic
debates about the proper balance between national and local power, the
fiercest arguments have been fought not over "how much?" (perhaps an
impossible question in any event) but "who?" Thus, for each key aspect of
national power-for example, the scope of the Commerce' and Treaty2
powers, the Tenth3 and Fourteenth Amendments,4 and Congress's ability to
subject states to suits for damages by private individuals-there is an acA.B. Harvard College, J.D. Columbia. Appellate Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice. I am
grateful for helpful comments and suggestions from Richard Briffault, John Bronsteen, Jonathan Cedarbaum, Jon Connolly, Michael C. Dorf, Jeff M. Hauser, Aziz Huq, Robert Katzmann, Bernadette
Meyler, John C. Nagle, and Mark Tushnet. Unless otherwise noted, the views here are those of the
author alone and not those of the United States or any person mentioned in this or any other footnote.
I See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman, Revolution on a Human Scale, 108 YALE L.J. 2279, 2336-39
(1999); Lynn A. Baker, Putting the Safeguards Back into the PoliticalSafeguards of Federalism,46
VILL. L REV. 951, 958-61 (2001); Martin H. Redish & Karen L. Drizin, Constitutional Federalism
and JudicialReview: The Role of Textual Analysis, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (1987).
2 See Curtis A. Bradley, The Treaty Power and American Federalism, 97 MICH. L. REV. 390
(1998); Gerald L. Neuman, The Nationalizationof Civil Liberties, Revisited, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1630,
1648-49 (1999); Carlos Manuel Vbzquez, Treaties and the Eleventh Amendment, 42 VA. J. INT'L L.
713 (2002).
3 See, e.g., Robert W. Adler, Unfunded Mandates and Fiscal Federalism:A Critique, 50 VAND.
L. REV. 1137, 1193-1230 (1997); Jay S. Bybee, The Tenth Amendment Among the Shadows: On Reading the Constitution in Plato's Cave, 23 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 551, 553-54 (2000); Martha A.
Field, Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority: The Demise of a Misguided Doctrine, 99
HARV. L. REV. 84, 84,95 (1985).
4 See, e.g., Paul Brest, Congress as ConstitutionalDecisionmakerand Its Power To Counter
Judicial Doctrine, 21 GA. L REV. 57, 68-78, 104-05 (1986); Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Legislative Constitutionalismand Section Five Power: Policentric Interpretationof the Family and Medical
Leave Act, 112 YALE L.J. 1943 (2003) [hereinafter Post & Siegel, Legislative Constitutionalism].
5To choose two worthy articles among many, see' Vicki C. Jackson, Principle and Compromise
in Constitutional Adjudication: The Eleventh Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity, 75 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 953 (2000); Ernest A. Young, Is the Sky Falling on the Federal Government? State
Sovereign Immunity, the Section Five Power, and the FederalBalance, 81 TEx. L. REV. 1551 (2003)
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companying literature considering who best to decide where the federalism
shadow falls. In recent years the Supreme Court has asserted a strong role
for itself in nearly all of these areas.6
A notable exception is the Spending Clause. Although the Court has
penciled in a rough set of judicially-enforceable limits on Congress's
power to spend funds "for the general welfare,"7 as a practical matter these
guidelines have been purely hortatory!5 The Court has been content to
leave to ordinary politics the balance between national conceptions of
"general welfare" and state autonomy.9
The Spending Clause thus has come to represent something of a gap in
what is otherwise a generally aggressive regime of judicial enforcement of
federalism values.'0 As a result, constitutional thinkers of all stripes have
been drawn to the Spending Clause. Policymakers, rebuffed in direct efforts to legislate, have attempted to re-enact what was formerly direct lawmaking as a condition on a grant of funds to the regulated entities." In the
academy, friends of judicially-enforced federalism have with increasing
(reviewing JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., NARROWING THE NATION'S POWER: THE SUPREME COURT SIDES
WITH THE STATES (2002)).
6 See, e.g., Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001) (holding that Congress
lacks power under Section Five of Fourteenth Amendment to abrogate state sovereign immunity from
suit under federal statute outlawing discrimination against disabled employees); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (curtailing Congress's powers under the Commerce Clause and Section Five);
Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (concluding that Tenth Amendment prohibits the federal
government from directing state officials to enforce portions of federal handgun control legislation);
City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (ruling that the Fourteenth Amendment did not grant
Congress power to force states to give wider latitude for religious freedom than the First Amendment
required).
7U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.1. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207 (1987).
8 See Lynn A. Baker & Mitchell N. Berman, Getting Off the Dole: Why the Court Should Abandon Its Spending Doctrine, and How a Too-Clever Congress Could Provoke It to Do So, 78 IND. L.J.
459,463-69 (2003).
9 See Thomas R. McCoy & Barry Friedman, ConditionalSpending: Federalism'sTrojan Horse,
1988 Sup. CT. REV. 85, 123.
10 See Baker & Berman, supra note 8. at 460, 484; Albert J. Rosenthal, Conditional Federal
Spending and the Constitution, 39 STAN. L. REV. 1103, 1105-06 (1987); Rebecca E. Zietlow, Federalism's Paradox: The Spending Power and Waiver of Sovereign Immunity, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
141, 189 (2002).
11 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-l(a)-(b) (2000) (requiring recipients of federal funding to limit burdens on religious exercise much as recipient would have under direct legislation previously invalidated
by Supreme Court); Lynn A. Baker, Conditional Federal Spending After Lopez, 95 COLUM. L. REV.
1911, 1913 (1995) (describing President Clinton's plan to reinstate the Gun Free School Zones Act by
use of the Spending Clause); Michael T. Gibson, Congressional Authority to Induce Waivers of State
Sovereign Immunity: The Conditional Spending Power (and Beyond), 29 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 439,
493 (2002) (discussing a Spending Clause bill, "The Older Workers' Rights Restoration Act," which
would make states liable for damages under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act); Peter J.
Smith, Pennhurst, Chevron, and the Spending Power, 110 YALE L. J. 1187, 1188 (2001) (identifying
other efforts to use conditional spending to further congressional goals).
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frequency called for the Court to shut the sluice-gate. 12 And, in some judicial quarters, the gate has begun to creep closed. 3
In this article I argue that the gate is not open wide enough. Although
the Court does not directly police spending legislation, it does restrict conditional spending by means of an actively enforced "clear statement rule."' 4
In construing the terms of a statute enacted under the authority of the
Spending Clause, the Court refuses to recognize any duty burdening a state
unless, in the Court's view, the language of the statute clearly requires it.' 5
The result is an extraordinarily rigid statute, with little opportunity left for
courts to interpret in light of changed events or novel uses. 6 Depending on
how we understand the clear statement rule, it may also leave little or no
room for executive interpretation, a major problem in an era that has come
to depend on agencies to provide essential adaptability and to elaborate the
detail of Congress's broad designs. 7 In effect, the Supreme Court has
given Congress free reign to legislate under the Spending Clause, but only
if Congress legislates badly.
The clear statement rule also constricts the reach of federal constitutional norms. Federal judges often use statutory interpretation as a substitute for constitutional adjudication. For example, by presuming that a statute should be read, if possible, to avoid constitutional doubt, a court in effect weaves constitutional values into the open texture of federal legislation. But federal courts do not have comparable power over state law. To
the extent that dependence on their statutory power has left federal courts
less willing to expand the limits of the Constitution itself, state law is relatively less constrained by constitutional values. Since the civil rights era,
12 See Baker, supra note 1I,at 1916; Baker & Berman, supra note 8, at 470; John C. Eastman,

Restoring the "General" to the General Welfare Clause, 4 CHAP. L. REV. 63, 65 (2001); McCoy &
Friedman, supra note 9, at 124; Rosenthal, supra note 10, at 1110; Note, Federalism, PoliticalAccountability, and the Spending Clause, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1419, 1420 (1994).
13See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 212, 215-18 (1987) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting); West
Virginia v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 289 F.3d 281, 290 (4th Cir. 2002); Jim C. v. United
States, 235 F.3d 1079, 1083-84 (8th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (Bowman, J., dissenting); Va. Dep't of Educ.
v. Riley, 106 F.3d 559, 569-72 (4th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (Luttig, J., dissenting); Westside Mothers v.
Haveman, 133 F. Supp. 2d 549 (E.D. Mich. 2001), rev'd in part,289 F.3d 852 (6th Cir. 2002).

14Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 255 n.7 (1985) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
15Dole, 483 U.S. at 207; Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981).
16See Philip P. Frickey & Steven S. Smith, JudicialReview, the CongressionalProcess,and the
Federalism Cases: An InterdisciplinaryCritique, III YALE L.J. 1707, 1742 (2002); Jerry L. Mashaw,
Prodelegation:Why AdministratorsShould Make Political Decisions, 1 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 81 (1995),
reprinted in ADMINISTRATIVE LAW ANTHOLOGY 20, 26 (Thomas 0. Sargentich ed., 1994); Cass R.

Sunstein, InterpretingStatutes in the Regulatory States, 103 HARV. L. REV. 405,420-21 (1989).
17 See United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 172-73 (1968); William
N.
Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Foreword: Law as Equilibrium, 108 HARV. L. REV. 26, 30 (1994)
[hereinafter Eskridge & Frickey, Law as Equilibrium]; Cass R. Sunstein, Justice Scalia 's Democratic
Formalism, 107 YALE L.J. 529, 532 (1997) (reviewing ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW (1996)).
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however, this constitutional gap has been filled by federal legislation and
regulation. 18
The difficulty with the clear statement rule is that it sharply restricts
courts' power to interpret constitutionally-inspired federal lawmaking
flexibly so as to fulfill constitutional values. And recent cut-backs in Congress's ability to use its power under Section Five of the Fourteenth
Amendment to enact constitutionally-inspired legislation broader than what
the Supreme Court has been willing to recognize 9 place increasing weight
on the Spending Clause-the best available avenue for reinvigorating the
Constitution in the states. For example, the Supreme Court's decision limiting the liability of states for damages under Title I of the Americans with
Disabilities Act2° has put much greater importance on the availability of
remedies under the Rehabilitation Act, an earlier statute limiting discrimination by states accepting federal funds. 1
Despite these dramatic costs, the clear statement rule enjoys virtually
unanimous support. In addition to the expected accolades from those who
believe federalism is under-enforced, and in need of a rule of statutory interpretation to support it, 22 Laurence Tribe has praised the clear statement
rule; 23 even the most stubborn critics of judicially-enforced federalism
24
make an exception for it.
18 See infra nn.323-35 and accompanying text.
19

See Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001); United States v. Morrison, 529
U.S. 598 (2000) (curtailing Congress's powers under the Commerce Clause and Section Five); Kimel
v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000); City of Boeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
20 Garrett, 531 U.S. at 360. Title I prohibits discrimination in employment. 42 U.S.C. § 12112
(2000). Remedies under Title II, which forbid discrimination in the provision of public accommodations may in some cases face similar limitations. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-12134. See Tennessee v. Lane,
124 S. Ct. 1978, 1992-93 (2004).
21 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2000). See Garrett v. Univ. of Ala. at Birmingham Bd. of Trs., 344 F.3d
1288, 1290 n. 1 (11 th Cir. 2003) (explaining that plaintiffs were proceeding under Rehabilitation Act
following Supreme Court's decision that their ADA claims must be dismissed); cf. Ruth Colker &
James J. Brudney, Dissing Congress, 100 MICH. L. REV. 80, 142 n.263 (2001) (making similar point
about spending legislation to replace invalidated portions of Age Discrimination in Employment Act).
22See ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 29

(1997); David Engdahl, The Spending Power, 44 DUKE L.J. 1, 86 (1994); McConville, supra note 12, at
183; John Copeland Nagle, Waiving Sovereign Immunity in an Age of Clear Statement Rules, 1995
Wis. L. REV. 771, 811; Rosenthal, supra note 10, at 1142; Ernest A. Young, Two Cheersfor Process
Federalism,46 VILL. L. REV. 1349, 1389, 1394 (2001).
23 See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw § 6-25, at 479-80 (2d ed. 1988).
24
See JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS 240 (1980);

Adler, supra note 3, at 1205; Dan T. Coenen, The Rehnquist Court, Structural Due Process, and
Semisubstantive Constitutional Review, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1281, 1397-98 (2002); William N.
Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-ConstitutionalLaw: Clear Statement Rules as Constitutional
Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REV. 593, 597 (1992) [hereinafter Eskridge & Frickey, Clear Statement
Rules]; Frickey & Smith, supra note 16, at 1747; Vicki C. Jackson, Federalism and the Uses and Limits
of Law: Printz and Principle?,111 HARV. L. REV. 2180, 2234 (1998); H. Geoffrey Moulton, Jr., The
Quixotic Search for a Judicially Enforceable Federalism,83 MINN. L. REV. 849, 911 (1999).
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Yet none of the justifications for the clear statement rule-generally
proffered off-handedly, in a sentence or two-withstand serious scrutiny.
The Court has suggested that since Spending Clause legislation is "in the
nature of a contract, ' 25 the clear statement rule is required by contract-law
principles. Contract law, to the contrary, rejects formalism and actively
facilitates the use of agreements that on their face are incomplete or ambiguous. Liberals who favor the "political safeguards" of federalism over
judicial enforcement explain that the clear statement rule ensures that burdens on states arise out of the political process, not judicial decision. 26 But
an incomplete agreement is itself the product of, not the failure of, the legislative process, and in any event no case could come before a judge without congressional authorization to make the right in question enforceable
by federal officials or other parties. And those who claim that a clear
statement makes sure that credit or blame for the conditions of federal
spending stay with the federal government cannot explain why state officials who elect to receive funds subject to those conditions should not in
fact share the public barbs or praise that result.
Probably the strongest argument for the clear statement rule is that, like
the doctrine of constitutional avoidance, it reinforces the political protections for the constitutional values of federalism. As I show, however, the
political process actually overprotects states against conditional spending.
States can engage in strategic behavior-for example, holding out for a
payoff that falls just short of the overall value of the proposed legislation to
the majority coalition-that may dramatically inflate the costs of conditional spending. These opportunities are especially enticing when the federal government cannot act directly, and the states know that it must obtain
their agreement. In this way the Court's aggressive watch over the
boundaries of federalism in other areas spills over into spending legislation. Although in theory the Spending Clause may grant Congress the ability to obtain results it could not under its other enumerated powers, as a
practical matter transaction costs will usually kill such projects. Thus,
unlike in many other areas of legislation, states have a built-in incentive to
resist federal expansion, and powerful means for doing so. That leaves the
case for further, judicially-invented limits, whether in the form of the clear
statement rule or otherwise, to look elsewhere.
This Article develops these themes in the ensuing Parts. Part I fills in
background for readers who may not be familiar with the Spending Clause
or the clear statement rule. Part II begins the analysis of the merits of the
clear statement rule with the justification most often offered by the Supreme Court: that Spending Clause legislation is "in the nature of a contract." Part 1H argues first that, contrary to one prominent critique, legisla25

Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 17.

26See infra nn. 154-57 and accompanying text.
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tion under the Spending Clause is not actually a contract but is in fact an
exercise of Congress's enumerated powers. It then concludes that, whatever the status of spending legislation, contract law flatly contradicts the
formalism of the clear statement rule. Part III considers and rejects the
alternative rationale that the clear statement rule provides "notice" to
states, or that it affords them a necessary opportunity to use the political
process to their advantage. Part IV examines two models of the political
process, concluding that under either view there is little need for further
judicial protection against conditional spending. Part V briefly addresses
the claim that conditional spending undermines transparency and confuses
voters. In Part VI, this Article shifts gears to consider the benefits of the
clear statement rule for preserving federal constitutional norms. Finally, in
the Conclusion, this Article discusses the implications of this new understanding of the clear statement rule as it applies to other controversies.
I. DOCTRINE
The Constitution gives Congress "power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises, to pay the debts and provide for the common
defen[sle and general welfare of the United States."27 By implication, then,
Congress is authorized to spend its tax revenues for either of the two enumerated purposes.28 Unfortunately, this clause of Article I-the "Spending
Clause"-is not especially clear about the limits of the powers it bestows.
For example, does the "general welfare" include projects not otherwise
included within the scope of Congress's delegated powers? That very
question divided Madison from his Federalist Papers co-author, Hamilton.29
Others have related thoroughly the interpretive history of the Spending
Clause, from its beginning in the Madison-Hamilton debate down to the
modern era.3" The key point is that over time, Congress discovered that it
could use the offer of federal funds to entice competing government authorities-the states-to agree to many things they otherwise might not
voluntarily have done.3 Innovations in federal income tax collection,
which began during the Civil War and gained impressive momentum with
27 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, c1.1.

28 See Engdahl, supra note 22, at 49.
29 See Eastman, supra note 12, at 66-67. Madison believed that "general welfare" did not include
projects not otherwise within the scope of Congress's powers, while Hamilton believed that it did. Id.
30 See Baker, supra note 11, at 1924-29; Erwin Chemerinsky, Protecting the Spending Power, 4
CHAP. L. REV. 89, 90-92 (2001); Engdahl, supra note 22, at 4-53; Gibson, supranote 11, at 454-58;
Rosenthal, supra note 10, at 1111-13; Zietlow, supra note 10, at 168-70.
31See Engdahl, supra note 22, at 34; Lewis B. Kaden, Politics, Money, and State Sovereignty:
The Judicial Role, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 847, 871 n.144 (1979); Earl M. Maltz, Sovereignty, Autonomy
and ConditionalSpending, 4 CHAP. L. REV. 107, 109 (2001).
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the enactment of the Sixteenth Amendment,32 greatly expanded the pool of
federal revenue, so that the spending power became an increasingly important factor in the relationship between the federal government and the
states.33 Today, many major federal programs (excluding national defense)
in fact incorporate elements of both federal and state authority, with the
terms of the states' participation defined by way of Congress's power to
dictate the conditions under which its funds may be expended.34 Indeed,
"objectives not thought to be within Article I's 'enumerated legislative
fields' . . . may nevertheless be attained through the use of the spending
power and the conditional grant of federal funds. 35
On its surface the modern law of the Spending Clause is fairly stable.
The definitive case is South Dakota v. Dole.36 There is no justiciable limit
on the expenditure of funds, with or without conditions, for "the General
Welfare. 37 That is, although there might conceivably be an argument that
some spending-for a particular farmer's hog feed, let's say--does not
advance the general welfare of the nation,. the Court defers to Congress's
view of what that welfare might entail.3 8 Any "conditions" that Congress
attaches to its expenditure, however, must be stated clearly.39 The conditions must be reasonably related to the purpose of the expenditure.' The
test of reasonableness, as in most other areas of the Court's review of congressional decision making, is very forgiving.4
Additionally, of course, Congress cannot enact spending legislation
that would be barred by any other provision of the Constitution. 42 To take
an obvious example, federal procurement decisions cannot be based invidiously on race. 43 Although the Tenth Amendment is generally not an independent bar to spending conditions, the Court has suggested at times that it
is conceivable that highly "coercive" spending, the federal offer that states
cannot refuse, might be at least a reason to scrutinize attached conditions
more closely.44
32 See BORIS I. BITrKER ET AL., FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF INDIVIDUALS I (3d ed. 2002);
Rosenthal, supra note 10, at 1111.
33 See Engdahl, supra note 22, at 33-34; Zietlow, supra note 10, at
170.

34 Zietlow, supra note 10, at 174-75.
35South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207 (1987).
36 483 U.S. 203 (1987).
37Id. at 207; Baker & Berman, supra note 8, at 464 n.34; Smith, supra note 11, at 1196-97.
38 See Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 640-41 (1937).
39 Dole, 483 U.S. at 207.
40 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 167 (1992); see Dole, 483 U.S.
at 207.
41See New York, 505 U.S. at 167; Baker & Berman, supra note
8, at 466.
42 Dole, 483 U.S. at 208.
43 Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 235-37 (1995).
44 See Dole, 483 U.S. at 211 (citing Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 590 (1937)). Although many commentators describe coercion as a "fifth" limitation, it is apparent from the early
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Other than the "clear statement rule" for spending conditions, none of
the constitutional limits peculiar to the Spending Clause has had any real
teeth since the end of the Lochner era. No modem court of appeals has
ever held that an expenditure did not advance the general welfare,45 or that
a state was coerced into accepting the conditions attached to a federal
grant.4 6 Only very rarely have courts found that a condition was not reasonably related to the spending it accompanied 47-unsurprisingly, since it
would seem that one could often argue that the purpose of the expenditure
is precisely to induce the state to accept whatever conditions might apply.48
Underneath the surface, though, some of the spending waters are
roiled. As Peter Smith has observed, one troubled area becomes visible
when we examine closely the basic rationale for the "clear statement
rule. 4 9 Many of the Court's early decisions applying its clear statement
rule for spending conditions-most prominently PennhurstState School &
Hospital v. Haldeman5°-suggest that the rule is a necessary by-product of
the fact that state agreements to accept federal funds with some strings
attached are "in the nature of a contract."'" Under this view, a state could
not knowingly have accepted the terms of the grant unless they were apparent on the face of Congress's enactment.52
By the beginning of the 1990s, however, it had begun to appear that the
Pennhurstrationale was obsolete. In a series of cases, the Court repeatedly
demanded a clear statement from Congress wherever the federal government sought to displace existing sources of state authority, regardless of
Spending Clause cases that the Court thought coercive conditions would violate the Tenth Amendment.
See United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 70-73 (1936).
45 See Kansas v. United States, 214 F.3d 1196, 1200 (10th Cir. 2000); Baker & Berman, supra
note 8, at 524.
46 West Virginia v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 289 F.3d 281, 289 (4th Cir. 2002);
Kansas v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 214 F.3d at 1201-02; Baker & Berman, supra note 8,
at 467-69.
47 Baker & Berman, supra note 8, at 466.
48 See Matthew D. Adler & Seth F. Kreimer, The New Etiquette of Federalism:New York, Printz,
and Yeskey, 1998 SuP. CT. REV. 71, 105.
The notable exception involves a federal criminal statute making it unlawful to bribe a person
who works in any part of a state or local government, where the relevant segment of that government
receives a minimal amount of federal funding. 18 U.S.C. § 666 (2000). Prior to a Supreme Court
decision upholding the law, many lower courts had held that there was at least a serious question
whether the very broad sweep of the criminal prohibition was reasonably necessary to protect the
integrity of the federal funds. See, e.g., Sabri v. United States, 124 S. Ct. 1941, 1945 (2004); Richard
W. Garnett, The New Federalism, the Spending Power, and Federal Criminal Law, 89 CORNELL L.
REV. 1, 10 (2003).
49 See Smith, supra note 11, at 1189-90.
50451 U.S. 1 (1981).
51 Id. at 17.
52 Id. The unmentioned assumption here, of course, was that Congress's conditions were not
binding on the state unless the state knowingly accepted them.

2004]

GETTING SPENDING

whether the federal source of law was the Spending Clause. 3 Although the
Court had invoked this rule a few times before, it had never done so in
terms so sweeping, or with so elaborate a justification, as in its 1991 opinion in Gregory v. Ashcroft.5 4 In that case, the Court upheld Missouri's
mandatory retirement age for certain state judges, notwithstanding the provisions in the federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA")
making such limits by "employers" illegal and explicitly including "states"
as covered employers.55 The Court explained that given the important constitutional function served by state governmental autonomy-a constellation of values it labeled collectively as "federalism"-Congress would
not
56
be permitted to act on or limit that autonomy unless it did so clearly.
In tying the clear statement rule to the importance of federalism, the
Court claimed that its clear statement rule was in fact a variation of its traditional rule of constitutional "avoidance. 5 7 Indeed, most commentators
58
have understood Gregory as a classic example of the avoidance canon:
the Court used statutory interpretation, rather than the Constitution itself, to
prop up or expand a rule of constitutional law it was unwilling to enforce
directly, simply by making it a bit harder for Congress to enact law in that
area. 59 But the Court rather subtly offered another, more specialized justification for the clear statement rule peculiar to the federalism context.
Quoting Professor Tribe's treatise on constitutional law, the Court remarked at the end of its paragraph on avoidance that "[t]o give the statedisplacing weight of federal law to mere congressional ambiguity would
evade the very procedure for lawmaking on which Garciarelied to protect
states' interests." 6 Tribe, in turn, explained that the Court had gotten out
of the business of enforcing most federalism-derived constitutional limits
on federal authority on the assumption that ordinary politics was sufficient
to safeguard state autonomy. 6' He argued that that assumption would
prove false if federal judges could use ambiguities in federal statutes to
further their own vision of the appropriate federal-state balance, insulated
by Article I from the political pressures that the states could otherwise
53E.g., Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 461 (1991); BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp.,
511 U.S.

531, 544 (1994).
54501 U.S. 452 (1991).
55 Id.
at 455-56.
56 Id. at 457-61.
57

Id. at 464.

58 See Coenen, supra note 24, at 1303-04; Eskridge & Frickey, Clear Statement Rules, supra note

24, at 624; Nickolai Levin, ConstitutionalStatutory Synthesis, 54 ALA. L. REV. 1281, 1362-63 (2003).
59Sunstein, supra note 16, at 468-69; Ernest A. Young, ConstitutionalAvoidance,
Resistance
Norms, and the Preservationof JudicialReview, 78 TEx. L. REV. 1549, 1603-06 (2000).
60Gregory, 501 U.S. at 464 (quoting TRIBE, supra note 23, § 6-25, at
480).
61 TRIBE, supra note 23, § 6-25, at 480.

CONNECTICUTLAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37:155

use to protect themselves from federal overreaching.62 Some lower courts
have recognized that this point is a distinct reason, above and beyond the
usual avoidance rationale, for applying the clear statement rule in federalism cases.63
I explore each of these three distinct explanations for the clear statement rule in much more detail in the ensuing Parts. For now, however, my
aim is simply to emphasize the ways in which the uncertainty surrounding
the rationale for the clear statement rule could produce different results in
otherwise identical cases. Professor Smith, for example, argues that the
answer to the question whether federal agencies, rather than Congress, can
provide the requisite clear statement depends on whether we think the clear
statement requirement comes from Pennhurst'sidea of notice or the Gregory notion of constitutional avoidance. 64 This tension came to the fore in
the Supreme Court's 1999 opinion holding that state defendants could be
liable for damages under Title IX for knowing indifference to student-onstudent sexual harassment. 65 The majority opinion, pointing to the contractual nature of Title IX, argued that federal regulations and court rulings
gave states ample warning that they would be liable for damages.6 6 The
dissenters, in contrast, argued that the unclear language of the statute had
made it too easy for Congress to impose that obligation, and had deprived
states of the opportunity to use their political influence against the Court's
rule.67 Yet neither side acknowledged that the other's position made a fair
bit of sense, given the premise for the clear statement rule it started with.68
62 See id. at 479-80; see also LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 6-28, at

1175-76 (3d ed. 2000) (arguing that, because the "congressional political processes" used in "protecting the sovereignty of the states" are absent in court, courts should be reluctant to rely on ambiguous
congressional language to displace state regulatory regimes).
63 See, e.g., Va. Dep't of Educ. v. Riley, 106 F.3d 559, 567 (4th Cir. 1997) (en banc) ("To give
the state-displacing weight of federal law to mere congressional ambiguity would evade the very procedure for lawmaking on which Garcia relied to protect states' interests.").
64See Smith, supra note 11, at 1189-90. As I explain a bit later, I largely agree with Professor
Smith's analysis of the Pennhurstrationale, see infra Part I1B, but I think his exploration of Gregoryis
incomjilete, see infra text accompanying notes 238-245.
5 Davis ex rel. LaShonda D. v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 632-33 (1999).
66Id. at 640-44, 647-48.
67 Id. at 654-55 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
68 Similarly, the Courts of Appeals are presently split on whether individuals can sue states for
damages under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. Compare Doe v. Nebraska, 345 F.3d 593, 601 (8th Cir.
2003); Garrett v. Univ. of Ala. at Birmingham Bd. of Trs., 344 F.3d 1288, 1292-93 (11 th Cir. 2003)
(per curiam); M.A. ex rel. E.S. v. State-Operated Sch. Dist. of City of Newark, 344 F.3d 335, 349-51
(3d Cir. 2003); Nieves-Marquez v. Puerto Rico, 353 F.3d 108, 129-30 (1st Cir. 2003); and Douglas v.
Cal. Dep't of Youth Auth., 285 F.3d 1226, 1226 (9th Cir. 2002); with Pace v. Bogalusa City Sch. Bd.,
325 F.3d 609, 615-18 (5th Cir.), vacated and reh 'g en banc granted,339 F.3d 348 (5th Cir. 2003), and
Garcia v. S.U.N.Y. Health Scis. Ctr., 280 F.3d 98, 113-15 (2d Cir. 2001). The center of the disagreement is whether states that accepted funds subject to the conditions of the Rehabilitation Act "knowingly" waived their sovereign immunity from suit, if at the time they accepted the funds they might
reasonably have believed that Congress already had the power to abrogate that immunity directly. E.g.,
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The uncertain rationale for the clear statement rule also leaves open
just how "clear" a statute must be in order to satisfy the rule. Based on
Gregory's reading of the ADEA, which in some senses was very stringent,
the popular view is that the clear statement rule demands exceptionally
clear language on the face of the statute. Gregory, by reading "employee"
not to include state judges, refused to apply a seemingly all-encompassing
term to include its more specific applications.6 9 But Gregory does not tell
us where the clear statement rule ranks relative to other principles of statutory interpretation-most importantly, canons that would import into the
statutory text terms that do not appear in the statute at all, but would be
obvious to any reader. Thus, for example, does the clear statement rule
prohibit judges from employing the traditional assumption that a term of
art imports its interpretive history into the statute? How about whether
states are bound by a condition that a court imposes because any contrary
reading would be absurd? If the clear statement rule is only about making
it more difficult for Congress to impose conditions on states, maybe not.
But if it rests instead on the need to provide a state with "notice" of what
will be required of it, there would seem to be every reason to assume that
the states know the obvious. Similarly, the Court suggested prior to Gregory that legislative history is relevant to whether a statute is clear enough to
meet the Pennhursttest.7" That makes perfect sense from a notice perspective, and is quite defensible in Tribe's political-process analysis, but is
harder to justify if we want to make the legislative process as difficult as
possible.
At present we do not know whether Pennhurst'sanalysis, based on the
knowing acceptance of contract terms, is still good law. Lower courts still
regularly invoke that explanation, 7' and the Supreme Court itself, after
something of a pause, has now quoted the contract rationale of Pennhurst
favorably several times since Gregory.72 Yet Gregory itself points to
Doe, 345 F.3d at 601. If the language of the Rehabilitation Act is clear, however, see Nieves-Marquez,
353 F.3d at 129 (observing that "the majority of circuits that have addressed the issue" have found the
statute "unambiguous"), this argument is entirely moot if the real basis for the clear statement rule in
spending legislation is not Pennhurst's idea of knowing acceptance but rather Gregory's twin theories
of political limitations.
69 Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 465-67 (1991).
70 See Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 204 n.26 (1982) ("The Act and its history impose
no requirements on the states like those imposed by the District Court and the Court of Appeals. A
fortiori Congress has not done so unambiguously, as required in the valid exercise of the spending
power.") (emphasis added); Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 19-21 (1981)
(looking to "the specific language and legislative history" of the statute to discern clear statement).
7 E.g., Garcia v. S.U.N.Y. Health Scis. Ctr., 280 F.3d 98, 113-15 (2d Cir. 2001); MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. Bell At. Pa., 271 F.3d 491,506 (3d Cir. 2001); Bell At. Md., Inc. v. MCI Worldcom,
Inc., 240 F.3d 279, 292 (4th Cir. 2001); Coleman v. Glynn, 983 F.2d 737, 737 (6th Cir. 1993) (Merritt,
J., concurring).
72 Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181, 186 (2002); United States v. Texas, 507 U.S. 529, 538 n.6
(1993); Franklin v. Gwinett County Public Schs., 503 U.S. 60, 74-75 (1992).
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Pennhurst as an authority for its own version of the clear statement rule.73
Does this mean that, when the Court quotes Pennhurst,it really means its
re-imagining of the clear statement rule in Gregory? Or, since the two
theories could conceivably overlap, perhaps it means to invoke both.
So that is where we stand now. In addition to the Court's own
explanations of its doctrine, a number of commentators have attempted to
justify or improve on the Court's Spending Clause jurisprudence with
theories of their own. The ensuing Parts engage the various rationales I
have already mentioned, as well as a few others of scholarly provenance.
Ultimately, I find that none of the justifications for the clear statement rule,
whether judicially-invented or otherwise, are persuasive.
II. THE PENNHURST RATIONALE

In this section I consider the original explanation for the clear statement rule, as set out by the Court in its opinion in PennhurstState School
& Hospital v. Haldeman.74 Noting that conditions attached to grants of
federal funds are "in the nature of a contract," the Court declared that any
such condition would have to be made clear in advance of the state's acceptance in order to validate the bargain. 75 Later writers have attempted to
make a stronger version of this claim, arguing that Spending Clause legislation is not actually "law," but is simply a contractual agreement between
the federal government and the states.76 In the first subsection I examine
both the strong and weak versions of the contract argument, both rather
skeptically. In the second subsection I argue that, even if we accept the
proposition that Spending Clause legislation is, or is "in the nature of," a
contract, we still would have no reason to impose a clear statement rule.
A. The ContractAnalogy
It is difficult to understand what work Pennhurst'scontract analogy is
supposed to do in changing the way we should interpret Spending Clause
legislation. Ordinary law, of course, does not have to be clear. Indeed, if
law were always clear, there would be little need for courts. But legislative
clarity is both impossible and highly undesirable.77 Even in a static world,
no legislature could anticipate all of the ways a single piece of legislation
will interact with other laws and policies, or the variety of factual circum73Gregory, 501 U.S. at 469.
74451 U.S. 1 (1981).
75Id.at 17.
76 See Garnett, supra note 48, at 63.
77See Julius Cohen, Legisprudence: Problems and Agenda, 11 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1163,
1171

(1983); Frickey & Smith, supra note 16, at 1742; Cynthia Farina, Statutory Interpretationand the
Balance of Power in the Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 452, 464 (1989).
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stances in which it will be applied.78 And the world turns. Experience may
show that what was thought a wise detail will prove to undermine the overall statutory scheme. A central function of judicial statutory interpretation
is to make these adjustments-fine-tuning the law, as it were. 79 Thus, a
statute that attempts to foresee and provide for every eventuality is actually
undesirable, because it would often have the effect of preventing later interpretation from accounting for flaws in the original vision.8"
The PennhurstCourt never explains why these basic principles should
be different in legislation that results from a bargain between states and the
federal government. That is unsurprising; nearly every statute could be
described as a bargain among various interests.8' Certainly there are
some-textualists, most prominently-who argue that courts have an obligation to preserve each such bargain in haec verba, in the exact words ultimately negotiated by the parties. As I discuss a bit more in the section
on contract interpretation, section I.B, the better view is probably that
most negotiators prefer recourse to a neutral arbitrator in order to resolve
unanticipated difficulties. In other words, flexibility is much to be preferred over near-literalism, both in contract and in legislation generally.
That argument seems especially forceful when the bargain affects not only
the bargainers but also third parties, either those who were not informed
and energized enough to participate in the original round of legislating, or
simply those who live under the law's effects in the future.8 3 In any event,
my main point for now is that under either view the fact that Spending
Clause legislation is "in the nature of a contract" adds little to the arguments for or against a clear statement rule.
Some writers after Pennhurst, though, have tried to make a stronger
claim: Spending Clause legislation is not merely like a contract; it is a contract. 84 Obviously, if that argument were right, it would make contract
78 See Eskridge & Frickey, Law as Equilibrium, supra note 17, at 62; Daniel J. Meltzer,
The Supreme Court's Judicial Passivity, 2002 SUP.CT. REV. 343, 380, 386-87; Kenneth A. Shepsle, Congress is a "They," Not an "It": Legislative Intent as Oxymoron, 12 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 239, 252

(1992); Smith, supra note 11, at 1208, 1212; Sunstein, supra note 17, at 544.
79GuIo CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 87 (1982);
T. Alexander Al-

einikoff, Updating Statutory Interpretation,87 MICH. L. REV. 20, 60 (1988); Eskridge & Frickey, Law
as Equilibrium, supra note 17, at 56-57; Meltzer, supra note 78, at 396.
80 See Mashaw, supra note 16, at 22; Sunstein, supra note 16, at 420-21. Of course, given infinite legislative energy, the error costs of incomplete or overly rigid statutes could be made fairly low,
as the legislature "fixed" problems as they arose. Unfortunately, legislative energy is far from infinite,
and after-the-fact fixes are small comfort to the parties affected by the initial error.
81 See McNollgast, Positive Canons: The Role ofLegislative Bargainsin Statutory Interpretation,
80 GEO. L.J. 705 (1992).

82 E.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533, 540-44 (1983).
83 See Bennett v. Ky. Dep't of Educ., 470 U.S. 656, 669 (1985); Mark L. Movsesian, Are Statutes

Really "Legislative Bargains"? The Failure of the Contract Analogy in Statutory Interpretation, 76
N.C.L. REV. 1145, 1166-67, 1171-73 (1998).

84 Engdahl, supra note 22, at 104; Garnett, supra note 48, at 63.

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37:155

principles important to our understanding of the Spending Clause. The
basic rationale is that in many cases, Congress uses the Spending Clause to
secure agreement from the states to do what Congress could not directly
mandate under any other constitutional provision.85 That premise has become more plausible recently as the scope of the Commerce Clause power
has dwindled slightly.8 6 The claim then is that the Constitution authorizes
Congress to spend, but not to spend for a particular purpose.87 While Congress may well select its own purposes, these goals are, according to one
commentator, "extraneous ends"-they may well be desired by Congress,
but are not themselves part of the spending power.88 Like a jury's power to
nullify, in this view, extraneous ends are a simply structural consequence
of power. Therefore, while the appropriation itself is "law," any goals or
conditions of the expenditure are said to be binding only to the extent that
the recipient agrees to them. 89 Nor, the argument goes, does the Necessary
and Proper Clause make Congress's spending goals part of its enumerated
powers, because the focus of what is "necessary" must be the expenditure
itself, not the purpose for which it is spent.'
As I mentioned, all of these arguments ultimately depend on the claim
that the purposes for Congress's spending are not themselves enumerated.
That claim, though, is based on a strained reading of the Constitution's
text, which expressly provides that Congress may spend "for the general
welfare." 9' If we take this language at face value, any aim of Spending
Clause legislation is itself an enumerated power, so long as it advances
"the general welfare."'92 This would make conditions related to that purpose necessary and proper, and therefore, under the logic of the contract
argument, would create "law" that was binding and "supreme" irrespective
of its status as contract. 93
85 Engdahl, supra note 22, at 34.
86 Garnett, supra note 48, at 13.
87 See Engdahl, supra note 22, at 49-53.
881d. at 16-17.
89
d.at 22, 64-65, 70-71.
9°Id.at 18, 20, 73, 93.
91See Chemerinsky, supra note 30, at 93; McCoy & Friedman, supra note 9, at 102 ("[B]y its
terms the spending power is 'broader' than the delegated regulatory powers.").
92 Engdahl, supra note 22, at 42; Michael W. McConnell, Federalism:Evaluating the Founders'
Design, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1484, 1497 (1987). But see McCoy & Friedman, supra note 9, at 87 n.l 1
(asserting that imposition of condition on spending to further congressional purpose is not within Congress's enumerated powers).
93See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 90 (1976); Engdahl, supra note 22, at 50. Although Professor Engdahl concedes the logic of this syllogism, he claims that its textual premise is weak, primarily
because he believes that the text allows only tax revenues, rather than federal funds as a whole, to be
spent for the general welfare. See id. at 51-52. That argument hardly helps Engdahl's position,
though, since if the power to spend for the general welfare is enumerated, then Congress can use any
means that it finds necessary and proper to facilitate that spending. One obvious tool for increasing the
usefulness of a revenue stream is borrowing against it.
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The Spending-Clause-as-contract proponent avoids this result by arguing that such a broad reading of the Spending Clause is absurd.94 "The
general welfare" sweeps so broadly that it imposes no meaningful limits on
the ends towards which Congress can spend (except, perhaps, grants to
particular individuals or entities), and therefore no real limit on what Congress can regulate. 95 If that is true, this argument goes, then why on earth
would Congress have gone to all the trouble of enumerating other powers,
and (in the Bill of Rights) reminding the republic that any power not enumerated was reserved to the states? 96 Therefore, the proponent says, we
should select a different meaning, albeit one that is somewhat in tension
with the plain language of the Spending Clause.
The difficulty with this argument is that there are major limitations on
Congress's ability to use the Spending Clause to effect its policy goals: the
voters' wallets. The founders understood that the powers both to tax and
spend would be subject to serious political limitations.97 Thus, so long as
federal priorities had to be purchased, the federal government's license to
displace state ordering was subject to the willingness of voters to pay for
nationalization.9" Moreover, this check is more likely to be exercised than
most other forms of political constraint on accumulations of federal power.
The founders understood interest-group politics well.99 Legislation under,
for example, the Commerce Clause, diminishing state control in some relatively ineffable way, which harms (in an opaque manner) a widelyscattered group, but benefits directly and obviously some discrete group, is
quite likely to win passage.'r ° Higher tax bills, in contrast, are not difficult
94 See Baker & Berman, supra note 8, at 485; Eastman, supra note 12, at 66 n.13; Engdahl,
supra

note 22, at 43; Garnett, supra note 48, at 81-82; McCoy & Friedman, supra note 9, at 115-16, 123;
Bradley A. Smith, Hamilton at Wits End: The Lost Discipline of the Spending Clause vs. the False
Disciplineof CampaignFinanceReform, 4 CHAP. L. REV. 117, 123 (2001).
% Engdahl, supra note 22, at 43; Garnett, supra note 48, at 83-84; McCoy & Friedman, supra
note 9, at 115-17.
96 See Garnett, supra note 48, at 83-84; Smith, supra note 93, at 123.
97 Maltz, supra note 31, at 114-16.
98 D. Bruce La Pierre, PoliticalAccountability in the National PoliticalProcess-TheAlternative
to JudicialReview of FederalismIssues, 80 Nw. U. L. REV. 577, 644-45 (1985).
99 See Elizabeth Garrett, Harnessing Politics: The Dynamics of Offset Requirements in the Tax
Legislative Process, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 501, 505 (1998) (observing that James Madison anticipated
that factionalism would attend "the apportionment of taxes"); Jonathan R. Macey, Chief Justice
Rehnquist, Interest Group Theory, and the Founders' Design, 25 RUTGERs L.J. 577, 577, 581-85
(1994) ('The Framers' most important innovation was a realistic appreciation of Homo economicus,
economic man."); Smith, supra note 94, at 129-31 (noting the Framers' collective belief that "civic
virtue alone was insufficient to assure the public good against the power of special interests"); John C.
Yoo, The Judicial Safeguards of Federalism, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 1311, 1398 (1997) ("The Framers
clearly anticipated the possibility that organized factions would seek to use the legislative process to the
detriment of the public good.").
100George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation; 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. ScI. 3
(1971), reprinted in ADMINISTRATIVE LAw ANTHOLoGY 399, 402 (Thomas 0. Sargentich ed., 1994).
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for the suffering majority to detect,'' and, while there are free-rider effects,
these diminish as the tax bill increases. 02 Rich taxpayers are the quintessential disproportionately powerful minority "faction."'0 3 It therefore is
very difficult to enact a tax increase.
It might be objected that the federal government's ability to borrow
undermines the extent to which tax burdens have a limiting effect on the
Spending Clause. But the members of the Constitutional Convention were
only too aware of the painful burden of governmental debt, both for the
states and the Continental Congress.' 04 It is unlikely they would have
thought of federal borrowing as less, rather than more, politically damaging
than higher taxes.
Thus, as a matter of structural logic, the natural reading of the Spending Clause is entirely consistent with the founders' constitutional scheme.
The taxing and spending powers were very broad but very difficult to use.
Other enumerated powers were easier to employ, but limited in scope.
There was nothing inconsistent about having both systems in place. Put
another way, the need politically to justify federal taxation is perhaps the
most significant safeguard of federalism.
To sum up, it is unclear why contract theory should play any role in the
interpretation of Spending Clause legislation. The argument that congressional expenditures have no source of authority other than the fact of mutual agreement between parties is based on an improbable reading of the
constitutional text, and relies on unfounded structural inferences about the
design of the Constitution. Nor is the analogy to contract especially forceful, given that one could draw the same comparison with virtually any
piece of lawmaking.
B. Contract Theory
Even if one, for whatever reason, were determined to apply contract
law to Spending Clause legislation,' 0 5 the result would still not be a clear
101 See R. DOUGLAS ARNOLD, THE LOGIC OF CONGRESSIONAL ACTION 194 (1990).
102 See MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY

OF GROUPS 21, 35 (1971); Stigler, supra note 100, at 402.
103 See Garrett, supra note 99, at 518-19; Stigler, supra note 100, at 402-03.

104 See James E. Pfander, History and State Suability: An "'Explanatory"Account of the Eleventh
Amendment, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1269, 1281-1313 (1998).
105 For example, a court might elect to begin interpretation of an ambiguous provision of a piece
of Spending Clause legislation with contract principles, on the assumption that those rules represent a
useful and tried set of assumptions about the ways that bargaining partners would want to govern their
relations with one another. Unlike the Pennhurst rule, however, that assumption would be defeasible
by Congress. See Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 287 (1998); Henrietta D. v.
Bloomberg, 331 F.3d 261, 285-86 (2d Cir. 2003). The Court's interpretation of liability under Title IX,
which prohibits spending recipients from discriminating based on gender, appears to be based on a
similar assumption about congressional intent. See Franklin v. Gwinett County Pub. Schs., 503 U.S.
60, 74-75 (1992).
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statement of a rule. Black letter contract law recognizes a wide variety of
vague terms, such as "best efforts" or "good faith," that must be interpreted
by a court in light of specific circumstances. 1° What is more, contract law
routinely recognizes as binding terms that are either objectively or subjectively unclear in context, such as a commitment to deliver "chickens" when
the parties have not specified egg-laying hens or "roasters."'' 7 And in
some cases, courts hold parties to terms that do not appear in the contract at
all. 108
All three doctrines are based on pragmatic assumptions about the nature of deal-making. Contract law embraces the use of "good faith"
clauses and other vague terms because the costs of precision are too
high."° For both sides to sit down and think about the precise behavior for
which they want to bargain, and to craft proposed language embodying that
standard, would add considerable time and planning (not to mention
lawyering) costs to every deal." 0 More time would be spent in reaching
agreement between the two sides about every contingency each envisions.
And some deals would never happen if the sides had to reach complete
agreement on each point. Unwritten, "off-the-rack" default rules added
later by courts can save parties the effort of elaborating their own."'
In addition, complete precision is very difficult to achieve even in the
simplest exchanges." 2 Even if we assume that negotiating contract terms
ex ante is costless, it obviously is impossible for parties to foresee all of the
circumstances that might affect the contractual relationship in the future.
Markets shift, opera singers get the flu, and nations rise and fall." 3 If the
106 JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 158 (4th
ed. 1998); 2 E.

ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 7.8, at 243 & n.25 (1990).

107 Eric Posner, Economic Analysis of Contract Law After Three Decades: Success or Failure?,

112 YALE L.J. 829, 839 (2002).
108See ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, 6 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 562, at 10-14, § 564, at 16-20 (interim ed. 2002).
109See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory
of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 92 (1989); Posner, supra note 107, at 833.
110 See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 109, at 92-93; Posner, supra note 107, at 833; Shepsle, supra note 78, at 251.
III See Easterbrook, supra note 82, at 540.
112See Gillian K. Hadfield, Weighing the Value of Vagueness: An Economic Perspectiveon Precision in the Law, 82 CAL. L. REV. 541, 547-48 (1994); Posner, supra note 107, at 833 (noting that
transaction costs and parties' inability to foresee low probability events make all contracts incomplete).
113 See generally Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Limits of Expanded Choice: An Analysis of the Interactions Between Express and Implied Contract Terms, 73 CAL. L. REV. 261, 265-66
(1985) (discussing various types of contracting errors that can arise due to occurrence of different
contingencies). Some contract theorists have suggested that very sophisticated negotiators might be
able to cope somewhat with the perils of uncertainty by designing contracts to stipulate not precise
outcomes, but rather carefully calibrated methods of dispute resolution. See, e.g., Sanford J. Grossman
& Oliver D. Hart, The Costs and Benefits of Ownership:A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration,
94 J. POL. ECON. 691, 716 (1986). So far, though, real-world contract writers have not implemented
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deal is to go forward, the parties must either be prepared to re-negotiate, or
the court to figure out how best to enforce the remaining obligations. In
many cases, the court's intervention is more efficient than re-negotiation, at
least from the perspective of the parties, because of both general transaction costs and the opportunity for strategic behavior by either side."l4
In short, contract law accepts both implied and uncertain language because deals have value."' It is often better to have incomplete agreement,
in which both sides get at least some of what they want, than to throw away
the deal altogether." 6 A duty to bargain for a contract extension in "good
faith" may not describe exactly what the parties must do when the present
contract runs out, but it at least establishes that a duty of some kind does
exist. A similar rationale in part underlies the use of "implied" terms to
bind both parties." 7
Contract law therefore flatly contradicts the Pennhurst rationale for the
clear statement rule. Incomplete contracts-contracts that do not clearly
instruct the court how they should be applied in all circumstances-are
both inevitable and often deliberately drafted by contracting parties. Indeed, because incomplete deals are often more efficient, contract law facilitates them." 8 At the same time, contract law manages incompleteness, by
curtailing transaction costs and ensuring that ambiguities and oversights
will not be used as an opportunity for strategic behavior or risk-shifting.' 9
If contract law teaches us any lessons, it is that businessmen have concluded that the better balance is to embrace ambiguity, fortified with some
less restrictive rules that channel, but do not eliminate, the uses of uncer-

the predictions of this so-called "incomplete contract" theory, suggesting that in fact such draftsmanship is beyond the skill of actual practitioners (especially in a world where negotiation costs are not
zero).
114 See RIcHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 82 (3d ed. 1986);
Alan Schwartz &

Robert E. Scott, ContractTheory and the Limits of Contract Law, 113 YALE L.J. 541, 559-65 (2003).
115See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 109, at 95-96.
116 See CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 106, at 158-59 (describing conventional court justifications for implied terms); Schwartz & Scott, supra note 114, at 573-77 (arguing that average firm is
indifferent to variances in interpretation). Schwartz and Scott, it should be noted, use this premise to
reach an opposite conclusion from mine; they claim that courts in most cases should use a formalist
default rule for interpreting contracts. Id. at 577. They argue that, since it is costly to litigate context
and purpose, and firms are relatively indifferent to the gains they might realize from the additional
precision in capturing their intent that would result, it is more efficient in most cases just to stick with
the plain text. Id. at 576-77. 1 find their judgment about the relative preferences of firms for litigation
cost-cutting over added precision dubious, especially in light of what the market shows us about demand for the services of contract litigators. Admittedly, however, that is evidence of ex post rather
than ex ante preferences.
117See FARNSWORTH, supra note 106, § 7.15, at 298-309; Goetz & Scott, supra note 113, at 270.
118 See Shepsle, supra note 78, at 251.
119 See FARNSWORTH, supra note 106, § 7.16, at 307; George W. Dent, Jr., Gap Fillers and Fidu-

ciary Duties in Strategic Alliances, 57 Bus. LAW. 55, 68-70 (2001).
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tainty. 120
There are, however, some critics of the predominant approach to contract who urge a more formalist methodology.' 12 These critics assert that
courts generally do a bad job interpreting contracts, especially when measured in terms of economic efficiency. 22 They maintain, therefore, that
courts should in essence apply a clear statement rule to all or most contracts, refusing to invoke default rules, and limiting their search for con23
tractual meaning to the text and structure of the contract document itself.
The critics freely admit that many productive deals would be lost as a re"
sult. 24
' They seem to suggest, though, that the possibility of this penalty
would induce parties to draft more complete contracts
in the future, so that
25
overall there would be a net gain in efficiency.
There are two fairly glaring problems with these arguments. First, if
some incomplete contracts are caused by the limited capacity of the drafters, there is not much point in trying to incentivize them to do a better
job. 126 Relatedly, the claim that the benefits of more complete drafting will
exceed the costs of the penalties is essentially empirical. 27 If courts are
bad at measuring efficiency, how are they supposed to predict whether the
gains of the formalist strategy will outweigh the losses? 28 And how can
the critics make that judgment, without knowing how many contracts are
incomplete by choice, how much effort is saved by that choice, and to what
extent society economizes on ex post litigation cost by forcing the additional ex ante negotiation? This is not to say (for now) that formalist interpretation of statutes is necessarily wrong, only that the contract analogy
seems to, if anything, weigh against such tools of formalism as the clear
120 See Dent, supra note 119, at 78; McNollgast, supra note 81, at 705.
121 See SAMUEL WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CoNTRACrs § 31:6, at 314-15 (Rich-

ard A. Lord ed., 4th ed. 1999); Robert E. Scott, The Rise and Fall of Article 2, 62 LA. L. REV. 1009,
1021 & n.35 (2002).
122 See Scott, supra note 121, at 1021-22.
123 See WILLISTON, supra note 120, § 31:6, at 313-14; Robert E. Scott, The Casefor Formalism
in Relational Contract, 94 Nw. U. L. REV. 847, 859-60 (2000).
124 Id. at 860.

125 See Posner, supra note 107, at 839-40; Scott, supra note 123, at 860; see also Ayres & Gertner, supra note 109, at 93.
126 See Posner, supra note 107, at 877; see also Aleinikoff, supra note 79, at 25 (making a similar
critique of formalism in the statutory context); Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Interpretation
and Institutions, 101 MICH. L. REV. 885, 918, 922 (2003) (same).
127 See Scott, supra note 123, at 848 (conceding this point).
128 See Mashaw, supra note 16, at 23-25; cf. Hadfield, supra note 112, at 545 (observing that
vague standards may be better response to limited judicial capacity to identify "correct" rule). For a
similar discussion in the statutory context, see Cass R. Sunstein, Foreword: Leaving Things Undecided,
110 HARV. L. REV. 4,27 (1996) and Adrian Vermeule, Interpretive Choice, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 74, 7577 (2000).
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29
statement rule. 1

Therefore, far from mandating a clear statement rule, contract law and
theory suggests that Spending Clause legislation should have the flexibility
to preserve and adapt bargains in the face of time and human failings. Indeed, in one of its most recent Spending Clause opinions, the Supreme
30
Court seems to acknowledge the inadequacy of contract as a rationale.
The Court, in holding that punitive damages are not available in private
lawsuits brought to enforce obligations arising under Spending Clause statutes, begins with the familiar invocation of contract theory.' 3' But a peculiar thing happens nearly at the end of the contract analysis: The Court admits that ambiguous terms in contracts can be interpreted to reflect "fairness."' 132 Thus, although buried beneath a lengthy-and, apparently, superfluous-walk through the use of punitive damages in contract actions, the
Court's ultimate rationale is actually its own sense of fairness and good
government. I follow that lead in the ensuing sections by examining other
possible rationales for the clear statement rule.
III. TAKE NOTICE ... PLEASE!

The need to provide states with "notice" as another rationale for the
clear statement rule runs alongside the contract explanation, sometimes
serving to provide the real reason for decision in what are nominally contract-rationale cases. In this section I try to make what sense I can out of
the notice argument. As the reader may gather, I think "notice" has little or
no independent meaning outside some more substantive explanation for
why a state should have more notice than any other constitutional actor.'33
129

See Einer Elhauge, Preference-EstitnatingStatutory Default Rules, 102 COLUM. L. REV.

2027, 2049-50 (2002); Sunstein, supra note 17, at 556-57.
130 See Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181, 186-189 (2002).
131 Id. at 187.

132 Id. at 188. It is also worth noting that the Court's analysis was based not on constitutionallyrequired limitations on the spending power, but rather on its presumptions about what Congress intended by the term "appropriate relief." Id. at 187, 188 n.2. Thus it remains open after Gorman
whether Congress can make state recipients liable for punitive damages if it speaks more clearly on that
point. More vexing is the question, of tremendous interest to many litigants (but well beyond the scope
of this Article), whether courts may now presume that a general grant of remedial power includes the
ability to impose punitive damages. The Court itself had thought it had such an ability for thirty years
or more. See Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 36 n.5 (1983); Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 47-48 (1981)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (assuming that a Bivens remedy includes punitive damages, but stating that
the imposition of such damages needs to be considered on the basis of factors, such as the character of
the wrong and the amount necessary to "punish" the defendant); Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. Faust,
442 U.S. 42, 47-52; id. at 53 (Blackmun, J.,concurring in result); Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 397 (1971); Donahue v. Staunton, 471 F.2d 475,
483 (7th Cir. 1972) (citing Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 628 (1946)). However, the majority in Gorman
makes no mention of these cases in asserting that it can presume the contrary.
133 1 examine the most likely candidates for that substance in the next two sections. See infra
Parts IV and V.
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Even if we take as a given the claim that the extraordinary degree of notice
offered by the clear statement rule is necessary, I argue here that the clear
statement rule is redundant, given the states' ability to alter the effect of
ambiguous statutory language through administrative lobbying.
A. Notice as a Requirement of Contract

For most courts the core of the notice rationale seems to be to ensure
fair bargains.'34 Since Spending Clause legislation resembles a contract,
courts have suggested that a state should not be obliged to make a deal
when all of the federal government's cards are not face up.' 35 Similarly,
since conditional spending sometimes obliges states to give up a portion of
their constitutional rights-such as their sovereign immunity from suitmany courts have claimed that the clear statement rule can be justified by
who must waive
analogy to the rule of waiver that applies to individuals
136
rights, as with the defendant who pleads guilty.
Like most too-easy analogies, these arguments simply beg the question. As we have already seen, the parties to a contract routinely and intentionally make deals in the face of uncertainty. Leaving the terms of a deal
incomplete can benefit both sides. Even criminal defendants ordinarily,
and constitutionally, plead guilty in order to effectuate deals based on only
a sliver of information about their alternatives. 37 Nor is it obvious that the
clear statement rule in fact provides states with more information about the
burdens of agreement; by definition one cannot plan for the unexpected.
What, then, is special about the states? Is there some reason for why we
should be especially reluctant to presume that a state would be harmed by
unclear clauses, or that a state should not be entitled to accede to them? If
134 See Pace v. Bogalusa City Sch. Bd., 325 F.3d 609, 615-17 (5th Cir.), vacated and reh'g en
banc granted, 339 F.3d 348 (2003); Douglas v. Cal. Dep't of Youth Auth., 285 F.3d 1226, 1228 (9th
Cir. 2002) (O'Scannlain, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc); Garcia v. S.U.N.Y. Health
Scis. Ctr., 280 F.3d 98, 113-15 (2d Cir. 2001); MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. Bell Atl.-Pa., 271 F.3d 491,
506 (3d Cir. 2001); Bell Atl. Md., Inc. v. MCI Worldcom, Inc., 240 F.3d 279, 292 (4th Cir. 2001);
Coleman v. Glynn, 983 F.2d 737, 737 (6th Cir. 1993) (Merritt, J., concurring); Lieberman v. Univ. of
Chicago, 660 F.2d 1185, 1187 (7th Cir. 1981).
135 See United States v. Texas, 507 U.S. 529, 538 n.6 (1993); Cedar Rapids Cmty. Sch. Dist. v.
Garrett F., 526 U.S. 66, 83-84 (1999) (Thomas, J., dissenting); Pace, 325 F.3d at 616-17; Lieberman,
660 F.2d at 1187; see also David Freeman Engstrom, Drawing Lines Between Chevron and Pennhurst:
A Functional Analysis of the Spending Power, Federalism, and the Administrative State, 82 TEX. L.
REV. 1197, 1227 (2004); Garnett, supra note 48, at 28-29 & n.140; McConville, supra note 12, at 183.
136See Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666,
682
(1999); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 673 (1974); Doe v. Nebraska, 345 F.3d 593, 601-02, 604
(8th Cir. 2003); Eskidge & Frickey, Clear Statement Rules, supra note 24, at 619-20.
137 See McMann v. United States, 397 U.S. 759, 769-70 (1970) ("Waiving trial entails the inherent risk that the good-faith evaluations of a reasonably competent attorney will turn out to be mistaken
either as to the facts or as to what a court's judgment might be on given facts."); Brady v. United States,
397 U.S. 742, 756-57 (1970); John G. Douglass, FatalAttraction? The Uneasy Courtshipof Brady and
Plea Bargaining,50 EMORY L.J. 437, 447-52 (2001).
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so, the notice rationale by itself does not supply one. Furthermore, without
better theoretical grounding we cannot know whose notice, whose consent,
is relevant-the state legislature, the voters, or perhaps the state officials
who will have to comply with the new mandate.
Consider also the problem of the appropriate level of abstraction. That
is, the idea of "notice," standing by itself, does little to resolve how detailed the notice given by a particular statute must be. Several courts have
made similar observations about Spending Clause legislation containing
explicit, open-ended authorization for judicial lawmaking, such as the provisions of the Rehabilitation Act directing courts to pattern remedies after
the judge-made (and judicially evolving) remedies of Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964. 138 A state that takes money from the federal government knows that it takes the risk that the common law Rehabilitation Act
remedies will be construed by a court in a way that imposes new costs on
the state. 39 These cases, although sensible, fail to explain why the same is
not true of all legislation. States surely know that (absent the clear statement rule) courts have power to interpret the terms of a statute."4 Why is
not acceptance of an unclear term, subject to that understanding, a "knowing" acceptance of the result?
A recent Rehabilitation Act case in the Second Circuit suggested
obliquely that this logic might produce different results in suits for damages or other retroactive relief. 4' Although the court explained that the
unwritten remedies of the Rehabilitation Act could satisfy the clear statement rule, it cautioned that there are independent limits that would apply in
claims for damages. 4 This may represent an analogy to the law of qualified immunity, which similarly makes individual defendants liable in damages only for obvious or clear violations of the law, and which defines clarity at a rather low level of abstraction. 43 The point, obviously, is to prevent the threat of damages from over-deterring the state officer in carrying
out his duties, and to create space for state officers to exercise independent
judgment in interpreting the law.'" In contrast, it is often the case that a
private actor must avoid "sailing too close to the wind" in interpreting the
meaning of a criminal provision (notwithstanding the occasional resort to
lenity). 45 Perhaps the clear statement rule, if it applied only to some kinds
of retroactive relief, could be justified by a choice to invest those who must
138 See Henrietta D. v. Bloomberg, 331 F.3d 261, 285 (2d Cir. 2003).
139 See id.; see also Smith, supra note i1, at 1216; cf Posner, supra note 107, at 845 ("[Rlational
parties always know that something could happen that makes performance more or less costly.").
140 See Meltzer, supra note 78, at 390-91; Shepsle, supra note 78, at 252.
141 See Henrietta D., 331 F.3d at 285-86 &
n.16.
142 Id.
143 See Smith, supra note 1I, at 1220-21.
144 See Hadfield, supra note 112, at 549.
145 See id. at 544.
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comply with Spending Clause legislation (who are usually, but not always,
states) a similar flexibility to read the requirements of the statute aggressively.
These possibilities again push us back against the need for theory that
the idea of "notice" itself cannot supply. Perhaps it seems intuitive, in our
federalism-saturated legal culture, to assume that we of course would
choose the meaning of "notice" that offers state recipients maximum flexibility. But considering the rigidity and heightened bargaining costs of the
clear statement rule, it might be wiser to ask first whether the rule is even
needed to obtain that flexibility. For instance, public choice theory and
some limited empirical data suggest that the states are not actually deterred
by the threat of damages. 46 Even if that is wrong, the states might also be
able to obtain largely the same benefits that the clear statement rule is supposed to provide through other mechanisms that impose lower overall costs
on the lawmaking system.
B. Notice as Deliberation
To be fair, there is at least one significant value of notice that likely
holds no matter what our other justifications. As I mentioned, uncertainty
in language can be a way for parties to avoid the need to reach agreement
on the unsettled terms. Conversely, a condition that appears clearly in the
text of an offer of funds is more likely to have been the subject of discussion and debate, not only among the state decision makers who weigh the
offer but also the Congress that crafts it, and ultimately between the two
bodies. 147 In other words, the notice argument may be a way of describing
the familiar point that clear statement rules can be "republican-forcing" (or
at least encouraging); they foster conversation
and consideration in public
48
bodies prior to the court's interpretation.
In this respect, though, the notice (now the republicanism) rationale
simply re-enacts the debate between textualists and other theorists of statutory interpretation.'49 Many textualists justify their views by pointing to
the way that limiting the scope of judicial interpretation to the plain semantic meaning of a text helps guarantee that the terms the court can enforce
146

See Daryl J. Levinson, Making Government Pay: Markets, Politics, and the Allocation of

ConstitutionalCosts, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 345, 373-74, 378-80 (2000) (arguing that the effect of liability for individual officer torts on the state's behavior is "simply indeterminate").
147See Smith, supra note 11, at 1202; Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U.
CHI. L.
REV. 315, 317, 335 (2000).
148 See Coenen, supra note 24, at 1298-99; Eskridge & Frickey, Clear Statement
Rules, supra
note 24, at 631; Jackson, supra note 24, at 2234; Sunstein, supra note 147, at 317.
149 See Brian D. Galle, Can FederalAgencies Authorize Private Suits Under Section 1983? A

TheoreticalApproach, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 163, 191 (2003) [hereinafter Galle, FederalAgencies].
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are only those that were reached through actual agreement. 50 One common criticism of textualist methods seems especially trenchant in this context. A number of commentators (including this one) have observed that a
decision-making body, and Congress in particular, may reach agreement at
different levels of generality. 5' Thus, the "gap" in a statute that to a textualist is a failure of agreement to another interpreter may be evidence of
Congress's shared intention to delegate that policy decision to another
body. 5 2 We could similarly say that Congress and the states have agreed
that incomplete Spending Clause legislation will be filled out by an interpreting court.
The notice/republicanism rationale proponent now has a dilemma. The
textualist, in an ordinary interpretive debate, has a standard counter at this
point. The textualist says, "Aha! But the agreement I am talking about is
non-delegable. Courts are not legitimate policy-makers in our federal constitutional system; therefore, all agreements must be formed at a very low
level of generality, by legitimate (i.e., elected, or diverse and deliberative)
policy-makers. 153 But a judicial interpretation of the terms of an unclear
condition on federal dollars is a decision about federalism. In taking the
textualist's line, the notice-as-deliberation proponent is, in effect, asserting
that judges should not be in the business of defining and defending federalism. That, I suspect, is a problem for some of the clear statement rule's
expositors and defenders, many of whom have not been shy54 in asserting the
judiciary's federalism-preserving prerogatives and duties.
It thus turns out, in a bit of an 0. Henry twist, that we should expect
that the strongest proponents of the deliberation rationale for the clear
statement rule will be opponents of judicially-enforced federalism. And in
fact, these opponents appear overwhelmingly to support the clear statement
rule. 5 5 As I explain in more detail in Part IV, opponents of judicial review
150 See JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT 105-18 (1999); John F. Manning, Legal

Realism and the Canons' Revival, 5 GREEN BAG 2D 283, 290-92 (2002). Or, if not actual agreement,
then at least the decision by some not to read or object to the clear provisions of the statute.
151See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Spinning Legislative Supremacy, 78 GEO. L.J. 319, 333-43
(1989); Daniel A. Farber, Statutory Interpretationand Legislative Supremacy, 78 GEO. L.J. 281, 28492 (1989); Galle, FederalAgencies, supra note 149, at 179-80, 184; Meltzer, supra note 78, at 386-87.
152Eskridge, supra note 151, at 323-24.
153See, e.g., Bank One Chicago v. Midwest Bank & Trust Co., 516 U.S. 264, 279 (1996) (Scalia,

J., concurring); Easterbrook, supra note 82, at 539; John F. Manning, Deriving Rules of Statutory
Interpretationfrom the Constitution, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1648, 1649-51 (2001).
154See supra note 22 and accompanying text. I assume here that my hypothetical clear statement

rule proponent is not actually a textualist, in which case she has an independent reason for believing
that judicial authority is suspect. But the clear statement rule in its deliberation form is largely redundant for the textualist in any event, except to the extent that it may change the weight of some otherwise
permissible contextual considerations. For example, the deliberation rationale might limit references to
the views of administrative agencies.
155See Adler, supra note 3, at 1205; Denis Binder, The Spending Clause as a Positive Source of
Environmental Protection:A Primer, 4 CHAP. L. REV. 147, 151 (2001); Eskridge & Frickey, Clear

20041

GETTING SPENDING

in this context maintain that the states exert enough influence over Congress and the Executive to preserve federalism values. Some of these "political process" proponents assert that statutory clarity increases the likelihood that Congress itself has considered carefully the effects its actions
will have on the states. 56 But that is simply a tautology; it offers no explanation for why deliberation cannot be delegated. Other commentators have
linked more explicitly the states' reliance on political safeguards to the
clear statement rule, arguing that the clear statement rule helps to ensure
that the states have an opportunity to use their political power against any
of the burdens of federal legislation.'57 Deliberation, these commentators
claim, must be in a branch of the federal government that is1 open
to state
58
influence; otherwise, the political safeguards cannot function.
This argument fails to recognize that an incomplete agreement is itself
the end result of a deliberate deal. 5 9 The fact that a statute is unclear, and
Statement Rules, supra note 24, at 597; Frickey & Smith, supra note 16, at 1747; Jackson, supra note
24, at 2240; Moulton, supra note 24, at 911. But see William P. Marshall, The Eleventh Amendment,
Process Federalism and the Clear Statement Rule, 39 DEPAUL L. REV. 345, 353-54 (1990) (arguing
that Congress does not need to be forced to consider federalism).
156 See, e.g., Adler, supra note 3, at 1205; Jackson, supra note 24, at 2240; Moulton, supra note
24, at 911. This theory probably has its roots in Professor Bickel's suggestion that the Court traditionally had read, and should continue to read, congressional delegations very narrowly when the delegate
exercised its power in a way that came close to unconstitutionality. See ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE
LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 156-169 (1962).

He

claimed that this helped guarantee that Congress, as the most representative branch, would be held
accountable for outcomes that were arguably unconstitutional. Id. That claim is only relevant for my
argument to the extent we believe conditional spending in general threatens constitutionally-protected
federalism values, a possibility I reject in Part IV.
157 See, e.g., TRIBE, supra note 23, § 6-25, at 480; Frickey & Smith, supranote 16, at 1747;
Jackson, supra note 24, at 2240; William P. Marshall & Jason S. Cowart, State Immunity, PoliticalAccountability, and Alden v. Maine, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1069, 1078-79 (2000); Smith, supra note
11, at 1203-04; Sunstein, supra note 147, at 339; Young, supra note 22, at 1359. 1cannot explain why
Professor Marshall seems to have changed his mind on this point. See supra note 154 and accompanying text.
158 See TRIBE, supra note 23, § 6-25, at 480; Adler, supra note 3, at 1205; Marshall & Cowart,
supra note 157, at 1078-79; Sunstein, supra note 147, at 339; cf. Meltzer, supra note 78, at 381 (arguing that leaving lawmaking power with courts diminishes states' power, because federal judges are less
susceptible to state influence than is Congress). Professor Young makes a similar argument, although
he is also in favor of other forms of judicial enforcement of federalism, as well. See Young, supra note
22, at 1359, 1354-55.
159See Elhauge, supra note 129, at 2091; Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory
Interpretationand the
Balance of Power in the Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 452,468-69 (1989); Harold J. Krent,
Delegationand Its Discontents, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 710, 718 (1994) (reviewing DAVID SCHOENBROD,
POWER WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY (1993)). Professor Easterbrook, too, makes this point. See Easterbrook, supra note 81, at 540, 546-47. However, he claims (contrary, I think, to what we know about
deals) that courts should not enforce most implicit or unclear terms. Id. at 537; see also Aleinikoff,
supra note 79, at 56-57 (explaining that "[b]y leaving issues for subsequent interpreters, the legislature
has necessarily recognized that it needs help making the statute work in unprovided-for cases," but
asserting that groups that have bargained for statutory results may be interested in "maintaining their
gains irrespective of changes elsewhere in the legal system"). Again, I am not aware of any convincing
research demonstrating that parties believe subsequent interpretation is more likely to upset their deal
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has been left to the court to interpret, may represent the product of, rather
than the failure of, state political influence. True, some uncertainties may
arise because the parties did not anticipate, or in fact could not have foreseen, future events. But just as in the argument for formalist interpretation
of contracts, we cannot know how often the clear statement rule will save a
state, and how often it will frustrate it. What is more, even if we reject the
view that there is no such thing as truly "clear" language (or Dworkin's
similar claim that clarity exists only after interpretation'6°), given that the
application of language to the world almost always presents some policy
choices, it is doubtful that "clear" language meaningfully reduces the discretion of courts.' 6' On balance, the clear statement rule may well undermine, rather than support, the political safeguards.
Nor could we justify selectively invoking the clear statement rule on
those occasions where it was plain that the state could not have expected
the particular contingency before the court to arise. Federal law is presumed by default to be unenforceable against non-federal defendants; Congress can create a private right of action only by clear statement.' 62 The
very fact that a dispute is before a court at all thus can only be the result of
an express choice by Congress to authorize suit-a choice that, by hypothesis, the states had an opportunity to alter. There is therefore a strong
argument that every case of unforeseen circumstances that comes before a
court is actually a case of deliberate incompleteness.
Finally, the unforeseen events objection assumes that the states have no
recourse when they are surprised. Given the possibility of new lawmaking,
163
including retroactive lawmaking, that assumption is obviously wrong.
At most, then, the clear statement rule protects states from paying the costs
of overcoming legislative inertia in that uncertain percentage of cases in
which they have not deliberately left a piece of conditional spending legislation incomplete. And we have not yet taken stock of the advantages that
than it is to protect it against the vicissitudes of time and circumstance, relieve them of the burdens of
plannin, and save them the costs of negotiating language to match their plans.
2

RONALD DWORKIN, LAw's EMPIRE 87-88 (1986).

161 See Mashaw, supra note 16, at 26; Nicholas S. Zeppos, JudicialCandorand Statutory Interpretation, 78 GEO. L.J. 353, 388 (1989); cf. Goetz & Scott, supra note 113, at 283-84 (acknowledging
that even express contract terms carry risk of judicial misinterpretation).
162 See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 286-87 (2001); Marshall, supra note 155, at 354.
Although it is not as clearly established that federal governmental entities cannot sue without express
statutory authorization, the Court was doubtful of such power even during the era when it was quite
open to implied judicial remedies for private parties. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. United States,
403 U.S. 713, 719 (1971) (Black, J., concurring); id. at 723-24 (Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 730
(Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 731 n. 1, 740 (White, J., concurring); id. at 741-47 (Marshall, J., concurring); id. at 753-54 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
163 States are potent lobbyists. See Lauren Ouziel, Note, Waiving States' Sovereign Immunity
from Suit in Their Own Courts: PurchasedWaiver and the Clear Statement Rule, 99 COLUM. L. REV.

1584, 1601-02 (1999).
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states may gain in their dealings with federal administrative agencies.
C. The Role of Agencies
Let us assume for the moment that it is possible to state coherently a
test for clarity that can sort "clear" from "unclear" statutes on some principled basis, or to formulate the need for deliberation in a way that would
satisfy anyone other than a textualist. 6 4 Even assuming away these difficulties, both views of notice face another problem. Each largely presumes
that agreement has to take place at the very beginning of the deal. In fact,
though, states and other parties affected by Spending Clause legislation
have an ongoing opportunity to affect the meaning of the terms of unclear
requirements, as those requirements are elaborated and enforced by federal
(and sometimes both federal and state) administrative agencies. The vast
majority of conditional spending is delivered in the form of grant-in-aid
programs, each administered by an agency.' 65 Many other conditions, such
as Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,68 Title IX of the Education
Amendments of 1972,67 the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,68 and the Equal
Education Opportunity Act, 69 are not overseen in their entirety on a daily
but are nonetheless subject to a federal agency's
basis by agency personnel,
70
interpretive authority. 1
The centrality of federal agencies has two important consequences for
the notice argument. The first, which I explore further in the next Part, is
that a state or other regulated entity with influence over the regulatory
process itself has little need for notice. A state can often control the initial
form of the federal norm, and, if surprised by later judicial interpretation,
can reverse the court by resorting again to the agency.
Even if federal spending recipients have no direct control over regulations, the regulatory process offers significant informational advantages.
Agencies give more elaborate content to relatively general statutory language. Under the so-called "Chevron" doctrine, courts must defer to these
164 Congressional drafting being what it is, it might be the case that a statute could be so unclear

even on a semantic level that no reasonable person or entity could know the obligations a state will
bear. A "clear statement rule" that acted only on these dregs of the drafting office would be the functional equivalent of the rule against absurd interpretations, and it is hard to imagine any objection. A
rule stated so weakly, obviously, is not the concern of this Article.
165 See DAVID B. WALKER, THE REBIRTH OF FEDERALISM: SLOUCHING TOWARD WASHINGTON
182, 189-91 (1995) (discussing the use of grant-in-aid programs to administer conditional spending);
see also THOMAS R. DYE, AMERICAN FEDERALISM: COMPETITION AMONG GOVERNMENTS 100-15
(1990) (discussing grant-in-aid programs as the "principal instrument for the expansion of national
power").
166 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2000).
16720 U.S.C. § 1681 (2000).
16829 U.S.C. § 794 (2000).
16920 U.S.C. §§ 1701-58 (2000).
170 See Freeman Engstrom, supra note 135, at 1253.
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elaborations and interpretations where they are reasonable and issued in a
way that Congress has intended as authoritative, such as through notice and
comment rulemaking.' 7 ' States can therefore rely on an agency's definition
of the general terms of a spending clause statute, which provides them with
itself. 72
the "notice" that they might otherwise find lacking in the statute
More critically, states can get information from agencies that no statute
can provide. For instance, by looking to an agency's published guidance to
its field officers, a state could learn how frequently and against whom a
particular stricture will likely be enforced. 73 This might tell it far more
about the true costs of compliance than any statutory language, no matter
how clear. Published records of the agency's deliberations, such as might
appear in the Federal Register accompanying a new rule, 174 can give guidance about how the agency will view novel situations. A state can also
approach federal officers themselves to pre-clear a proposed course of conduct, negotiate for pilot programs75or exemptions, or strike other deals that
help the state plan for the future.
Largely for the same reasons, agencies also have something to offer
those who would demand careful federal consideration before imposing
federal norms on state entities. The information that states get from agencies reduces the frequency of unforeseen burdens, and correspondingly
weakens the argument that the clear statement rule is needed to shield
states from those burdens. Federal agencies also give states another avenue
for overturning adverse decisions, one that may be easier to achieve than
176
legislation subject to the requirements of bicameralism and presentment.
171 Barnhart

v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 222 (2002); Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def.
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984).
172 See Eskridge & Frickey, Law as Equilibrium, supra note 17, at 81; Smith, supra note 11, at
1221. 173 See Eskridge & Frickey, Law as Equilibrium, supra note 17, at 81.
174 See Elhauge, supra note 129, at 2140; Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justificationfor
the BureaucraticState, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1511, 1560 (1992) (discussing review of the Federal Register as a means of tracking agencies' informal rulemaking proceedings).
175See Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Political Economy of Cooperative Federalism: Why State
Autonomy Makes Sense and "Dual Sovereignty" Doesn't, 96 MICH. L. REV. 813, 860-61, 866-67
(1998); Smith, supra note 11, at 1232.
176 See Jonathan R. Macey, TransactionCosts and the Normative Elements of the Public Choice
Model: An Application to Constitutional Theory, 74 VA. L. REV. 471, 513 (1988); Seidenfeld, supra
note 174, at 1565-66. But see Smith, supra note 11, at 1203-06 (claiming that accountability concerns
cannot be satisfied when Congress delegates lawmaking power to an agency); Ernest A. Young, State
Sovereign Immunity and the Future of Federalism, 1999 Sup. CT. REV. 1, 25 ("[T]he abandonment of
the nondelegation doctrine and consequent dramatic expansion of federal lawmaking by executive
agencies... represent a substantial erosion of process federalism values."). David Freeman Engstrom,
in his recent article arguing that agency interpretations may sometimes satisfy the clear statement rule,
argues both sides of this issue. See Engstrom, supra note 135, at 1228-29, 1232-33. His arguments
for why agencies are relatively closed to state influence, though, focus on the activities of field-level
administrators in cooperating state and federal bureaucracies. See id. at 1228-29. That limited analysis
neglects the efforts by politically accountable high-ups in both sets of organizations to make the field
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Thus, even taking for granted that the need for "notice" is a meaningful
concern about Spending Clause legislation, federal agency involvement
largely satisfies it.
The notice rationale is the beginning, not the end, of the Spending
Clause question. Why do states need a special kind of notice, and what
form of notice could satisfy that need? Or, if "notice" is only another way
of saying that we should be cautious about letting judges fill in the spaces
in a statute left by Congress, what is there about Spending Clause legislation that would differentiate it from any other law? Is this justification
sufficient to overcome the shared judgment of Congress and the states
about how best to exemplify their agreement? The next two Parts try to
answer these riddles.
IV. FEDERALISM

A. The ClearStatement Rule as a Supplement to the PoliticalSafeguards
of Federalism
Probably the most important justification for the clear statement rule is
as a second-best tool for judicial enforcement of federalism values. 77 In
areas outside of the states' sovereign immunity, the Supreme Court has
generally been reluctant to enforce directly limitations on federal power,
especially limitations on Congress's commerce power. 78 That reluctance,
to be sure, has diminished in recent years.'79 Nonetheless, in many cases,
courts continue to rely on the "political safeguards of federalism" in preference to active judicial intervention. 80 The political safeguards are a set
of structural features, such as the disproportionate power of some states in
the Senate, 181 or the dependence of national political figures on state and
more responsive, so that it produces outputs they can campaign on, not run away from. While I agree
that the question whether those efforts-including frequent rotation of staff, highly transparent benchmarking, and internal or external judicial review-ultimately are successful is an "empirical" one, id. at
1230, Engstrom's summary significantly overstates the political opacity of agency decision making.
177 See Eskridge & Frickey, Clear Statement Rules, supra note 24, at 597; Joshua
A. Klein,
Commerce Clause QuestionsAfter Morrison: Some Observationson the New Formalism and the New
Realism, 55 STAN. L. REV. 571, 603-04 (2002); Moulton, supra note 24, at 866-67; Nagle, supra note
22, at 811; Rosenthal, supra note 10, at 1142; Smith, supra note 11, at 1204-05.
178 See Gamett, supra note 48, at 3-5.
179See Chemerinsky, supra note 30, at 89; Yoo, supra note
99, at 1312.
180 See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528, 552
(1985); Gregory v.
Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 464 (1991); see also Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back Into the Political Safeguards of Federalism, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 215, 290 (2000) (stating that "[a]ctive judicial
intervention to protect the states from Congress is consistent with neither the original understanding nor
with more than two centuries of practice.... [s]o far, the Justices have managed to avoid provoking a
constitutional crisis by confining their activities to the peripheries of congressional power").
181 Garcia, 469 U.S. at 550-56; Herbert Wechsler, The PoliticalSafeguards of Federalism: The
Role of the States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV.
543, 559 (1954) (arguing that disproportionate power of small states in the Senate, as well as fact that
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local activists and officials of the same party for their long-term success,182
that allow states to look out for their own interests fairly effectively in the
course of the political process.
The political safeguards theory acknowledges that the Constitution
recognized by the Court is a diminished one, narrower in its protections
3
than might arguably be understood from text, history, and principle. 8 The
diminished Constitution, of course, is hardly unique to federalism; there are
many places where constitutional trees might fall, with no court willing to
hear them.' 84 The point generally is to minimize the need for the Court,
which is thought to be less representative of popular preferences than the
political branches, to enter into controversial or difficult areas of policy.'85
While one might argue that an apolitical, highly expert decision maker
might often be desirable, the Court also often does not have enough information to make truly expert decisions.' 86 Thus, the Court would prefer to
leave the question of how much federalism is too much to others where
possible.'87
The Court's use of the clear statement rule, though, suggests that it
considers the political process alone inadequate to protect federalism val' It may be, for example, that the Court would like to signal that fedues. 88
eralism is an important value, and one that legislators and executive officers should take into account when making their decisions.'89 Because the
clear statement rule is defeasible, it can serve this signaling function efficiently, allowing the Court to bar some federal initiatives from time to time
without permanently upsetting any popularly-chosen policy.' 9° In addition,
as I mentioned earlier, the clear statement rule increases the costs of legislating in an area that affects states, which has the effect of re-inflating the
underlying constitutional norm-that is, giving some of the protection of
congressional representatives are chosen on a state-by-state basis with electoral qualifications controlled by states, gives states enough power to defend themselves against federal encroachment).
182 See CHOPER, supra note 24, at 179; Kramer, supra note 180, at 279-85.
183See, e.g., Garcia,469 U.S. at 547-48.
184See Lawrence Gene Sager, FairMeasure: The Legal Status of UnderenforcedConstitutional
Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212, 1213-20 (1978).
185See Coenen, supra note 24, at 1397-98; Yoo, supra note 99, at 1319.
186 See Garcia,469 U.S. at 538-47.
187See id. at 556.
188See Eskridge & Frickey, Clear Statement Rules, supra note 24, at 635; Moulton, supra note

24, at 867, 911; Yoo, supra note 99, at 1335, 1338.
189See Adler & Kreimer, supra note 48, at 133-34; Eskridge & Frickey, ClearStatement Rules,
supra note 24, at 597; Jackson, supra note 24, at 2226-27; McConville, supra note 12, at 187-88.
190 See Dan T. Coenen, A Constitution of Collaboration: Protecting Fundamental Values with
Second-Look Rules of Interbranch Dialogue, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1575, 1587, 1591 (2001);
Eskridge & Frickey, Clear Statement Rules, supra note 24, at 631; Klein, supra note 177, at 602.
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the underlying right without active court intervention.' 9 '
The key question here is whether the signaling and political-processreinforcing functions of the clear statement rule the Court employs in enforcing the Tenth Amendment and other limits on the Commerce power are
equally necessary in enforcing the terms of the Spending Clause. As with
the other forms of federal power, legislation under the Spending Clause is
limited not only by the intergovernmental lobby but also by political constraints on the national government's ability to tax and spend to establish
and administer its projects.' 92 Spending legislation faces a unique additional cost, however, in that proponents of a relatively uniform nationwide
law must buy out each individual dissenting state. The next section explores this extra cost in depth, arguing that (contrary to some recent critics)
it is so substantial that it should weigh powerfully against additional judicial limitations on conditional spending.
B. The SafeguardsAnalyzed
In this section I argue that the political process actually overprotects
states from federal overreaching under the Spending Clause. Spending
Clause legislation is fairer to political "losers" than traditional lawmaking
under, say, the Commerce Clause, and its renewability and administration
by federal agencies offer the states ongoing opportunities to influence the
actual bargain. Some skeptics, though, claim that conditional federal
spending is coercive rather than empowering, or that it lowers overall utility by reducing diversity and tolerance for minority positions at the state
level. In responding to these claims I first personify the states, treating
their internal workings as a black box producing a single output, the states'
preference for a given piece of legislation. I then go inside the box, examining some interest-group models of internal state voter behavior to demonstrate that conditional spending provides superior protection to ordinary
politics at that level, as well.
1. The Static Black Box Model
One of the familiar virtues of federal legislation is that it can solve the
states' collective action problems. 93 The states compete against one an191 See Coenen, supra note 24, at 1288; Eskridge & Frickey, Clear Statement Rules,
supra note
24, at 631; Young, supra note 58, at 1606, 1608-09.
192 See supra note 97; infra note 207.
193 See Helen Hershkoff, State Courts and the "Passive Virtues": Rethinking the Judicial Func-

tion, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1833, 1903-04 (2001); Moulton, supra note 24, at 903; Richard P. Revesz,
Rehabilitating Interstate Competition, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1210, 1216-17 (1992); Thomas S. Ulen,
Economic and Public-Choice Forces in Federalism, 6 GEO. MASON L. REV. 921, 926-29 (1998);
Adam Badawi, Comment, Unceasing Animosities and the Public Tranquility: Political Market Failure
and the Scope of the Commerce Clause, 91 CAL. L. REV. 1331, 1337-39 (2003).
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other for capital and the loyalty of their citizens. 4 A business that finds
Wisconsin too expensive can relocate to Minnesota or Miami. This sometimes can result in the infamous "race to the bottom," as states lower regulatory standards in an attempt to reduce the cost of doing business.' 95 Relatedly, each state has an incentive to externalize some of its costs on its
neighbors.' 96 Lax air emissions standards in Ohio help the state attract
business dollars, but it is the citizens downwind who experience most of
the ill effects. While in theory (absent the Interstate Compact Clause)
states could bargain directly with one another to avoid these costs, the
transaction costs of so many individual bargains would make many of them
inefficient. 197 National lawmaking dramatically reduces these transaction
costs, and allows uniform regulation to prevent capital leaking across borders.' 98
Most federal legislation does not perfectly duplicate the structure of inter-state bargaining. There is, of course, logrolling, and over time the
states probably experience about an even distribution of benefits and burdens.' 99 For each discrete statute, though, a majority coalition of states
need offer nothing to the losing side. There is, therefore, no guarantee that
the end result will increase overall national utility. For instance, a small
minority of states might very strongly prefer their own position, and, because they are always a minority (or ironically actually agree with a fair
portion of the majority coalition on other significant issues), they do not
have enough to offer by way of logrolling to sway even the weak preference the majority states have for their position.
Spending Clause legislation, in contrast, is utility-maximizing. Recall
that the conditions of a given expenditure are only binding on states that
actually accept the funds. 2°° By definition, then, if we assume states are
rational and act with good information about the costs and benefits of fed194 See Baker, supra note 11, at 1947.
195 See Solid Waste Agency v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159, 195-96 (2001); Coll.
Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 703 (1999) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
196 See McConnell, supra note 92, at 1495; Moulton, supra note 24, at 903; Ulen, supra note 193,
at 926.
197 See Baker, supra note 11, at 1971 n.280; Moulton, supra note 24, at 917 n.356; Ulen, supra
note 193, at 927.
198 See Baker, supra note 11, at 1951; Baker & Berman, supra note 8, at 477-78; Revesz, supra
note 193, at 1216-17.
199 See Mashaw, supra note 16, at 24 ("[B]ecause legislatures represent different constituencies
with different interests, all of them will find it useful to make trades with each other (logrolling) so that
demands of a wide variety of constituencies can be satisfied."); Carol M. Rose, Takings, Federalism,
Norms, 105 YALE L.J. 1121, 1127-29, 1139 (1996) (reviewing WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, REGULATORY
TAKINGS: LAW, ECONOMICS, AND POLITICS (1995)).
200 See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 210 (1987); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 301
(1980).
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eral legislation, a state that accepts funding is subjectively better off than it
would have been if not for the offer of federal money." °' Similarly, if the
majority is willing to pay the price named by the minority states for uniformity, the majority by definition is subjectively better off (although obviously not as well off as it would be if it did not have to pay the minority
states to obtain compliance).2 2
The federal government overpays for all that happiness. Minority
states can reap huge benefits precisely by virtue of their minority status. A
state opting out of an expensive regulatory regime might attract significant
new capital from its rivals.2" 3 The majority coalition will have to pay the
rational minority state enough to compensate for this lost opportunity.
Other buy-outs will be expensive because the intensity of the state's preference may be in direct proportion to its scarcity. For example, residents
of the last state, where it is legal to drive more than fifty-five miles per
hour, or the only state where same-sex marriage is lawful, likely value that
opportunity more than their neighboring states; they may well live where
they do exactly in order to engage in that behavior.20 Finally, minority
states will recognize that they can obtain holdout costs from the majority.2 5
Over repeated rounds of bargaining, the holdout price is likely to approach
the value to the majority of the entire project.2 °'
As a result, Spending Clause legislation is subject to an inherent limit
not applicable to any other conventional form of lawmaking. The federal
government's capacity to pursue its own policiesis, I have argued, subject
to political restraint, not only by the need to justify the individual policy on
its merits, but also by the corresponding tax burden the policy imposes on
the electorate.20 7 Spending Clause legislation, especially on controversial
subjects where minority preferences are likely to be strongly held, is disproportionately expensive, and, if voters track the individual costs of par201 See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 168 (1992); Baker, supra note 1, at 963; Hills,
supra note 175, at 861, 874; Maltz, supra note 31, at 113.
202 See Hills, supra note 175, at 872; La Pierre, supra note 97, at 599.
203 See Hills, supra note 175, at 884 n.249.
204 See Baker, supra note 11, at 1971 & n.279; Baker & Berman, supranote 8, at 471-74.
205 See Richard A. Epstein, Exit Rights Under Federalism, 55 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 147,
159 (1992); Hills, supra note 175, at 856; Ilya Somin, Closing the Pandora'sBox of Federalism: The
Casefor JudicialRestriction of FederalSubsidies to State Governments, 90 GEO. L.J. 461,476 (2002);
Badawi, supra note 193, at 1373. But see Yoo, supra note 99, at 1401-02 ("TIThe states that are most
willing to surrender some of their autonomy will be the ones that acquire federal funds with the greatest
ease.").
206 Badawi, supra note 193, at 1360-61.
207 See Adler & Kreimer, supra note 48, at 107; Hills, supra note 175, at 865, 871; La Pierre, supra note 97, at 633, 644, 647-48; William P. Marshall, UnderstandingAlden, 31 RUTGERS L.J. 803,
816-17 (2000); cf. Adler, supra note 3, at 1209-10 (claiming that the Sixteenth Amendment was, like
the Civil War Amendments, a decision to expand federal power by giving the federal government more
money).
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ticular legislation, imposes a correspondingly large expenditure of political
capital on its proponents. Even if voters do not explicitly tie policy results
to costs on a statute-by-statute basis, a Congress that governs largely by
use of the Spending Clause will be able to support far fewer policy objectives. 8 Thus, use of the Spending Clause restricts the degree to which
state preferences can be displaced by the federal government, whether by
drastically increasing the support needed for a given piece of legislation, or
simply by diminishing the size of the federal government as a whole.
It might be argued, though, that Congress does not necessarily need to
pay full price on the states' holdup charges. Professor Hills, for example,
has argued convincingly that the federal government can reduce such costs
by threatening to use its power of preemption. 209 Rather than paying a state
to capitulate, Congress can simply displace state control and hire federal
workers to regulate in those .states refusing to take Congress's money."' 0
The Clean Air Act, among other regimes, uses just that strategy, directing
the Environmental Protection Agency to oversee emissions in states that
fail to submit satisfactory plans of their own. 21 ' As a result, the amount of
money a state can demand for surrendering its position may sometimes be
limited by the risk that the state's intransigence risks losing both the policy
fight and the payout.
There are, however, several important qualifications to Professor
Hills's argument. First, it is almost always the case that Spending Clause
legislation will give states some, albeit limited, opportunity for holdouts.
Consider why Congress would resort to the Spending Clause at all. One
possibility is that delegation to the states is cheaper perhaps because it
saves start-up costs, or because states can better distribute overhead expenses. Delegation may also produce better results, especially if Congress's program works better when other local policies are coordinated
together with it. Another likely reason Congress pays off the states is to
obtain political support for what would otherwise be a losing initiative. In
each of these situations, the states will be able to charge, if not the full
value of the program to the states who favor it, at least a cost close to the
savings or efficiency gains of delegation.
Next, and crucially, the preemption alternative does not work at all
when the object of the spending legislation is beyond any of the federal
government's other enumerated powers. In that situation, a state, knowing
Congress has no "do it yourself' alternative, is free to hold out for all it can
208
209
210
211

Hills, supra note 175, at 865; see also La Pierre, supra note 97, at 644-46.
Hills, supra note 175, at 880-82.
Id. at 880; see also McCoy & Friedman, supra note 9, at 111.
42 U.S.C. § 7661a(d) (2000).
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get.2" 2 If several states take this route, and uniformity is important to the
success of the program, it will probably fail unless the holdouts somehow
coordinate their demands to split the available pie. 213 As a result, the political checks on federal legislation are strongest exactly where the textual
sources of federal authority are thinnest. This outcome dovetails nicely
with my earlier claim that the founders could reasonably have written the
Spending Clause with the understanding that, despite its fairly unlimited
language, it would not dramatically expand the power of the national government.
For similar reasons, the fears of some commentators that the Spending
Clause provides an effective end-run around limits on judicial limits on the
Commerce Clause and other sources of congressional power 2 4 would appear to be rather overblown. The more likely it seems that the Court would
strike down direct legislation, the more likely it is that a state will hold out
for the full value of the enactment. In effect, judicially enforced federalism
in other doctrinal areas spills over into conditional spending, so that as
judicial safeguards emerge elsewhere, the need for a supplementary clear
statement rule for spending legislation diminishes.
Another potential objection to the effectiveness of political limits on
the spending power, suggested by Professor Baker, is that the political cost
of raising funds is overstated.215 Professor Baker's argument, at least as I
understand it, has two parts. First, she claims, because taxes might be imposed either by states or by the federal government, the money Congress
uses to buy off recalcitrant states is not really federal money at all, but
rather money that Congress has prevented the states from raising on their
own.216 Furthermore, assuming that the public's tolerance for an overall
level of taxation is limited, federal taxation crowds out state taxes, so that
states are left in a situation where their own cash flow is subject to federal
212 Roderick M. Hills, The Eleventh Amendment as Curb on Bureaucratic Power, 53 STAN. L.

REV. 1225, 1231 (2001) [hereinafter Hills, Bureaucratic Power]; see Zietlow, supra note 10, at 206.

There may also be some spending legislation in which the objects of the law are constitutionally
permissible but it would be highly impractical for Congress to displace state regulation. In some situations, federal administration would be more expensive than the value of the federal program to its
proponents, so that the threat of preemption is hollow. Consider, for example, the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA"), which provides states and localities with funds for the educational of children with disabilities. 20 U.S.C. § 1411 (2000). Even assuming the federal government
would have authority to take over local school districts, the sheer expense of administering whole

districts, or even just an independent parallel educational system for students with disabilities, is daunting. See also Binder, supra note 155, at 158; Hills, supra note 175, at 862-63.
213 Epstein, supra note 205, at 159, 161; see also Hills, supra note 175, at 885.
214

See Baker, supra note 11, at 1933, 1988; Lynn A. Baker, The Spending Power and the Feder-

alist Revival, 4 CHAP. L. REV. 195, 196 (2001) [hereinafter Baker, The Spending Power]; Baker &

Berman, supra note 8, at 484; Garnett, supra note 48, at 38; McCoy & Friedman, supra note 9, at 87;
Rosenthal, supra note 10, at 1105-06; Note, supra note 12, at 1427.
215 Baker, supra note 11, at 1935-54.
216 Baker, supra note 11, at 1936-38.
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tax decisions.21 7 This is "coercive," according to Baker, because Congress
has itself created the situation where its offers of funds are needed by the
states, and thereby reduced the amount of money that would otherwise be
required to change state preferences.218
This claim fails on its premises. Because states compete fiercely with
one another for capital, there are significant collective action barriers to
any individual state raising its tax rates. 2 '9 Federal taxation, by avoiding
this difficulty, is able to tap a large base of revenue unavailable to the
states.22 ° Professor Baker offers no evidence that federal tax levels, either
now or at any time in history, have been so high that they have exceeded
this base.22' For example, suppose that because of interstate competition
all of the states together could collect $100 billion, but popular sentiment
nationwide will support tax levels high enough to generate $1 trillion in
revenue. If the federal government collects $900 billion, it has not
crowded out a dime of state funds. In addition, as Professor Hills points
out, even if there were an overlap between federal and state pools of
taxes will occupy the states' tax "space,"
money, it is unclear why federal 222
rather than the other way around.
The second part of the argument is that states in favor of a particular
piece of spending legislation are not spending their own money.223 Rhode
Island, for example, is writing checks not from the Rhode Island treasury to
get what it wants, but rather Congress's, probably in disproportionate share
to Rhode Island's own contributions. Evidently the difficulty with this is
that we cannot then be sure whether Rhode Island would have paid the
same amount of its own funds, leaving open the possibility that we have
achieved a very weak preference of Rhode Island's at the expense of, say, a
217 See Adler & Kreimer, supra note 48, at 107; Baker, supranote 11, at 1937; Baker, The Spending Power, supra note 214, at 214; McCoy & Friedman, supra note 9, at 86.
218 See Baker, supra note 11, at 1938; Baker, The Spending Power, supra note 214, at 223;
McCoy & Friedman, supra note 9, at 86.

219 See Richard Briffault, "What About the 'Ism'?" Normative and FormalConcerns in Contem-

porary Federalism, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1303, 1314, 1321 (1994); Epstein, supra note 205, at 155; La
Pierre, supra note 97, at 594; Moulton, supra note 24, at 906; Revesz, supra note 193, at 1239-40;
Ulen, supra note 193, at 933-34.
220 See Ulen, supra note 193, at 948.
221 Indeed, the conventional wisdom is that state and federal tax levels rise and fall together. See,
e.g., Alysoun McLaughlin, National Conference of State Legislatures, The Impact of Federal Tax
Policy Decisions on States' Budgets (2003) ("As a rule, when federal taxes go up or down, so do state
taxes."), at http://www.ncsl.org/statefed/taxprimer.htm (last visited Oct. 3, 2004) (on file with the
Connecticut Law Review). That dynamic is very hard to explain if, as Professor Baker claims, higher
federal tax collections put political pressure on states to lower their own tax rates.
222 See Hills, supra note 175, at 865. Furthermore, the federal government could always give tax
credits to federal taxpayers for any state income tax they paid, so that Baker's feared "displacement" of
state taxing authority is politically contingent.
223 See Baker, supra note 11, at 1972; Baker, The Spending Power, supra note 214, at 199-200.
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strong preference of Connecticut. 24 More to the point, it may be that
Rhode Island's congressional delegation will feel like they are playing with
house money, since the money that is used to obtain their objectives does
not impose the political costs that would come with higher taxes in Rhode
Island.225
The problem with this argument is that spending legislation is not exempt from Article I and Article I1. It still takes a majority of both houses
plus the President, or a supermajority of both houses, to enact a conditional
spending measure. Although of course the House, Senate, and Electoral
College do give advantages to small states, it should be relatively rare for a
2 26
majority to represent a disproportionately small share of federal revenue.
Moreover, the rational wealthy-state minority will demand extra compensation in that situation, exactly because it recognizes that its own funds are
being used for purposes it opposes, rather than more generally beneficial
purposes. In any event, even for the Rhode Islands of the nation, interstate
bribery via the Spending Clause is not costless. Spending Clause legislation either displaces other desirable, cheaper legislation that could be enacted through other means, or requires an increase in the overall level of
federal revenues, including taxes levied on the Rhode Islands and Montanas.
2. The Black Box Model with Post-EnactmentModifications
To this point I have focused on the political dynamics of legislation at
224 See Baker, supranote 11, at 1972; McConnell, supra note 92, at 1496.
225 Baker, The Spending Power, supra note 214, at 200-02; see also McCoy & Friedman, supra
note 9, at 124. Note that this same structural feature also potentially increases the cost of Spending
Clause legislation. We might expect to see false-negative states, states whose actual preference is for
the majority position, but who pretend to be opposed in order to exact payment. Although the game
theory analysis is complicated by the risk that unnecessary holdouts can jeopardize the entire deal, the
false negative would often be a rational strategy where the costs of buyouts are largely born by other
majority states.
Ilya Somin offers a variation of Baker's argument, claiming that the cost of refusing grants is exacerbated by the fact that the state has already subsidized its competitors with its tax money. Somin,
supra note 205, at 466. But that is just a sunk cost. Rational decision makers ignore sunk costs and
analyze only marginal gains or losses; a corporation does not keep manufacturing widgets at a loss just
because it spent a lot to build its widget factory.
226 Mashaw, supra note 16, at 24. In addition, the President represents a national constituency,
and has some incentive to resist unfair redistributions among states. See Elhauge, supra note 128, at
2149-50; Mashaw, supra note 16, at 25; John 0. McGinnis, PresidentialReview as Constitutional
Restoration, 51 DUKE L.J. 901, 903-04, 926, 928-29 (2001). Professor Baker claims, though, that
prospective grantees will be more effective in courting the President's favor, because the benefits of a
veto are widespread and thin, whereas the gains of the spending legislation are more concentrated.
Baker, The Spending Power, supra note 214, at 202-03. But Baker's argument about spending generally actually undercuts her opposition to conditional spending. A rational state will seek a veto when
the benefits of federal grants plus or minus the effects of the accompanying condition are a net negative. If minority states are more effective in that effort, then that represents an additional protection
against conditions that might result in some loss of utility for the minority position. See infra text
accompanying notes 242-46.
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the time of enactment. But time is the destroyer of all things, including
political consensus. What seems a fair bargain during debate on the Senate
floor can in five years look like a raw deal. In the intervening period,
though, the state may well have made significant investments in the national scheme, so that declining further federal funds may involve substantial expense above and beyond the foregone dollars. Taking these "lockin" costs into account, it may be that compliance is only the better of two
bad options.
It could be argued that the clear statement rule offers states some protection against this problem.227 As I discussed briefly in the last Part, the
clear statement rule creates a sort of qualified immunity for states. That is,
by reducing the risk that a court would be able to reject the state's interpretation, the rule allows the state to deviate somewhat from the terms of its
bargain. For example, suppose federal spending legislation requires states
to reduce "automobile" emissions, but exempts pollutants emitted by
"trucks." Years later, the increased popularity of sport utility vehicles
(which did not even exist when the statute was written) makes compliance
with the federal legislation prohibitively expensive. The state might decide
that SUVs are not "automobiles," but rather "light trucks," and avoid having to give up federal funds. If private citizens or downwind states sue, a
court would likely be compelled to agree that the original legislation did
not clearly designate SUVs as "automobiles" and not "trucks."
Again, though, this benefit turns on the relative effectiveness of the political process in safeguarding the states' interests. If states can use politics, not only at the time of the writing of the statute, but also subsequently
to ratify their own interpretations, then there is little need to protect them
from judicial oversight.
An efficacious alternative would be especially welcome in light of the
destructive consequences of the clear statement rule. Consider the SUV
example. There, the rule allows some states to unravel what is probably
the key objective of the federal legislation, reducing non-commercial vehicle emissions.228 Other states, observing (or anticipating) this behavior,
may reasonably wonder why they should themselves invest in a cooperative venture that will not, ultimately, be truly cooperative. Once more,
there is a parallel in contract law. The common law is reluctant to allow a
party to escape the obligations of a contract simply because the plain terms
of the contract apply with some degree of uncertainty to subsequently aris227 See Freeman Engstrom, supra note 135, at 1242-46.
228 In saying that the original legislature only "probably" wanted to curb non-commercial vehi-

cles emissions meaningfully, regardless of how big the non-commercial vehicle, I stipulate that the
legislative history is not entirely clear on this point. This Article is agnostic as to whether the clear
statement rule permits examination of legislation history in appraising the clarity of a statute. Thus, I
assume that if the legislative history were clear, it would have permitted a court to hold the state in
violation of the Act.
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ing conditions, unless the later event would completely destroy the fundamental purpose of the contract itself. 29 The reason, as with our SUV example, is that to do otherwise would seriously curtail the incentives for
both sides to invest in the deal.23 °
We do not have to look far for an ongoing political alternative to the
clear statement rule. As I have already mentioned, modem governance
uses administrative agencies to solve the problem of changing conditions
231
over time. 23
States have influence over the administrative process through
a variety of channels: electoral sway with the chief executive, and through
him, the political leadership of each agency; 232 intergovernmental lobbying; 233 federal dependence on the knowledge and resources of cooperating
state regulators; 2' and the now-familiar mechanisms, described by public
choice theory,
by which any interest group can sway government decision
23 5
making.

A state utilizing this influence can protect itself from extra costs of
compliance that appear subsequent to enactment of spending legislation.
Indeed, in one sense the protection afforded by administrative involvement
is broader than the clear statement rule. An agency's power to interpret the
terms of a federal statute it administers is limited by the clear meaning of
the statute.236 Just as with the clear statement rule, a state (with the assis229

See

JAMES

P. NEHF, 14 CORBIN ON CONTRACrS § 74.1, at 2-11 (Joseph M. Perillo ed., rev'd

ed. 2001).
230 Ayres & Gertner, supra note 109, at 98; see also Dent, supranote 119, at 68-70, 72 & n.1 10;
Richard A. Posner & Andrew M. Rosenfield, Impossibility and Related Doctrines in Contract Law: An
Economic Analysis, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 83 (1977).
231 See United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 172-73 (1968); Aleinikoff, supra
note 79, at 43-45; Elhauge, supra note 129, at 2127-28; Shepsle, supra note 78, at 252; Smith, supra
note 11, at 1196.
232 See Galle, Federal Agencies, supra note 149, at 210-11; Hills, BureaucraticPower, supra
note 212,
at 1252.
233 See CHOPER,
supra note 24, at 180-81; Hills, supranote 175, at 861, 866-67; Marshall, supra
note 207, at 816-17.
234 See Galle, FederalAgencies, supra note 149, at 210-11; Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation
of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1669, 1686 (1975).
235 See Thomas W. Merrill, Capture Theory and the Courts: 1967-1983, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
1039, 1050-51 (1997); Richard A. Posner, Theories of Economic Regulation, 5 BELL J. ECON. &
MGMT. SCI. 335, 335 (1974); David B. Spence & Frank Cross, A Public Choice Casefor the Administrative State, 89 GEO. L. J. 97, 114 (2000).
236 The Fourth Circuit has also suggested that the Pennhurst clear statement rule is incompatible
with judicial deference to otherwise authoritative agency interpretations. Va. Dep't of Educ. v. Riley,
106 F.3d 559, 567 (4th Cir. 1997) (en banc). The reasoning, evidently, is that rulemaking subsequent
to the time the "contract" was made undermines the state's ability to assess the costs of the deal. See
id. at 567; see also McConville, supra note 12, at 186 (arguing that a state should not be bound by a
condition to which it did not agree). As I argue in the main text, this logic presumes wrongly that the
state has no involvement in the subsequent rulemaking. In any event, the Fourth Circuit's argument
would prove far too much. All laws are deals. A state's decision to lobby against a bill, or the state
delegation's decision to vote for or against it, would be no less undermined by later administrative
action than the state's decision to accept funds. Why then would not the clear statement rule of Greg-
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tance of a federal agency) cannot by interpretation alone avoid obligations
plainly demanded by federal law. A state could, however, win agreement
by the agency not to enforce even plainly applicable federal requirements,
perhaps by promising to deliver other, more achievable goals.237 Thus, an
agency can often relieve a state from burdens that would not be affected at
all by the clear statement rule.238
Of course, it could be objected that the "minority" states, those that
must be bribed to comply with a spending initiative, are not the only states
with influence over the administrative process.239 Indeed, one commentator has argued that the rationale of the clear statement rule should prevent
courts from deferring to federal administrative interpretations of federal
law, because such interpretations (perhaps under the influence of the majority states) might add unfairly to the burdens of the state that has already
accepted funds.24 °
I would first say in response that there are several reasons to expect
that the minority state will fare relatively well in a system in which states
use federal agencies to exert influence over one another. Most significantly, the minority state has ongoing opportunities for exacting holdout
costs from the majority states. Once a national regulatory scheme is in
place, other states will act and invest based on the assumption that rival
states will also comply. A federal regulatory apparatus will be put into
place, in part designed on the assumption of cooperation with (and perhaps
even field-level contribution by) the minority state. By threatening to decline federal funds, a holdout state now has an additional set of costs it can
impose: waste of these investments of time and resources.
ory equally preclude Chevron deference to any interpretation affecting a state's interests? And such a
rule would be far less flexible, since the federal government could not argue that the state had capitulated to administrative interpretations by accepting later grants of funds. See Smith, supra note 11, at
1220-21.
It is also unclear whether the Fourth Circuit's logic would apply to interpretations that lower the
state's costs. If so, one then must wonder how a court is supposed to discern when non-monetary
obligations would make a deal more or less attractive to the accepting state.
237 See Hills, Bureaucratic Power, supra note 212, at 1253; Hills, supra note 175, at 860-61,
866-67.
238 Marshall, supra note 207, at 816-17. This quasi-prosecutorial discretion also supplements the
agency's interpretive power over less-than-clear provisions of federal law. The agency's own enforcement choices are particularly important for such provisions because vague federal laws cannot be
enforced privately by suits under § 1983. Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 340 (1997).
239 See Baker, supranote 1, at 966.
240 Smith, supra note 11, at 1189-90.
241 See Epstein, supra note 205, at 158; Philip J. Weiser, Towards a ConstitutionalArchitecture
for CooperativeFederalism, 79 N.C. L. REV. 663,671 (2001).
To be sure, these costs are likely to be much smaller than the lost value of the program as a
whole. A holdout state is therefore unlikely to win concessions that radically undermine the value of
the project to the majority. But the state could expect to gain smaller concessions, approximating the
lesser of either the cost of replacing the sunk investment or the benefits that would accrue to the majority in the remaining term of the project. See Epstein, supranote 205, at 158.
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In addition, standard public choice analysis suggests that the minority
state will often be able to succeed in its administrative lobbying efforts.
Put very simply, public choice theory claims that, because of free rider
effects, a group that receives a relatively small benefit spread widely
among the members of the group is unlikely to act aggressively in protecting that benefit through lobbying and the like. 42 In contrast, a small, welldefined group that receives a relatively larger benefit or burden is more
likely to overcome its collective action problems and push hard to preserve
or alter government policy. 243 Pollution, again, is a good example, since
the benefits of clean air and water inure extremely broadly, but the costs of
regulation fall narrowly and heavily on polluters. Spending Clause legislation has something of this flavor. The benefits fall to a class larger than the
group that bears the burdens. Since the majority would likely comply voluntarily with the regulation, while the minority must be bribed, it is also
likely that the minority will feel more acutely the sting of the regulation.
As a result, the general tendency will be for the minority states to be more
vigorous, and therefore more effective, in lobbying an agency to soften its
regulatory stance towards the minority state. While agency supervision of
spending legislation offers some risk that the "costs" of a program will
increase, the greater likelihood is that agency involvement makes costs
both more manageable and (as I discussed in Part IH) more predictable. 2 "
242 See OLSON, supra note 102, at 21-22, 31, 35; Rose, supra note 199, at 1137; Stigler, supra
note 100, at 401.
243 See OLSON, supra note 102, at 21-22, 31, 35; Garrett, supra note 99, at 523; Rose, supra note
199, at 1037; Stigler, supra note 100, at 401.
244 David Freeman Engstrom has recently argued that, although the clear statement rule should be
subordinate to agency policy making in most instances, states should not be bound by agency decisions
enacted after the state has elected to begin receiving funds. See Freeman Engstrom, supra note 135, at
1217. My disagreement with him turns in part on the fact that he (in my view) incorrectly claims that
states do not have significant bargaining power after the initial spending agreement is reached. See id.
at 1241-46. Freeman Engstrom's most forceful point is that states cannot credibly threaten to hold out
against future participation, because once a program is up and running it creates an in-state constituency that will likely be attentive to efforts to cut back their services. Id. at 1243-44. The federal government will therefore know that the state is bluffing and refuse to pay holdout costs, whether in cash
or in altered program details. Id. at 1244. But, as he later seems to acknowledge, this problem is
unlikely to arise when the federal government has a do-it-yourself alternative. Id. at 1270-71. By
assumption, the federal program proponents want uniformity (otherwise they would not be paying for
it). Therefore, the state can assume that, even if it pulls out, the federal government will step in. It can
thus make the threat of withdrawal without having to pay the political price to the entrenched beneficiaries. The federal entity, recognizing its bind, will have to take the threat seriously, and pay at least the
additional cost it would incur in order to take over itself. Even where there is no preemptive federal
alternative, the state retains significant holdout power, by virtue of the fact that its threat, even if not
hugely credible, is to the value of the entire program, not just the costs of replacing the single state's
participation. The fact that the state may face some internal political pressure may cause the federal
negotiators to discount somewhat its demands, but even at a discount they will still likely command a
substantial price.
Freeman Engstrom's other arguments are weaker. He writes that a state might be reluctant to
abandon resources it devotes to a program, but admits that rational planners should account for this
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More critically, though, the objection presumes that the relationship
among competing states will be adversarial rather than cooperative. It is
not inevitable, however, that the structural competition among states will
necessarily be reflected in a bureaucratic system that permits the states to
impose costs on one another. With good institutional design, these competitive forces can be channeled into a system where they make internal
improvements in state and local administration more attractive than gaming
the federal system. 45 Rather than undermining national diversity, as Professor Baker fears, 46 such a system could incentivize and reward difference, while considerably expanding each locality's capacity for innovation
by providing them with comparative data and basic building blocks, such
as extensive libraries of "best practices. 2 47 The clear statement rule thus
can actually impede diversity; as Professor Mashaw has pointed out, demands for exceptionally clear statutory directives tend248 to undermine, not
strengthen, the regional diversity prized by federalism.
3. Inside the Box
Now let us suppose that each state does not behave as a single composite of its overall interests. Assume instead that a state's decision to accept
or refuse federal funds is the product of an accumulation of the preferences
of individual state voters, either through a state legislature composed of
representatives responsive (to a greater or lesser degree) to diverse constituencies, or through plebiscite. Roughly speaking, voters within each
state break down into three groups: those who agree with the national majority position, those who are in the national minority but whose view
could be changed with a bribe the majority can afford, and those in the
minority who cannot be swayed by the money the majority can offer. Although we are now sketching our picture in a finer grade, the overall image
should be the same.
Our voter-level analysis suggests that there may be somewhat weaker
possibility by demanding more up front. Id. at 1242, 1248. His response to the counter-argument is
simply that state legislators might not be rational, preferring short-term benefits to long-term flexibility,
given that it may be hard to connect the legislator's earlier vote to the later costs. Id. at 1249. Putting
aside questions about whether that claim is right ("Jane Legislator has voted to accept IDEA funds
eight times ...her votes now cost us $100 million a year"), I do not understand why we would want to
design a quasi-constitutional rule that rewards such self-serving behavior. States can design institutions
that are more interested in long-term planning, and assign the power to make choices at least in part to
those institutions. For example, state agencies are more likely to be interested in preserving their longterm budgets; if they had principal authority to accept or receive funds, then Freeman Engstrom's lockin arguments would be much weaker.
245 See Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitutionof Democratic Experimentalism, 98
COLUM. L. REV. 267, 314, 321 (1998).
246 See Baker, supra note 11, at 1950-51.
247 See Doff & Sabel, supra note 245, at 322, 347, 444.
248 See Mashaw, supra note 16, at 26-27.
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constraints on conditional spending in some circumstances. Suppose, for
example, that within a state the three groups are split evenly one-third each.
Obviously, the national-majority and unswayable-national-minority voters
combined represent a majority. Both groups may be uninterested in holding up other states for funds-the majority because it does not want to risk
its coalition, the minority perhaps because they would realize little benefit
from additional funds, or view their position as inalienable. We now have
a majority in favor of accepting funds, but also a majority against holding
out for additional funds.
Individual voters may also be less likely to act strategically than states
as a whole.249 Staging a successful hold-up takes several fairly sophisticated steps. The voter has to recognize her opportunity, which means distinguishing legislation in which national uniformity is important. She must
then be prepared to follow the course of the legislation through several
rounds of negotiation, voting against it at times when the overall package is
less than ideal, and then in favor of it when the offer improves. These burdens magnify the familiar collective-action problem that deters voters from
participating vigorously in political decisions.2"
Professor Baker points to somewhat similar features as justification for
her claim that there should be judicially-enforced constraints on conditional spending.25' She claims that in some situations a conditional offer of
federal funds may not improve overall utility for a state that elects to accept, as when the unbribable minority's position is strongly held, but the
majority's preference for federal funds is relatively weak.25 2 To the extent
that the argument for an unconstrained Spending Clause depends on the
claim that conditional spending is utility maximizing, Baker's point does
superficially undermine the argument.
Baker's proposed solution of aggressive judicial enforcement of limits
on the Spending Clause, however, is out of tune with her underlying justification. She assumes that judges will be able to identify and invalidate
conditional grants in which utility declines.253 Yet the error costs of her
249 See Jackson, supra note 24, at 2216 ("Individual rights, unlike the interests of states, do not
have the same 'political safeguards' and thus require more judicial protection."); Yoo, supra note 99, at

1400.
250 See Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory Interpretation:An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 223, 229 (1986); Stigler, supra note 100, at 401-

02.
251 See Baker, supra note 11, at 1949.

252 See Baker, supra note 11, at 1949-50.

253 See Baker, supra note 11, at 1969-72. Not the least of the problems a judge would face is that
the values on either side of an equation are likely to be incommensurable, especially if one group views
the right or benefit it is foregoing as beyond price. Cf. Hills, supra note 175, at 936 (arguing that
judges are incapable of determining when states have been adequately compensated for burdens imposed on them by federal legislation); Ulen, supra note 193, at 938 (recognizing difficulty of distinguishing "circumstances in which interstate competition is good from those in which it is bad").
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approach-the familiar perils of an unelected judiciary rejecting duly enacted legislation based on its own theory of what the Constitution demands-are substantial.254
The clear statement rule might be thought an appealing resolution of
these problems. Occasional judicial intervention to block the invocation of
unclear spending conditions might send signals to voters to pay attention
during subsequent attempts to reauthorize the condition more expressly. 255
Clearer terms could reduce slightly the information costs to voters of following the course of federal legislation. 6 And the added "cost" of enacting sufficiently clear legislation, in terms of legislative time and effort,
may serve to replace in some measure the hold-up costs that otherwise constrain conditional spending. That the majority is willing to undergo these
costs allays to some extent Baker's concerns, because it demonstrates that
the majority's preference for its position is relatively strong.
Again, though, these benefits are redundant. Voters on the less popular
side of a federal spending initiative, or those who could stand to benefit
substantially from additional federal money, are a relatively discrete and
well motivated group. They will already be more attentive to the legislative process, and more dedicated to achieving the outcome they desire.
The scenario Professor Baker describes in which conditional spending
might result in an overall loss of utility also describes exactly the situation
in which a political minority is at its most active and most powerful: the
minority has a strong, well defined preference, while the majority has a
weak preference, and the benefit of the majority's preference (here, federal
dollars) is distributed widely and thinly among the majority. 7
The minority's influence is further magnified by the involvement of
administrative agencies. Administrative decisions, especially individual
enforcement decisions, are less visible to the general public, and therefore
require more attention and effort by the majority to monitor.258 In contrast,
the small sector of the public directly subject to regulation is more likely to
be aware of what an agency is doing, and faces lower transaction costs in
assembling needed information.2 5 9 That gives the smaller, regulated group
an advantage in influencing the decision makers who direct administrative
254

See Kramer, supra note 180, at 288-89; La Pierre, supra note 128, at 600, 621.

255See Smith, supra note 11, at 1202; Young, supra note 22, at 1359.
256 See Eskridge & Frickey, Clear Statement Rules, supra note 24, at 631.
257 See Richard L. Revesz, Federalismand Environmental Regulation:A Public Choice Analysis,

115 HARV. L. REV. 553, 571-72 (2001); cf. Hills, supra note 175, at 887 (noting that localities might
turn down federal subsidies for low income housing because middle class homeowners who oppose
them are more vocal and better organized than the beneficiaries).
258See Krent, supra note 159, at 717; Jonathan R. Macey, Public Choice and the LegalAcademy,
86 GEO. L.J. 1075, 1081 (1998) (reviewing JERRY L. MASHAW, GREED, CHAOS, AND GOVERNANCE:
USING PUBLIC CHOICE TO IMPROVE PUBLIC LAw (1997)).

259 See Stewart, supra note 234, at 1686.
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policy. 260 And, as I have mentioned, there are other factors, such as an
agency's dependence on state regulators for information and political support, its history of cooperation and shared personnel with state agencies,
and its need to cultivate outside lobbyists to support its goals, that enhance
the power of groups most directly affected by regulation.26'
All of these factors are generally portrayed as undesirable features of
the administrative process, largely because they are thought to reduce public accountability.2 62 The same might be said, though, of the Great Compromise. Both significantly enhance the power of minorities to block policy that would otherwise command a popular majority. 263 Both also help to
produce a more even distribution of benefits and burdens, thereby encouraging compromise and strengthening the commitment of both sides to the
system as a whole. 2 4 In that sense, then, they may actually be more "democratic" than their critics generally appreciate.
In any event, whatever the "democratic" credentials of the administrative process, it is likely here to stay. And in a system of conditional federal
spending that employs agencies to superintend the day-to-day compliance
of grantees with federal law, agencies offer a significant opportunity for
political influence by those who have "lost" at the national level. Perhaps
ironically, the pervasive role of federal agencies (and of joint federal and
state regulatory enterprises) is the most powerful check on the power of
Congress to utilize the Spending Clause to expand the influence of federal
policy decisions.
To sum up, it appears that whether considered at the scale of states or
individual voters, the political limits on congressional spending authority
need little supplement. At those points where spending conditions would
be most troubling-in extending Congress's reach beyond other enumerated powers, and in extracting agreement against the will of a minority that
places a high value on its contrary view-the structural barriers to federal
authority are most imposing. As judicial enforcement of federalism in
other areas increases, the need for a clear statement rule affecting conditions of spending decreases. And even in routine uses conditional spending
faces unusually high costs, both literally and politically. Of course it is
probably impossible to state in a meaningful way the point at which exercise of the spending power is "difficult enough," or sufficiently con260

See Garrett, supra note 99, at 522; Hills, supra note 175, at 887; Krent, supra note 159, at

717; Stewart, supra note 234, at 1686.
261 See supra text accompanying notes 232-35; see also Hills, BureaucraticPower, supra note
212, at 1255.
262 See Krent, supra note 159, at 710 n.2 (collecting critics of delegation).
263 See Baker, supra note 11, at 211; David B. Spence & Frank Cross, A Public Choice Casefor
the Administrative State, 89 GEo. L.J. 97, 124 (2000).
264 See Spence & Cross, supra note 263, at 124.
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strained, so as to need no further limitations.26 5 Nonetheless, given the
substantial, unique political limitations on the spending power, it seems
implausible to claim that it is so "under-enforced" that it must be buttressed
by a clear statement rule.266
V. CLEARING UP TRANSPARENCY

In the last Part I noted that one of the underlying assumptions in my
analysis of the political process at the level of the individual voter is that
state elected officials respond to voter preferences about policy choices.
The last of the major critiques of conditional spending speaks to the heart
of this assumption, claiming that Spending Clause legislation blurs the
lines of accountability for both federal and state legislators. According to
some commentators, Spending Clause legislation has the potential to confuse voters about which legislative body or other governmental unit is responsible for the policies that result from a state's decision to accept conditional funding.267 If that is right, then it may be difficult for voters to hold
state officials accountable for their choices, which in turn might weaken
my claim that the political process adequately limits federal spending
power. Alternatively, the critique might establish that political checks on
conditional federal spending come at the cost of transparency, and therefore democratic accountability, and for that reason alone merit closer judicial scrutiny.
The transparency critique, however, rests on several shaky assumptions
itself. The critique's proponents maintain that the boundary-spanning
structure of conditional spending confuses voters.26 Under this argument,
federal officials might force each state to enact and enforce unpopular policies, so that state voters blame state officials, rather than their congressional representatives or the President, for the distasteful results. 269 At the
same time, state officials can take cover in federal mandates, claiming that
bad results-either in particular, or in more general form, such as high state
taxes or poor economic performance-are the fault of the feds, not their
265 See Briffault, supra note 219, at 1304.
266 See Mashaw, supra note 16, at 24; cf. Coenen, supra note 24, at 1297 n.86, 1398-99 (arguing
that there is not much point in clear statement rule for congressional abrogation of state sovereign
immunity now that there are more direct, strongly enforced judicial limits on that power); Levin, supra
note 58, at 1363, 1366 (arguing similarly that direct enforcement of federalism values makes the Gregory clear statement rule cumulative); Adrian Vermeule, Saving Constructions, 85 GEO. L.J. 1945, 1965
(1997) (arguing that courts should eschew avoidance unless protecting rights that are particularly fragile and important).
267 See McCoy & Friedman, supra note 9, at 124; Young, supra note 22, at 1360; Note, supra
note 12, at 1420.
268 See McCoy & Friedman, supra note 9, at 124; Zietlow, supra note 10, at 203; Note, supra
note 12, at 1420.
269 See McCoy & Friedman, supra note 9, at 125; Note, supra note 12, at 1420, 1429.
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own bad judgment.
The first problem with these arguments is that it is not clear why the
supposedly confused voters in each hypothetical are wrong. A state official who chose to accept federal funds should be called to account for the
choices he makes, and the federal official should be held to answer for the
hard choices he puts to the states. The ultimate policy decision could not
come into effect without affirmative decisions by both sides, and, as joint
venturers, they are both entitled to credit or blame. One set of commentators asserts that the federal government should not be able to shift blame
" ' But that
for its choices onto the state officials who choose to accept.27
argument depends on the assumption that the state's acceptance is coerced.
I have already shown that it is not. Indeed, most recent commentary has
contrasted conditional spending with what some call "commandeering,"
where the federal government directs the states or their officers to act with
no opportunity to decline.2 72 Even if the latter is illegitimate, these
commentators generally acknowledge, the former is not.273
Nor is there any particular reason to believe that voters will fail to understand that both ends of the conditional spending transaction are accountable for the outcome.274 Voters who are interested enough to follow
an issue are likely to know from whence the object of their displeasure
emerged. Unjustly accused officials can point fingers back, and have a
strong incentive to lobby for change.275 To the extent that candidates do
not have the resources to make voters understand their message, and voters
270See McCoy & Friedman, supra note 9, at 125; Young, supra note 22, at 1360-61;
Note, supra
note 12, at 1420.
271 See Neal Katyal Kumar, Judges as Advicegivers, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1709, 1718 (1998); Note,

supra note 12, at 1434.
272 See Jackson, supra note 24, at 2211 & n.141; La Pierre, supra note 128, at 643-44 n.366;
Zietlow, supra note 10, at 190; cf La Pierre, supra note 128, at 658-60 (arguing that, while federal
statutes imposing uncompensated duties on state officers are unconstitutional, threats to preempt if the
state fails to comply with the federal demand are not because the federal government would have to pay
if its bluff is called).
273 See Chemerinsky, supra note 30, at 97, 101; Jackson, supra note 24, at 2211; Weiser, supra
note 241, at 702-03; Zietlow, supra note 10, at 190. But see Adler & Kreimer, supra note 48, at 110
(arguing that both commandeering and cooperation undermine accountability); Hills, supra note 175, at
826. I should note that I am unpersuaded by these efforts to distinguish commandeering from conditional spending; in my view, both are constitutionally unremarkable. State voters rely on state elected
officials not only to govem directly but also to serve as their agents in relation to the federal government. It is perfectly reasonable to hold our agents accountable for failing in their intergovernmental
lobbying efforts to prevent "commandeering" legislation. Thus, in both cases voters are properly
distributing blame to both sets of elected representatives.
274 See Adler, supra note 3, at 1240-41; Chemerinsky, supra note 30, at 100; Hills, supra note
175, at 910; Moulton, supra note 24, at 877.
275 See Chemerinsky, supra note 30, at 100; Hills, supranote 175, at 910. Indeed, as I mentioned
in an earlier footnote, a state official who fails to lobby against unpopular federal legislation is not
doing her job, and deserves the anger of her constituency. See supra note 273. Blaming these unsuccessful lobbyists is accountability, not confusion.
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do not have time to search out the truth, that is as much an argument for
campaign finance reform as it is for limiting the power of the federal
government.
It might be argued, however, that a clear statement rule could again be
something of a second best solution. Clearly worded legislation might
conceivably make it more difficult for federal officials to shift blame for
their own policy decisions entirely onto state officials, perhaps by making
it more likely that voters will notice the federal enactment, or making-it
more evident that the state's obligation was imposed, rather than freely
chosen. That clarity, however, is a double-edged sword. To the extent that
it gives spending legislation the appearance of a federal mandate, clear
language also makes it easier for state officials to pretend that the outcome
is solely a federal decision, rather than one that was bargained for and
agreed to by the state.
In any event, this debate overlooks the more fundamental point that
transparency is contingent on institutional design. A well-built cooperative
federal-state enterprise can activate and inform citizens, by incorporating
them in planning, implementation, and evaluation at all levels. 76 Centralized benchmarking of parallel enterprises might give local voters a way of
comparing the performance of their state representatives to those elsewhere, making the state officials more accountable for their choices than
they would be in a purely local system. 7 Obviously, not every conditional
expenditure will be so well designed. It is implausible, though, to read the
Constitution based on an assumption that none of them could be.
VI. RECONSTITUTING THE CONSTITUTION IN THE COURTS
Until now I have concentrated most of my efforts on debunking many
of the supposed dangers of the Spending Clause. In this Part I want to turn
to a major benefit of conditional spending so far neglected in the current
literature. As other commentators-and Congress itself-have recognized,
the Spending Clause offers an opportunity to make constitutional norms
not enforceable by federal courts binding on the states.278 It has not previously been observed, though, that the Spending Clause is actually a necessary structural component in seeing that the Constitution's promises are
fully realized. Modern constitutional interpretation uses statutory interpretation as its primary tool of constitutional enforcement, and leaves the core
of each constitutional right, which cannot be superseded by ordinary politics, somewhat "under-enforced." But the federal courts have no lasting
power over state law. Thus, in federal court, the Constitution's power over
276 See Dorf & Sabel, supra note 245, at 313.
277 See id. at 314, 321.
278 See supra note 11.
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state law is weaker than its influence over federal legislation. Subpart
VI.A explores the contours of this limited Constitution. Subpart VI.B
moves on to address the ways in which federal legislation and administration can serve to supplement the rights the Court has been willing and able
to defend. The clear statement rule, however, has thus far kept us from
realizing the extent of these advantages, by constricting the open texture
available for federal courts to interpret in giving meaning to federal constitutional norms, and by casting a cloud over whether there is any role at all
for agency interpretation. My claim therefore is that the clear statement
rule cannot be squared with contemporary constitutional thinking.
Of course, in recent years the Court has also repeatedly rejected congressional efforts to "enforce" the Fourteenth Amendment against the
states.279 Subpart VI.C attempts a sort of internal critique of these cases.
After outlining sympathetic accounts of three possible justifications for the
Court's decisions, I argue that building redefined rights into conditional
grants of federal funds largely eliminates each of the three concerns. Administrative involvement gives the Court greater assurance of an ongoing,
considered political commitment to the chosen policy, and a governmental
partner to take responsibility over time. And the political constraints on
conditional spending I have already described help to keep federal rights
and state policy making in equipoise.
A. The Limited Constitution
1. Judicial Review of State Law in the Era of "Under-enforced"
Rights
As Alexander Bickel described, and later authors like Lawrence Sager
have analyzed in greater depth, the Supreme Court recognizes an abbreviated version of the Constitution.2"' In many areas, ranging from the Constitution's guarantee of a republican form of government to the application of
the Equal Protection Clause to public school funding, the Court has concluded that it is not institutionally capable of defining or enforcing what
arguably are the full expanses of the rights protected by the Constitution.28'
And yet, as Sager and others have argued, the Constitution surely does
279 See Evan H. Caminker, "Appropriate" Means-Ends Constraints on Section 5 Powers, 53

STAN. L. REV. 1127, 1133 (2001).
280 See Sager, supra note 184, at 1213-20.
281 See Rachel E. Barkow, More Supreme Than Court? The Fall of the Political Question Doctrine and the Rise of Judicial Supremacy, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 237, 252-53, 329 (2002); Brest, supra
note 4, at 104-05; Hershkoff, supra note 193, at 1862-63; Sager, supra note 184, at 1217. To the
catalogue offered by Bickel one might also add more recent innovations such as constitutional limits on
standing, which arguably rest on the Court's fear of being dragged by individual litigants into political
debates that will undermine its credibility and authority, or forced to decide difficult issues without
sufficiently comprehensive understanding of the relevant facts.
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not shrink to fit the scope of what an assembly of nine unelected officials
can understand and enforce.282 For example, when the Court chose not to
recognize a judicially-enforceable right not to have one's vote diluted, it
rejected not the notion that the Constitution values meaningful participation in the democratic process, but rather the possibility that a court could
do more good than harm in trying to identify when that value had been
offended by state action.283 The constitutional norm remained intact; it was
only the judiciary's power to vindicate it that had been thrown into question. Similarly, a constitutional violation is no less a violation because a
given plaintiff lacks standing to assert it.
Of course, one could make the positivist claim that the Constitution is
meaningful only to the extent that it can be enforced in a court. But that
argument is implausible and probably not one that would be advanced by a
responsible judiciary. Other governmental actors sometimes behave as
though they are constrained by constitutional provisions the Court has decided are non-justiciable. 284 At the least, it would be undesirable for the
Court to suggest otherwise. Besides the obvious impact such a rule would
have on the likelihood of self-compliance, it would also diminish the
Court's5 potential as an expositor of meaning and value for society at
28
large.
Indeed, as I discussed in Part IV, the idea that the Constitution is "under-enforced" is the central premise of modern principles of constitutional
avoidance.286 Federal courts now interpret federal statutes and regulations
with the strong presumption that, absent very clearly contrary semantic
evidence, the statute or regulation does not require or regulate conduct in a
way that would raise "serious" constitutional questions. 287 By avoiding the
need actually to decide the constitutional question, the court in effect ex282 See Brest, supra note 4, at 66-67; Colker & Brudney, supra note 21, at 120; Michael W.

McConnell, Institutions and Interpretation:A Critique of City of Boerne v. Flores, 111 HARV. L. REV.
153, 156 (1997); Neuman, supra note 2, at 1643-44; Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Equal Protection by Law: FederalAntidiscrimination Legislation After Morrison and Kimel, 110 YALE L.J. 441,
464-65 (2000) [hereinafter Post & Siegel, Equal Protection];Sager, supra note 184, at 1220-21.
283 See Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 554-56 (1946); Sager, supranote 184, at 1224.
284 See Brest, supra note 4, at 83-93, 99; McConnell, supra note 282, at 171 & n.123; Mark
Tushnet, Evaluating Congressional Constitutional Interpretation: Some Criteria and Two Informal

Case Studies, 50 DUKE L.J. 1395, 1417-18, 1424 (2001).
285See Barry Friedman, Dialogue and Judicial Review, 91 MICH. L. REV. 577, 653-55, 668-71
(1993).

286 See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 348

(2000).

287 See Frederick Schauer, Ashwander Revisited, 1995 SuP. CT. REV. 71, 82-83; Vermeule, su-

pra note 266, at 1949.
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pands the scope of the underlying right,"' in some cases displacing the
most natural or obvious reading of the text even where, if push came to
doctrinal shove, the textual command would be constitutional.2 9
This method has a number of benefits. By leaving open the possibility
that the Court's decision could be overturned legislatively, avoidance helps
to alleviate the Court's concern about displacing the policy decisions of the
more representative branches.
At the same time, the avoidance decision
may encourage constitutional reasoning during the subsequent legislative
debate, both by signaling to legislators themselves and also potentially
activating otherwise inattentive voters. 29' Furthermore, avoidance partners
the Court with Congress and/or the Executive in the elaboration and enforcement of the Constitution. 292 A Congress that chooses not to overturn
an avoidance decision because it is convinced by the Court's constitutional
reasoning takes much of the political "heat" of a potentially controversial
decision off the Court itself.29 3 And, to the extent that the Court's constitutional judgment might depend on unresolved facts or policy judgments, its
avoidance decision could be something like a jurisprudential flow chart: "If
A is true, then we would reach result one. If A is false, then we would
reach result two. We remand to Congress for determination of whether A
is true or false." In this way, avoidance allows the Court to make at least
partial constitutional decisions in the face of what it perceives as its limited
expertise and accountability.
The avoidance method is so attractive that it actually exerts doctrinal
pressure on the scope of what we have traditionally labeled constitutional
"rights." That is, the Court takes a narrower view of rights that cannot be
displaced by the other branches exactly because it prefers to define rights
288 See Alexander M. Bickel & Harry H. Wellington, Legislative Purpose and the JudicialProcess: The Lincoln Mills Case, 71 HARV. L. REV. 1, 27-28 (1957); Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation-inthe Classroomand in the Courtroom,50 U. CHi. L. REV. 800, 816 (1983); Young, supra

note 58, at 1551-52, 1594-99.
289 See Barkow, supra note 281, at 314; William K. Kelley, Avoiding ConstitutionalQuestions as
a Three-Branch Problem, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 831, 857-58 (2001); Vermeule, supra note 266, at
1960.
290 See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 4-5 (1980); Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century of PlenaryPower: Phantom ConstitutionalNorms and Statutory Interpreta-

tion, 100 YALE L.J. 545, 563 (1990); Schauer, supra note 287, at 71; Young, supra note 58, at 160607; see also Eskridge & Frickey, Clear Statement Rules, supra note 24, at 630-31 (arguing that the
same is true of clear statement rules generally).
291 See Young, supra note 58, at 1608; see also Jackson, supra note 24, at 2234 (making same
observations about clear statement rules generally),
292 See Paul W. Kahn, Community in ContemporaryConstitutional
Theory, 99 YALE L.J. 1, 7-16
(1989); Klein, supra note 177, at 602; Lisa A. Kloppenberg, Avoiding ConstitutionalQuestions, 35
B.C. L. REV. 1003, 1005 (1994) [hereinafter Kloppenberg, Avoiding ConstitutionalQuestions]; Krent,
supra note 159, at 750-51; cf.Sunstein, supra note 128, at 88 (offering this same justification in favor
of variety of "minimalist" judicial techniques).
293 See Coenen, supra note 190, at 1591.
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in a way that permits congressional and executive involvement. 294 Even
under this view it may still be useful to make a semantic distinction between constitutional "rights" and "mere" statutory interpretation. But,
whatever our language, it is evident that each is defined in relation to the
other. The Court's very conception of a constitutional "right" now includes two parts, one politically contingent (i.e., defeasible by statute) and
the other not.295

As a result, a constitutional regime in which avoidance is sometimes
prohibited is inherently deficient. When avoidance is impossible, the
court's interpretive regime not only omits the politically contingent portion
of a given right, but also recognizes only core apolitical rights which have
been defined narrowly on the assumption that they will be complemented
by their political partners.296

One significant downside to the avoidance scheme of constitutional enforcement is that federal courts cannot authoritatively interpret state law.297
Thus, a federal court that refuses to reach the core constitutionality of a
state law on the assumption that the statute does not actually authorize the
constitutionally dubious conduct runs the risk that a month or a year later a
294 See Eskridge & Frickey, Law as Equilibrium, supra note 17, at 44; Post & Siegel, Equal Pro-

tection, supra note 282, at 517; Tracy A. Thomas, Congress' Section 5 Power and Remedial Rights, 34
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 673, 722-23 (2001). For an extensive discussion of this tension in the development of immigration law, see Motomura, supra note 290, at 564, 568-74, 610-11.
295 See Coenen, supra note 190, at 1862-66; Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration,99 COLUM. L. REV. 857, 885 (1999); Thomas, supra note 294, at 694-95; Young,
supranote 58, at 1551-52, 1594-99.
296 Of course, given that the avoidance doctrine has a number of detractors, it might be argued
that a scheme in which it plays a lesser role is much to be desired. Although the details of these critiques are beyond the scope of this Article, in broad outline they are not especially persuasive. Critics
generally claim that avoidance hypocritically claims to elevate legislative supremacy but, in fact, usually displaces what Congress would want. See, e.g., Lisa A. Kloppenberg, Avoiding Serious Constitutional Doubts: The Supreme Court's Constructionof Statutes Raising Free Speech Concerns, 30 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 1, 76 (1996) [hereinafter Kloppenberg, Serious Doubts]; Schauer, supra note 287, at
88-89, 94-95. That criticism has little force if we understand avoidance as simply another form of
judicial review, with no pretensions of exalting legislative supremacy over all other values. Avoidance
is more deferential than outright invalidation, but sometimes not much more. See Galle, FederalAgencies, supra note 149, at 220. Critics also worry that avoidance is confusing, because it leaves underlying constitutional doctrine unsettled. See Kloppenberg, supra, at 55-56, 73-74. But that is precisely
the point; avoidance allows the court to deter undesirable conduct without paying the full cost of invalidation. Cf. Adler & Kreimer, supra note 48, at 137 (making this point about virtues of Court's
confusing federalism doctrines). Finally, some authors worry that avoidance duplicates many of the
features of judicial review without the careful thought and rhetorical justification that ordinarily goes
with core constitutional adjudication. The "serious" constitutional question prerequisite, however,
imposes virtually the same demands. NLRB v. Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. 490, 500-01 (1979); see
Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 190-91 (1991) (analyzing in detail constitutionality of regulation to
determine whether it presents a "doubtful" constitutional question).
297 See Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 330-31 (1988); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104,
110 (1972); Coenen, supra note 24, at 1307; Kelley, supra note 289, at 836 n.14.
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state court will reach the opposite statutory ruling.298 While in theory the
federal court might then reopen its door to the party it erroneously turned
away, the federal courts generally have found that the more economic approach is not to make such predictions at all. 299 Further, in many cases the
federal court will be able to provide a remedy only if there is a federal constitutional violation-for example, if the suit was brought under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, or any time the defendant is the state itself.3 0 Avoidance in those
situations would leave the plaintiff with nothing but a favorable, but not
binding, precedent to present to a state court in a subsequent suit (and even
that assumes one is available, that further delay would not be the same as
an outright loss, and so on).
This, then, is the dilemma of federal judicial review of state law. Federal courts depend on the avoidance canon to make up for their own institutional shortcomings, and to give more complete meaning to recognized
constitutional norms. In many cases, the core "right" defining the scope of
immovable judicial protection for the norm itself may have been defined
narrowly on the assumption that avoidance would be available where application of the norm was difficult or contingent on determinations the
court could not easily make for itself. Yet federal courts cannot meaningfully use tools of statutory interpretation to shape state law. As a result, the
vigor of judicially-enforced constitutional norms is considerably diminished against the states.
2. Some Objections Considered
I do not want to suggest that my claim that in court the Constitution
binds the states rather less strongly than it constrains the federal government is open-and-shut. Federal courts do have some other methods for
recreating the avoidance canon when they are confronting state law. And
certainly there is always state-court review of federal constitutional claims.
In this subpart I consider both objections.
The first objection, again, is that federal courts already do account in a
298

See Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 428 (1979); Ala. State Fed'n of Labor v. McAdory, 325

U.S. 450, 471 (1945); Nicholson v. Scoppetta, 344 F.3d 154, 170 (2d Cir. 2003).
299 See Nicholson, 344 F.3d at 170. Several opinions seem to go even farther, suggesting that this
rule of economy is constitutionally mandated by Article I's case or controversy requirement. See id.
(citing Sims, 442 U.S. at 428; Rescue Army v. Mun. Court, 331 U.S. 549, 577-78 (1947)); cf.Michigan
v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1042 (1983) ("The jurisdictional concern is that we not 'render an advisory
opinion, and if the same judgment would be rendered by the state court after we corrected its views of
federal laws, our review could amount to nothing more than an advisory opinion."') (quoting Herb v.
Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 126 (1945)).
300 Extant sovereign-immunity constraints on supplemental jurisdiction also mean that federal
plaintiffs will never be able to raise state administrative law challenges in federal court. See Raygor v.
Regents of the Univ. of Minn., 534 U.S. 533, 539-42 (2002); Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 117-21 (1984). 1 am assuming for the moment that the plaintiff has no independent
federal statutory claim.
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variety of ways for their bounded authority over state law. However, none
of these solutions is especially powerful.3 ' Federal courts can, however,
also attempt to avoid constitutional adjudication by shifting state-law decisions to state courts. Pullman abstention"' is the most significant tool for
this kind of dodge, although it has now been replaced in most courts by
certification, which avoids some of the delay and unfairness that comes
with obliging plaintiffs to commence their state litigation from scratch. 3
Younger abstention,' in which federal courts decline equity jurisdiction
where they might be obliged to enjoin certain forms of ongoing or imminent state proceeding, can serve a similar function, although in the case of
Younger often both the state- and federal-law claims end up being heard in
state court. 30 5 But the effectiveness of any of these measures depends on
whether the state court is adequately equipped to carry out the task of
avoidance.
Thus, the better objection is that state courts are also capable of interpreting their own statutes to avoid potential constitutional questions. Indeed, some state courts possess the broad law-making authority that federal
courts deny themselves, so that a state court might be able to defy even the
plain text of a state law to prevent confrontation with a serious constitu-

301 For example, the vagueness and overbreadth doctrines both seem to allow federal courts some

latitude to interpret state law. See Coenen, supra note 24, at 1307-08. Both allow a federal court to
declare a state law unconstitutional based on the claim that it fails to give the public adequate notice
about what conduct is prohibited under the statute, notwithstanding the fact that a state court could
conceivably either find the statute perfectly clear or issue a subsequent clarifying or narrowing interpretation. Although the federal court is supposed to take account of the possibility that there exists an
unambiguous reading of the statute, see Virginia v. Am. BooksellersAss'n, 484 U.S. 383, 397 (1988), it
is possible that the federal court will insist on using an approach to interpretation that admits of more
ambiguity than the state court would choose. But both doctrines are applied only in narrow circumstances, and inconsistently even there. See Stuart Buck & Mark L. Rienzi, Federal Courts, Overbreadth, and Vagueness: Guiding Principles for Constitutional Challenges to Uninterpreted State
Statutes, 2002 UTAH L. REV. 381, 381-82; Vermeule, supra note 266, at 1966-68 (arguing that overbreadth serves as complement to, not replacement for, avoidance).
Professor Kloppenberg argues, somewhat unaccountably, that the Supreme Court can interpret
state law in order to avoid constitutional questions. Kloppenberg, Avoiding ConstitutionalQuestions,
supra note 292, at 1056. Her authority for this claim, however, is Siler v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co., 213 U.S. 175 (1909), a product of the pre-Erie era in which federal courts in fact had interpretive power over state law. Yet, as I discuss in the text, the entire premise of Pullman abstention is
that Erie prevents federal courts from using avoidance techniques directly on state law. Siler is also
difficult to reconcile with modem limitations on pendent jurisdiction, which often will mean that a
federal court cannot even hear state-law claims. See Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 104-21 (rejecting plaintiffs' claim that Siler authorized their pendent state-law suit against state officers).
302 R.R. Comm'n of Tex. v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941).
303 See Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 75-76 (1997).
304 Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971); see Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n v. Dayton Christian
Sch., 477 U.S. 619, 625-28 (1986).
305 See Dayton Christian Sch., 477 U.S. at 628; RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART AND
WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1226-27 (5th ed. 2003).
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tional problem. 3° State courts also have much more authority over state
administrative agencies, since federal courts do not have jurisdiction (absent state waiver) to hear state-law challenges to the actions of state agencies or their officers sued in their official capacity.3 7
The trouble with this objection is that federal norms are often contrary
to the interest of individual states. Many federal constitutional provisions
serve to prevent destructive collective-action problems that arise when
states compete with and affect each other. The Court's Dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence obviously is strongly influenced by these considerations, 30 8 as is its interpretation of the Article I grant of diversity
jurisdiction. ° Perhaps less obviously, the Constitution also prohibits
states from discriminating against migrants from other states; 3'0 helps assure that states cannot compete for employers by weakening labor rights,
such as the right to organize and picket; 31 I draws lower bounds on the extent to which the state can cut taxes by economizing on government services that contribute to the due process of law; 3 12 and removes exit-driven
political pressure to restrict core unpopular individual rights, including the
rights of criminal defendants and political and religious dissenters. In
short, we could well conceive of all of the incorporated provisions of the
Bill of Rights as resting, at least with one foot, on the ground that they represent public goods that can only be protected effectively if protected by a
central authority. 3 3 Furthermore, as other commentators have observed,
the Court's constitutional decisions can often best be explained as efforts
by a national popular majority to prevent contrary behavior by a local mi-

306

See State v. Williams, 205 Conn. 456, 472-74, 534 A.2d 230, 239 (1987) (collecting cases);

Buck & Rienzi, supra note 301, at 398 n.79; Hershkoff, supra note 193, at 1836-37; Sager, supra note
184, at 1256-57.
307 See Galle, FederalAgencies, supranote 149, at 206 n.202, 213-14 (explaining
that combined
effect of limits on supplemental jurisdiction and federal deference to state definitions of what constitutes a sovereign entity is that state agency cannot be sued in federal court unless state consents).
308 See TRIBE, supra note 23, § 6-5, at 1051; Eskridge & Frickey, Law as Equilibrium, supra
note
17, at 52.
See FALLON ET AL., supra note 305, at 1454-55.
310 See Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 498-504 (1999); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 642
(1969).
311 See, e.g., Allee v. Medrano, 416 U.S. 802, 819 n.13 (1974) (right to
organize); Thomhill v.
Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 101-06 (1940) (right to picket). But see Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 51721 (1976) (concluding that First Amendment does not protect right to picket on private store property);
id. at 535, 539-40 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (noting that private power to exclude uses inconsistent with
owners' general purposes devolves from state).
312 See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332-35 (1976).
313 See CHOPER, supra note 24, at 185; cf. Adler & Kreimer, supra note 48, at 127-30 (arguing
that diversity and experimentation arguments for federalism limits on national power are unpersuasive
when applied to the Fourteenth Amendment, which is supposed to protect rights that should be universal or are essential to a fair political process).
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nority.3" 4 It would be surprising if the local minority enforced the Court's
majoritarian view of a constitutional provision against itself as effectively
as the majority's courts would.
The objector now might respond that the weaknesses in her argument
are only apparent if state judicial decisions reflect the political interests of
their states, rather than a principled nationalist reading of the Constitution.315 The first problem with this counter-argument is that state courts, in
the abstract, are subject to political pressure.3 16 States have substantial
freedom to define the structure of their judiciary, and in fact many state
judges are elected.3 17 Even if the manner of state judicial selection were
constrained by federal law, state legislatures might well still have plenary
power to set the rules of interpretation and precedent for their courts.
While the state courts must generally be open to federal claims,3"' it is not
clear at present whether states could by legislation dramatically reduce the
force of state judicial interpretation of constitutional law, for example, by
outlawing the avoidance canon. 319 Thus, whatever the skill and principle of
314 See MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS 129-53 (1999);

Eskridge & Frickey, Law as Equilibrium, supra note 17, at 88; Hershkoff, supra note 193, at 1903-04;
cf. La Pierre, supranote 128, at 641-42 (arguing that courts should recognize national political choices
over those of state or local government).
315 See, e.g., FALLON ET AL., supra note 305, at 1225 ("[B]y 1971 there was no reason to think
state courts generally untrustworthy in cases involving claimed federal rights .... ").
316 See DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE 71 n.26 (1991);
Hershkoff, supra note 193, at 1887; Mark Tushnet, ConstitutionalInterpretationand Judicial Selection: A View from The Federalist Papers, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1669, 1669 (1988).
317 See Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 790-92 (2002) (O'Connor, J., concurring); Steven P. Croley, The MajoritarianDifficulty: Elective Judiciariesand the Rule of Law, 62 U.
CHI. L. REV. 689, 725 (1995); John Choon Yoo, Who Measures the Chancellor'sFoot? The Inherent
Remedial Authority of the FederalCourts, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1121, 1167 (1996).
318 See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 752 (1999); Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 358, 367-70
(1990); Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 389 (1947).
319 Cf Robert A. Schapiro, Conceptions and Misconceptions of State ConstitutionalLaw in Bush
v. Gore, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 661, 680-81 (2001) [hereinafter Schapiro, Misconceptions] (claiming
that states are very creative in finding ways to limit judicial review); Robert A. Schapiro, Judicial
Deference and Interpretive Coordinacy in State and Federal ConstitutionalLaw, 85 CORNELL L. REV.
656, 690-92 (2000) (noting that some states restrict state constitutional review of state statutes).
In other contexts the Constitution appears to place some limits on state power to define state
jurisprudential and interpretive theory. In Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983), the Supreme Court
held that it had power under Article III to review ultimate state court decisions unless the state decision
was clearly based on an adequate and independent state ground. Id. at 1039-42. Interestingly, the
Court stated that where a state-law doctrine was intended to incorporate or adopt federal law concepts,
any decision based on that doctrine would be a reviewable federal-law decision, not state law. See id.
at 1042 n.8. Why that should be so is, obviously, rather beyond my scope here. The point is that the
Long interpretive rule is contrary to some potential jurisprudential views of what makes law. ror
example, under a strong positivist view, any law issued by a state court, interpreting state law or the
state constitution, might be state law, regardless of the provenance of its reasoning. Long therefore
suggests, as I said, that the Constitution may exclude some potential state definitions of the meaning of
state law.
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state judges, 320 state courts may not be a welcoming place for some federal
rights.32'
But even supposing that state courts are perfectly insulated from the
pressures of state competition, and can vigorously apply avoidance principles, they can still be overruled by their own political branches. That, after
all, is the nature of avoidance. The same is true even if state courts rely on
state constitutional grounds, rather than statutory interpretation, for their
decisions; the political cost of overruling is just higher for the former.322
Could we make a similar argument that states cannot forbid the avoidance canon, or at least that
Congress or the Supreme Court may have the power to prohibit them from doing so? I think so, although probably not under existing case law. But cf. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 111-15 (2000)
(Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (reviewing and arguing for overturning the Florida State Supreme Court's
decision on state election law grounds by finding that Article H constrains such state laws); Henry Paul
Monaghan, Supreme Court Review of State-CourtDeterminationsof State Law in ConstitutionalCases,
103 COLUM. L. REV. 1919, 1925 (2003) (arguing that the Supreme Court has "ancillary" jurisdiction to
review a state court's decision involving a "federal constitutional provision [that] directly constrains or
incorporates state law"). The basic premise of the argument would be that a state court adjudicating a
federal claim is acting as one of the "inferior courts" Congress may establish under Article 1. The
power to establish those courts, we have been told, includes the power to make rules of decision in
those courts. And the Supreme Court has inherent supervisory power over its inferior courts. See
James E. Pfander, Marbury, OriginalJurisdiction,and the Supreme Court's Supervisory Powers, 101
COLUM. L. REV. 1515, 1518-19 (2001).
320 See Sager, supra note 184, at 1247-49 (discussing debate over whether state judges are as
good as federal judges at adjudicating federal rights).
321 On the other hand, it is true that the Madisonian Compromise assumed that there might not be
any inferior federal courts, see FALLON ET AL., supra note 305, at 8, and for a long time even plaintiffs
with federal claims for damages could not get into federal court unless their claim was worth a substantial amount of money. Id. at 1473. Both of these structural features imply an assumption that state
courts are adequate to preserve federal rights, presumably including those that would implicate interstate competition. Quite possibly that assumption is mistaken; for example, the Madisonian Compromise antedated the Bill of Rights and the idea of the Dormant Commerce Clause, and it was arguably
exactly the pressure of incorporation that killed the minimum-value restriction on federal claims. See
id. (noting widespread exceptions to amount in controversy requirement in cases that seemed to implicate national interests). But perhaps Madison's Compromise obliges us to find a way to harmonize
later developments in constitutional law with the premise of state court exclusivity. One such harmony
might be to accept that the state courts are at least adequate to protect what I have called "core" constitutional rights-rights that cannot be altered by the political process. And, to make up for the tools of
statutory interpretation needed to protect the full scope of the federal right, state judges might draw on
federal legislation (including federal spending legislation) instantiating federal constitutional values,
which through the Supremacy Clause also must prevail over contrary state law. In Subparts VI.B and
C, I explain why conditional federal spending legislation is especially useful for that purpose.
Another harmonization, as I suggested in an earlier footnote, would be to permit Congress or the
Supreme Court to place some limits on state political control over state jurisprudence, perhaps by using
their power over "inferior" federal courts. See supra note 319. Proposals to limit the election of state
judges offer a similar appeal.
322 See Hershkoff, supra note 193, at 1887; Schapiro, Misconceptions,supranote 319, at 679-80.
Of course, a state court can label what it does as federal constitutional law, and its interpretation of the
federal constitution is basically irreversible by the state's own population. But that very fact may well
be why the Supreme Court is so aggressive in identifying state interpretations of federal law for its own
review. As a result, it is not always easy for a state court to treat a federal constitutional provision
differently than federal courts have. And remember that in defining a federal constitutional right one
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There is therefore little guarantee that in the end the state will be fully constrained by the federal norm. Of course, it might be argued that political
defeasibility is exactly the point of non-core constitutional rights. But political decisions at the state level, as I have said, raise problems of collective action between states as well as of local intransigence. In contrast,
legislative or executive decisions at the federal level will internalize (albeit
sometimes imperfectly) the competitive forces that the constitutional rights
are in part aimed at preventing. And, obviously, a statute is by definition a
majoritarian act.
The bottom line, therefore, is that absent some supplement, the full
panoply of federal rights available in federal court is not effective against
state actors.
B. The Clear Statement Rule Keeps the ConstitutionLimited...
How, then, does this deficiency relate to the clear statement rule? Begin with this question: If, as I have just claimed, there is a large imbalance
in the judicial enforcement of federal constitutional rights, why has it gone
unnoticed? The answer (probably obviously) is that most important constitutional rights running against state and local governments are now supplemented by federal statute or regulation.323 Some of these enactments
have claimed expressly to be vindicating what Congress and the President
understand to be the obligations of the Constitution.324 Others, although
nominally an exercise of some other congressional power, such as the
Commerce Clause, are widely acknowledged to be in the service of constitutional norms of fairness or equality.325
In addition to filling the jurisprudential space that would otherwise be
left in federal judicial review of state law,326 federal legislation restores the
collaborative framework that is the heart of the avoidance method. 327 Recall that avoidance allows courts to draw on the superior political insight
and fact-finding capabilities of Congress and the Executive Branch in crafting not only the defeasible aspects of a constitutional right but also the
content of its inalterable core. As Professors Post and Siegel have pointed
factor the Court considers (outside what I have called the indefeasible "core" of that right) is the fact
that the elaboration of the right will include elected officials. Thus, we should be very reluctant to
encourage state supreme courts to re-designate the cooperative elements of federal rights as exclusively
judge-made, unless we are confident that in doing so we are not compromising the premise of the right
itself.
323 See Eskridge & Frickey, Law as Equilibrium, supra note 17, at 27-28; Neuman, supra note 2,
at 1635-36; Zietlow, supra note 10, at 144.
324 See, e.g., Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (b)(4) (2000).
325 See Zietlow, supra note 10, at 199-200.
326 See Kloppenberg, Serious Doubts, supra note 295, at 38.
327 See Coenen, supra note 190, at 1588; Kloppenberg, Avoiding Constitutional Questions, supra
note 292, at 1005; Post & Siegel, Equal Protection, supra note 282, at 467-68; Sager, supra note 184,
at 1239.
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out, federal civil rights legislation has had a similar impact, so that Congress and the President have had significant roles both in shaping how existing core constitutional rights will be enforced and also in the evolution
of those core rights over time.328
The clear statement rule interferes with both these benefits. Effective
constitutional adjudication depends on our willingness to accept a relatively open-textured source of authoritative law. The grand, unspecified
language we see in key portions of the Constitution is intentionally vague.
One cannot write in advance a meaningful code to distinguish the process
that is due, to choose two of innumerable examples, when a state removes
a child from the custody of a mother with an abusive spouse from the process that is due when the state bars the visitation rights of mentally ill
grandparents. We have instead to trust in the ability of judges to discern
the underlying values that are embodied by the broad terms and to apply
those values wisely in difficult new situations. In demanding absolutely
clear language of statutes imposing constitutionally-inspired limitations on
state or local governments, the clear statement rule strips from courts this
most central of constitutional tasks, and leaves the Constitution in the states
threadbare by comparison to its federal instantiation. That demand is especially hard to justify when, unlike "core" constitutional interpretation, judicial interpretation of the requirements of constitutional legislation is relatively easy to revise through a political process quite open to state influence.
The clear statement rule also undermines the partnership between
courts and the political branches. For one thing, if Congress or an agency
knows that the courts will be limited to carrying out the more-or-less literal
terms of what they enact, they will have considerably less incentive to preserve for public inspection the record of their reasoning, the constitutional
deliberation and analysis that produced the statutory or regulatory outcome.
And perhaps there is a lesser incentive to carry out such deliberation at all.
When a court announces, "your deliberations don't matter," it seems a fair
possibility that the natural response is not to bother. Even if as a practical
matter not much legislation is produced by real "republican" processes, the
premise of avoidance is that courts should encourage, not undermine, constitutional thinking by political actors.
Another way that the clear statement rule interferes with collaborative
constitutionalism is that it silences courts. A good partnership needs feedback from both sides. But if courts are limited simply to finding the clear
328 See Post & Siegel, Equal Protection,supra note 282, at 519; Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel,
Protecting the Constitutionfrom the People: JuricentricRestrictions on Section Five Power, 78 IND.
L.J. 1, 23-24, 31-33 (2003) [hereinafter Post & Siegel, JuricentricRestrictions]; see also Caminker,
supra note 279, at 1171-73.
329 See Kloppenberg, Avoiding ConstitutionalQuestions, supra note 292, at 1040; Sunstein, supra note 128, at 88.
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semantic meaning of a text, and then stopping, they will never engage their
partners on the meaning and wisdom of the principles that animate the
words.33 °
Furthermore, to the extent that the clear statement rule requires judges
to look exclusively to the terms of a statute, rather than a regulation, for the
necessary clear statement, the rule cuts out a major potential source not
only of expertise but also of political accountability. As I mentioned earlier, this reading of the clear statement rule is doctrinally plausible, at least
for now.33 1 I have shown, however, that it is also illogical. Agencies offer
better "notice" to states than does Congress; they are at least as deliberative
and are probably more accessible to state political influence.332
Additionally, elevating the clear statement rule above Chevron and related
deference doctrines is highly undesirable from the standpoint of effective
and collaborative constitutional interpretation. Agency involvement means
that judicial interpretations would not only be subject to occasional congressional alteration, but also would have the advantage of the expertise
and political judgment of the federal and state agencies who are administering the grant-in-aid program.333
Thus the fundamental problem with the clear statement rule is that it is
inconsistent with our modem Constitution. As applied to the federal government, the judicially-enforced Constitution is deeply collaborative, and
its politically indefeasible reaches are curtailed accordingly. Yet, thanks to
the clear statement rule, the Constitution in the United States is simply
"under-enforced."

C. . . . And the Limits are Unjustified
Our picture of constitutional legislation is not yet complete, however.
In response to congressional and other efforts to supplement the Constitution, the Supreme Court has devised new limits on both legislative and
executive power to impose constitutionally-inspired burdens on state government. The puzzle for this subpart is: Why? Do these concerns justify
the clear statement rule or other stronger constraints?
The search for an answer to those questions, I claim, has three leading
330 See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1479,

1529 (1987).
331 See supra notes 64, 236.
332 See Robert A. Anthony, Interpretive Rules, Policy Statements, Guidances, Manuals, and the

Like-Should FederalAgencies Use Them to Bind the Public?, 41 DUKE L.J. 1311, 1373-74 (1992);
Michael Asimow, Nonlegislative Rulemaking and Regulatory Reform, 1985 DUKE L.J. 381, 402-03
(1985); Hershkoff, supranote 193, at 1896 ("Justiciability doctrine assumes a president with a superior
capacity to supervise administrative agents and to implement policy.").
See Dorf & Sabel, supra note 245, at 363 (analyzing both informational and accountability
advantages for reviewing courts in allowing agencies to develop policy in a real-world setting before
courts consider the validity of the policy).
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candidates. Each is at least plausible within its own realm. Some may
even extend to include efforts to enforce constitutional norms through the
Commerce Clause or other national powers not directly tied to the meaning
of the Constitution. None, however, seem to have much force as applied to
conditional spending. This subpart thus has something of the flavor of an
internal critique; even accepting the best justifications for limiting direct
constitutional legislation, the Spending Clause offers a relatively unimpeachable alternative for rendering both state and federal law equally subject to constitutional scrutiny.
1. The Restrictions:Boerne & Sandoval
One principal source of Congress's power to enact constitutionallyinspired legislation is Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment, which
authorizes Congress to enforce the Amendment's other substantive provisions.334 As I suspect most readers will know, the Supreme Court has now
curtailed Congress's power to legislate under Section Five, beginning with
the Court's opinion in City of Boerne v. Flores.335 Congress, displeased
with the Supreme Court's penurious view of the Free Exercise Clause in
Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. v. Smith, 336 enacted the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act ("RFRA"). 337 RFRA sought to require all courts,
state and federal, to give strict scrutiny to state action burdening religious
conduct.338 The Court responded by holding that application of RFRA as
to state law exceeded congressional power under Section Five.339 Under
Boerne and its progeny, Congress may only use Section Five power to
"remedy or prevent" conduct that the Court itself would conclude violates
the Constitution.
Congress may not "make a substantive change in the
34
governing law.", ' The Court measures the propriety of Section Five legislation by looking to whether, based on the demonstrated history of unconstitutional conduct, there is a "congruence between the means used" and
the constitutional violations targeted.342
What perhaps is less familiar is the additional role played by Alexander
334See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,
§ 5.
335521 U.S. 507 (1997).
336 494 U.S. 872 (1990). For a more complete discussion of Smith, see Brian Galle, Note, Free

Exercise Rights of Capital Jurors, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 569, 576-84 (2001) [hereinafter Galle, Capital
Jurors].
337 See City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 512-16.
338 Id.
339 Id. at 536.

340 Id.at 519.
341Id. at 519-20.
342 Id. at 530; see also Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 365 (2001) (stating

that Section Five legislation reaching beyond the scope of Section One must exhibit "congruence and
proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that end");
Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 80-83 (2000).
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v. Sandoval,3'"a case in which the Court held that agency regulations enforcing the anti-discrimination provisions of Title VI cannot be privately
enforced" Title VI itself prohibits only intentional discrimination; nevertheless, the regulations in question also disallow facially neutral policies
having a "disparate impact" on protected groups. 45 Although the Court did
not actually declare the regulations themselves invalid, it ruled that they
could not be the basis for a private suit because "[lianguage in a regulation
may invoke a private right of action that Congress through statutory text
created, but it may not create a right that Congress has not." 34 As I have
explained elsewhere, that claim is inexplicable (and probably inaccurate) as
a matter of administrative law.347 Taken in the specific context of
Sandoval, however, it might be understood as an aspect of the Boerne rule.
If agencies can expand (within reasonable limits) upon the guidelines of
the underlying statute, then administrative elaborations of Section Five
legislation might prove broader than what the Court is willing to uphold as
"appropriate" legislation if enacted directly by Congress. Sandoval thus
can be understood in the tradition of other cases in which the Court has
interpreted Congress's grant of power to an agency strictly in order to
avoid possible constitutional problems. 34'
Thus, Boerne places a straitjacket on federal efforts to legislate constitutional rights and, by implication, on similar administrative efforts. Does
this tell us that the Constitution should not bind state law as tightly as it
does federal law, or only that some of the ways that Congress might seek
that goal are themselves constitutionally suspect? The next three subparts
argue the latter view.
343 532 U.S. 275 (2001).
344 Id.

345Id. at 280-81.
346 Id. at 291.
347 See Galle, Federal Agencies, supra note 149, at 174-75 n.60. Others have seized
on this
problem to suggest that Sandoval must in fact mean that the Court believes that the regulations are
invalid, perhaps because a prohibition on disparate impact is a substantive redefinition of, rather than
simply a prophylactic remedy for, unconstitutional discrimination. See John Arthur Laufer, Note,
Alexander v. Sandoval and its Implicationsfor DisparateImpact Regimes, 102 CoLUM. L. REV. 1613,
1614 (2002); cf. Richard A. Primus, Equal Protectionand DisparateImpact: Round Three, 117 HARV.
L. REV. 493, 520-23 (2003) (doubting that the disparate impact standard can be defended on the
ground that it is predictive of intentional violations). That view, however, assumes a sub silentiooverruling of South Carolinav. Katzenbach, which upheld parts of the Voting Rights Act under a similar
theory. 383 U.S. 301, 308, 325-26, 333-36 (1966) (upholding congressional suspension of existing
state limits on voting, and preclearance requirement for new state restrictions, despite the fact that the
Court had previously upheld similar ballot restrictions). Since, as I explain in the text, there is a third
explanation, so that the conclusion of the syllogism does not necessarily follow, I think the better view
is that the validity of the regulations is not in question.
348 See BICKEL, supra note 156, at 156-169; Krent, supra note 159, at 748-50.
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2. The Rhetoric of Separationof Powers
Probably the most popular explanation for Boerne, at least in the first
few years after the opinion, was that it was a demonstration of the Court's
commitment to a formalist understanding of the separation of powers between the three branches.349 That is, in rejecting Congress's power to craft
supplemental meanings of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court preserved
for itself the exclusive power to interpret the Constitution. Similarly, the
stringent test for what can constitute proper prophylactic rules for enforcing existing judge-made rights might be seen as a way of assuring that
Congress is not covertly remaking a right under the guise of revising the
remedy. 350 That understanding of Boerne finds obvious textual support 3in
5
the opinion's invocation of the Marbury power to "say what the law is," '
as well as contextual support in legislative history indicating that Congress's intention was to overturn Smith.352
But as several writers have pointed out, this result is puzzling when
taken in combination with the notion of under-enforced constitutional
norms. 353 In many areas the Court has as much as admitted that the Constitution comprises rights that the Court has not chosen to recognize.354 Why,
then, should the Court treat its under-enforced norms as what constitutional
"law is," rather than more forthrightly labeling them "judicially enforceable rights," or something similar, thus permitting congressional recognition of the rest?
The closest answer sympathetic to Boerne is probably that the
rights/enforceable rights distinction threatens to undermine one of the
Court's important rhetorical tools. Against the political power of its fellow
branches essentially all the Court has to offer in opposition is its claim to a
349 See Caminker, supra note 279, at 1180; Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager,
Why
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act is Unconstitutional, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 437, 445 (1994)
("[Congress] has, in effect, commanded the Court to act as though its understanding of the Constitution
is different than it is."); Samuel Estreicher & Margaret H. Lemos, The Section 5 Mystique, Morrison,
and the Future of Federal Antidiscrimination Law, 2000 SUP. CT. REV. 109, 128; Post & Siegel, Equal
Protection, supra note 282, at 454.
350 See Caminker, supra note 279, at 1166. Or, if we see the distinction between rights and
remedies as basically semantic, then the remedial limitations in Boerne are not simply a test for covert
redefinition of rights, but a direct bar on redefinitions of the right/remedy complex.
351Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803); see also Neal Devins, How Not to Challenge
the
Court, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 645,646 (1998).
352 See Caminker, supra note 279, at 1182-83.
See Estreicher & Lemos, supra note 349, at 113; Post & Siegel, Equal
Protection, supra note

282, at 462; Post & Siegel, Legislative Constitutionalism, supra note 4, at 2044.
354 See, e.g., FCC v. Beach Communications, 508 U.S. 307, 313-16 (1993) (offering several different rationales for "judicial restraint" in review of equal protection claims); City of Cleburne v. Clebume Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 441-42 (1985) (explaining Court's reluctance to scrutinize
closely some forms of discrimination); Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 55057 (1985) (describing reasons Court believes it need not act to protect state sovereignty).
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superior source of authority.355 "Yes," it can say, "flag burning is loathsome, but the Constitution, the founders, and the definition of what it
means to be American tell us that we must tolerate it." These appeals to
deeper commitments-to the hostile audience's sense of Lockean obligation, to their national selfhood, or to their more pragmatic need for a system with the potential for ultimate, uncontestable decisions that end further
wasteful political wrangling-may in large measure be what ensures that
the Court's opinions will be respected and enforced rather than ignored." 6
Boerne, then, may reflect a calculation that to arm Congress with the
argument that it, too, is interpreting the Constitution might in the long run
destroy the Court's authority to resist Congress's will. That, I believe, is
the import of the otherwise cryptic comment in Boerne that a contrary rule
would make everyday law the stuff of the Constitution.5 7 Once the Court
concedes that Congress can interpret constitutional provisions it has not
recognized, where does it find the power to oppose Congress's claim that
any given piece of legislation is required by the Constitution?
Perhaps it is an answer to say that this loss is costless since Congress
will simply be supplementing the constitutional rights already built by the
Court-what some call the "ratchet" theory.358 That presumes, however,
that we can always tell constitutional up from down. More problematically, it assumes that constitutional rights do not come into conflict.3 59 Yet
nearly all of the interesting and difficult constitutional questions of this era
are about rights in conflict: consider free exercise against establishment;
continued fetal support against parental autonomy; and state political sovereignty against individual liberties, to name but a few. Resolution of these
conflicts calls not just for rights definition, but also rights balancing. Once
the Court has acknowledged that Congress, too, is a source of authoritative
constitutional meaning, how shall the Court call the people to its side when
Congress claims to find a different balance?
These difficulties are compounded by the possibility that the distinction between rights and enforceable rights may be either illusory or too
subtle for the electorate to understand. As Daryl Levinson and I have both
355 See Post & Siegel, JuricentricRestrictions, supra note 328, at 25-26; cf. BICKEL, supra note

156, at 128-31 (claiming that Congress values stamp of legitimacy that judicial approval gives to its
actions).
356 See TUSHNET, supra note 314, at 24-25 (arguing that the Court's interpretive authority depends on the public's perceived need for an institution with such authority); Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On ExtrajudicialConstitutionalInterpretation,110 HARV. L. REV. 1359, 1369-70 (1997).
357 City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 529 (1997).
358 See Gregory P. Magarian, How to Apply the Religious Freedom Restoration Act to Federal
Law Without Violating the Constitution, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1903, 1932-44 (2001) (arguing that RFRA
did not usurp the Court's power to interpret or decide constitutional matters but rather was a precommitment to enforce rights); Post & Siegel, JuricentricRestrictions, supra note 328, at 39.
359See Brest, supra note 4, at 72-73; Caminker, supra note 279, at 1177-78; Post & Siegel,
JuricentricRestrictions,supra note 328, at 39.
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argued, although in slightly different senses, the distinction between a core
constitutional "right" and the extent to which that right is enforced in court
may well be at most semantic. 36 If Congress can claim plausibly that its
choice of remedy is a form of constitutional interpretation, it again has a
source of rhetoric with which to oppose a judicial determination that Congress's remedy distorts the balance between two core constitutional rights
that were previously in equipoise. 6 '
Whatever the persuasiveness of this rhetorical model of the Separation
of Powers argument, it seems to have little force outside the special context
of Section Five legislation. Statutes enacted exclusively under Section
Five, and the parallel clauses of the other Reconstruction Amendments,
impose a unique obligation on reviewing courts to determine and declare
whether Congress was in fact interpreting and enforcing the Constitution.
Commerce legislation, in contrast, may well purport to serve constitutional
ends, but there is no need for a court to decide whether or not that congressional judgment is correct. There is, therefore, no risk that the Court will
be forced to acknowledge the interpretive powers of another branch.362
And indeed, there was no implication in Boerne that its rationale called
into question cases in which various civil rights statutes were within Congress's commerce power.363 Furthermore, statutes enacted under other
sources of authority often will not claim explicitly to be interpreting the
Constitution. There is a world of difference, rhetorically, between the
statement that a particular law enforces the Constitution and the statement
that it fulfills constitutional values. The first is an assertion of authoritative
interpretation of the Constitution; the second acknowledges (if implicitly)
that it is based on Congress's subjective understanding of what the Constitution intends.
3. Federalism
Another common explanation for the Boerne rule is that it protects fed-

360 See Levinson, supra note 295, at 885; Thomas, supra note 294, at 694-95.
361 1 should say that I do not find this justification persuasive. The Court has more to gain from
cooperation than it has to lose, symbolically, from divided authority. For example, an electorate that
helps to make the Constitution is more likely to obey it.
362 Cf. Estreicher & Lemos, supra note 349, at 129-30 (arguing that congressional enactments are
less objectionable, from a Boerne perspective, where they can be described as simply furthering constitutional values, rather than changing constitutional rights).
363 See Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 250-52, 257, 261-62 (1964)
(holding that Congress's purpose in regulating interstate commerce was not relevant to validity of
regulation); see also Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 298-304 (1964).
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eralism values. 36' Although that explanation is not on the face of Boerne
itself, it emerges forcefully in the Court's later application of the Boerne
Section Five analysis in Morrison and Garrett.365 The federalist account is
in some sense rather simple: Without meaningful restrictions on Congress's ability to invoke Section Five, its "ultimate trump card" in its relations with the states, Congress would be free to circumvent any other restrictions the Court might find on federal legislative power.366
Our theory so far, though, explains why we must have limits, but not
necessarily why the limits are so dramatic. The Court's scrutiny of Section
Five legislation is far more demanding than the highly deferential view it
takes of Congress's decisions about what further enactments are "necessary
and proper" to carry out its enumerated powers.36 7 Yet the Necessary and
Proper Clause seems just as likely to threaten the existence of states as
meaningful policymaking institutions, and similarly raises questions, not of
the proper ends towards which Congress might legislate, but only of the
means it chooses to employ to reach those ends.368 Why, in short, are the
political safeguards of federalism adequate to prevent federal overreaching
under Article I but not Section Five?
The answer appears to be a story of ongoing political accountability.
several
other authors have pointed out, the Court's recent federalismAs
inspired restrictions on federal activity share a common concern with the
electoral accountability of state and federal officials.369 In the absence of
state sovereign immunity from damages, the Court's theory goes, state
voters may have difficulty ascertaining whether their state representatives
364See Post & Siegel, Equal Protection, supra note 282, at 511; Catherine Caroll, Note, Section
Five Overbreadth: The Facial Approach to Adjudicating Challenges Under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment, 101 MICH. L. REV. 1026, 1060-61 (2003).
365 See Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 374 (2001); id. at 375-76 (Kennedy,
I., concurring); Caminker, supra note 279, at 1187.
366 See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 578 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (noting that
the federal power balance is so tenuous that the Court cannot admit inability to intervene); Post &
Siegel, Equal Protection, supra note 282, at 511-12 (describing but not agreeing with the view that
Section Five may create a broad federal police power).
367 See Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 386-88 (2001) (Breyer, J., dissenting).

368 See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 650-656 (1966) (explaining basis of Court's view that
"fb]y including [Section Five] the draftsmen sought to grant to Congress, by a specific provision applicable to the Fourteenth Amendment, the same broad powers expressed in the Necessary and Proper
Clause," and examining whether Congress's choice of means to effect its goal of eliminating discrimination is consistent with Constitution); Caminker, supra note 279, at 1166-67, 1188-89; Estreicher &
Lemos, supra note 349, at 117-18; see also McConnell, supra note 282, at 192-93 (arguing that even if
federalism might justify some limits on congressional power, federalism concerns should not limit
Section Five authority, since the whole purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was to nationalize constitutional rights).
369 See Post & Siegel, Equal Protection,supra note 282, at 512 (discussing Court's concern with
direct congressional control of state political processes); Mark D. Falkoff, Note, Abrogating State
Sovereign Immunity in Legislative Courts, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 853, 855, 865-67 (2001).
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are responsible for using scarce treasury dollars to satisfy the grievances of
individual voters.37 ° Further, many funding decisions would be made by
unaccountable federal judges.3 Similarly, the Court justifies its new rules
more clearly prohibiting the "commandeering" of state non-judicial officials largely on the basis of concerns about political transparency and the
danger that a federal government that could shift its costs onto the states
would not be constrained372by the political demands of moderating its policy
goals to meet its budget.

These concerns arise not at the enactment of the federal legislation but
only afterwards. If the political safeguards are functional, then states
should be able to prevent initial passage of a statute abrogating their sovereign immunity or compelling them to carry out federal directives. There is
no obvious reason why the state would be less effective at blocking this
kind of legislation than anything else that Congress finds "necessary and
proper" but that diminishes a state's prerogatives. Even the exceptions the
Court identifies, as when the Executive Branch is willing to accept the expense and blame for litigating directly against a state, 73 provide assurances
of political accountability only after the liability-generating statute has
been passed. Evidently though, the future of continuing state political accountability is a core constitutional right, like freedom of speech, that cannot be left to the perils of everyday politics.37 Maybe the Guarantee
Clause is justiciable after all. 75

370See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 755-56 (1999); Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp.,

513 U.S. 30, 60-62 (1994) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
371Id. at 750-52.
372 See Moulton, supra note 24, at 876.
373 See Alden, 527 U.S. at 756.
374Professors Adler and Kreimer rely on a similar notion in proposing their own variant
of the
Boerne principles. According to Adler and Kreimer, legitimate Section Five legislation poses no threat
to federalism values, because it is intended to elaborate core political rights and fundamental norms that
should not be subjected to the pressures of politics and state competition. See Adler & Kreimer, supra
note 48, at 127-31. They imply that a Boerne-type inquiry could be defended as an effort to distinguish
Section Five legislation that in fact advances this type of right from ordinary, commerce-type lawmaking dressed up in Fourteenth Amendment clothes. Id. at 130-33. This theory, if anything, would tend
to support conditional spending aimed at furthering constitutional values.
375 Cf. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 184-86 (1992) (suggesting that the Guarantee
Clause might be source of Court's theory of political accountability in federalism cases).
This theory raises the question if state governments should not cloud their accountability for the
future with a single political decision, as the decision not to oppose federal legislation abrogating their
immunity, then why can states waive sovereign immunity entirely? The short answer is that the decision to accept damages liability may be a choice about which theory of representative democracy an
individual state prefers. See Bowers v. NCAA, 171 F. Supp. 2d 389, 400-02 (D.N.J. 2001), rev'd on
other grounds, 346 F.3d 402 (3d Cir. 2003). If the national rule were no immunity, then it would be
very difficult for individual states to choose a different rule-for example, by lobbying each time a new
federal liability arises for individualized opt-out provisions. In contrast, where the national rule is
immunity, it is basically costless for the state to choose liability instead. The national immunity rule
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To bring this discussion back to the Spending Clause, it is apparent that
the ongoing accountability theory of Section Five does not demand any
similar limits on conditional spending. As I have argued, the administration of cooperative federal and state programs under the Spending Clause,
like direct federal enforcement against states under other federal enactments, is subject to ongoing supervision by the Executive Branch.376 Both
the need to provide further appropriations every year and the danger of
escalating costs when states hold out also create a continuing and powerful
fiscal check on Congress's reliance on conditional spending. 77 And, as I
have also discussed, conditional spending does not mislead voters about
who is responsible for the resulting policy choices and their consequences:
both federal and state officials share blame. 37 8 Finally, to the extent that
the Boerne limits on Section Five prove to be no more than the simple
claim that there must be meaningful limits on federal power, the powerful
political constraints on spending legislation easily satisfy this concern.
4.

The Boomerang Effect

The last explanation for Boerne rests on notions of institutional competence. Recall that the "under-enforced norms" critique of Boerne argues
that the Court should permit Congress to craft remedies for constitutional
violations that the Court believes it is not itself well-suited to recognize or
adjudicate. 37 9 The Court may well be unconvinced, however, that it will
prove any better equipped to resolve disputes authorized in this way by
Congress. 380 Thus, we might chalk Boerne up to the Court's leeriness to
therefore maximizes state choice. Of course, one might doubt, as I do, that this is a choice we ought to
facilitate, but that is a different debate.
Whether or not this story, or the one I relate in the text, gives a satisfying explanation for Section
Five sovereign immunity cases like Kimel and Garrett is questionable. It admittedly does not do much
to justify Boerne itself or the Court's opinion striking down parts of the Violence Against Women Act
("VAWA") in United States v. Morrison. What defect in the political process, either present or future,
explains why the states could not resist Congress's use of Section Five to enact parts of VAWA, or to
modify the standard of review in federal free exercise cases? In fact, in the aftermath of Smith, many
states actually changed their own free exercise law to parallel RFRA. See Galle, CapitalJurors, supra
note 336, at 584-85 n.68. This does not necessarily mean that the ongoing accountability theory is
wrong. Again, I think that there are several distinct theories underlying Boerne, not all of which will be
applicable in all cases.
376 See supra notes 165-169 and accompanying text; see also Falkoff, supranote 369, at 874-76
(arguing that political accountability of federal agencies should mitigate accountability concerns of
making states defendants in agency proceedings).
See supra text accompanying notes 191-192, 200-226.
378 See supra text accompanying notes 270-271.
379 Colker & Brudney, supra note 21, at 120 (finding that the Court views its own role under Section One as antidemocratic and, therefore, is hesitant to act under that grant of authority); Post &
Siegel, Equal Protection,supra note 282, at 463.
380 See Eskridge & Frickey, ClearStatement Rules, supra note 24, at 633-34; cf. Caminker, supra note 279, at 1169 (noting that Court's view of its power to say what the law is may include supervision of how the Constitution is operationalized in practice). But see Magarian, supra note 358, at 1907;
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plunge back into the difficulties of balancing burdens on free exercise
against the legitimacy of the state's asserted interest, regardless of whether
Congress thought the Court was up to it. In other words, Boerne gives a
kind of constitutional status to the "passive virtues. 38'
We can tease out two somewhat distinct components of the institutional argument. The first is the difficulty that the other branches may
force the Court into making controversial choices between competing
value judgments. The facts of Sandoval are a good example of this phenomenon.38 2 Prior to Sandoval, the Court had repeatedly refused to recognize the possibility that unintentional racism, as in facially neutral policies
having a "disparate impact" on certain racial minorities, could violate the
Fourteenth Amendment.383 The Court's opinions suggest strongly that its
hesitation was based on the fact that to decide otherwise would require it to
strike down too much, generate too much controversy, and undermine its
long-term authority. 384 Relatedly, it seemed as though the Court feared that
it would have to make many difficult balancing decisions between the merits of each challenged program or practice and the incremental injury to
equality-judgments that would require the Court to take controversial and
uncertain stands on how important the challenged activity was, and how
vital equality ought to be.3 85 The disparate impact regulations promulgated
under § 602 of the Civil Rights Act, if enforceable in private suits to enforce Title VI would have required courts to decide many cases raising
exactly the same issues-for example, whether using as a qualification for
employment an entrance exam on which black applicants as a group scored

McConnell, supra note 282, at 191-92 (rejecting argument that Boerne can be justified by claim that
RFRA forced judges to conduct the sort of analysis the Smith Court had concluded courts could not
carry out). Magarian and McConnell's main contention is that the balancing imposed by RFRA is just
another version of strict scrutiny, which in their view courts have demonstrated that they are fully
capable of executing. McConnell, supra note 281, at 191-92; see Magarian, supra note 358, at 1947.
Professor McConnell also asserts, without explanation, that a court's limited capacity is at most a
reason for the court's refusal to take responsibility on itself, rather than rejecting authority granted to it.
McConnell, supra note 282, at 192. It is unclear what in his view justifies that distinction. For a discussion of Professor Magarian's related claims, see infra note 402.
381 BICKEL, supra note 156, at 111-98.
382 Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001). For a discussion of Sandoval, see supra notes
343-48 and accompanying text.
383 See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 297-99 (1987); Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro.
Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264-65 (1977); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239-42 (1976);
Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535, 548-49 (1972).
384 See, e.g., Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 375-77 (1996) (Thomas, J., concurring); Davis, 426
U.S. at 248 & n.14.
385See McClesky, 481 U.S. at 297; Davis, 426 U.S. at 247-48; see also Motomura, supra note
290, at 574; Post & Siegel, Equal Protection, supra note 282, at 468-69. The Court did not mention
that it carries out a similar balancing act in free speech cases. Cf.McConnell, supra note 281, at 29192.
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very poorly was unlawful discrimination.8 6
In short, rules for judicial decision crafted by the other two branches
may lack, in the Court's view, sufficient appreciation for the political delicacy of the Court's operation. Congressional or executive constitutional
interpretations that are forced on the Court may subject it to more political
heat than it thinks it can handle. The Court's opinions in Kime 387 and
3 8 have something
Garrett
of this quality; the Court seems to have determined that it does not want to involve itself in political decisions that affect
the aged or those with disabilities, and it resists being pushed into them. 89
It might be argued, though, that the very fact that it was one of the
other branches that established a new rule or right would give the Court
political cover, and satisfy its concern that its choice between competing
alternatives has some democratic legitimacy. 3 ° Whether or not that is so
might well depend on how broadly Congress has framed the right. What
seems like a swell idea in the abstract may be much less appealing when
applied to particular cases, especially unforeseen cases. How many people
who supported the Religious Freedom Restoration Act wanted to legalize
polygamy? Over time, it is likely to be the courts, not Congress, that take
the heat for individual applications of even moderately broadly phrased
rights. Later Congresses are unlikely to be eager to shift blame for unpopular decisions back to themselves.
Another problem with the objection is that statutes by their nature create problems of inter-temporal legitimacy. Laws sometimes stay on the
books well after they could no longer win a majority to enact them. This
may be because of, among other factors, legislative inertia, or (more interestingly for my present purpose), because a subject is just too hot to

386 See Davis, 426 U.S. at 248-52 (conducting parallel evaluation of same exam under both Titles
VI and VI1).
387 Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000) (holding that the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act exceeded Congress's authority under Section Five).
388 Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001) (holding that a provision
in the
Americans with Disabilities Act allowing individuals to sue the states for failure to comply with the Act
violated the Eleventh Amendment).
389 The Court's recent decision to uphold portions of the ADA under Section Five, Tennessee v.
Lane, 124 S. Ct. 1978 (2004), actually supports this analysis as well. The Lane opinion, in demonstrating the history of arguable constitutional violations that might have been targeted by Title II of the
ADA, relies in significant part on judicial decisions resolving constitutional claims that would also
have been actionable under the ADA. See id. at 1989-90 & nn. 10-14. One might think that as evidence of historical practice a few scattered cases would be at best no better than a collection of anecdotes. As evidence of courts' institutional capacity to resolve the problems the ADA raises, however,
they are considerably more powerful. And, indeed, the Lane opinion returns to that theme later, arguing that its task in enforcing the challenged aspects of Title II is no more burdensome than what it has
already done in the past. See id. at 1994.
390 See Eskridge & Frickey, Clear Statement Rules, supra note 24, at 637; Post & Siegel, Equal
Protection,supra note 282, at 516-17.
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touch.39 ' Judge Calabresi's well-known suggestion for this problem is to
allow courts to modify statutes that have fallen into desuetude.392 Another,
though, is to make it more difficult for Congress to pass laws that are especially likely to leave the courts in the business of enforcing highly controversial value judgments that may no longer command a majority of the
population. That, arguably, is one thing that Boerne accomplishes. 93
The other component of the institutional argument is the difficulty of
judicial fact-finding. In several doctrinal areas the Court explains its reluctance to act as a consequence of the problem that the "right" answer to the
constitutional question depends on empirical evidence that is not readily
available to the court. 94 Often this is evidence that changes over time, or
relates in complex ways with other facts.395 Courts, especially lower courts
bound by Supreme Court precedent, are likely to have trouble keeping up
with significant changes in facts that would alter doctrinal outcomes.396
Additionally, among other difficulties, the courts (at least in their present
design) have difficulty acquiring information, other than what is brought to
their attention by litigants.397 Absent a new suit, and attendant discovery, a
court's existing (and now perhaps outdated) rules may continue to influence how people and institutions behave.398 Thus, rather than attempting
See Eskridge, supra note 330, at 1524-27; Eskridge & Frickey, Law as Equilibrium, supra
note 17, at 62.
392 See CALABRESI, supra note 79, at 154-61 (providing judicial strategies for encouraging legis391

lative action on outdated statutory schemes).
393 I should say once more that I personally do not think these arguments are adequate to sustain
Boerne, and are certainly inadequate to sustain Kimel or Garrett. But my disagreement is not so much
with the internal logic of the institutional capacity rationale, which I have defended in the text, as it is
with the Court's substantive standard of review. I do not think the Court is right that, for reasons of
institutional capacity, it should leave the treatment of the elderly or people with disabilities to ordinary
politics. Many elderly or disabled persons are isolated, if not always politically then socially. Those
who cannot partake fully in the daily interactions that shape society and its views will be long-term
losers in our political games, whether their isolation is the result of hatred and distrust or just neglect.
Even if not, it would seem that sins of neglect (rather than commission) are better candidates for judicial action, not worse. By focusing public attention, and leading public opinion, the Court can cure
neglect far more easily than it can cure hatred. I think Sandoval and Washington v. Davis are probably
wrongl4 decided for the same reason. But, again, those are separate debates.
See Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 221 & n. 10 (1974) (contrasting the courts' reliance on parties with Congress's ability to initiate investigation); McConnell,
supra note 282, at 155-56; William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economics of Anticipatory
Litigation, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 683, 714-15 (1994).
395 See Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, DestabilizationRights: How Public Law Litigation
Succeeds, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1015, 1058-59 (2004).
396 CALABRESI, supra note 79, at 146; Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92
HARV. L. REV. 353, 394-96 (1978).
397See Reservists Comm., 418 U.S. at 221 n.10; Fuller, supra note 396, at 394-96; Jonathan T.
Molot, An Old JudicialRole for a New Litigation Era, 113 YALE L.J. 27, 64-67 (2003). But see Michael J. Saks, Judicial Attention to the Way the World Works, 75 IOWA L. REV. 1011, 1022-39 (1990)
(arguing that judiciary is capable of researching and analyzing at least non-legislative facts).
See CHOPER, supranote 24, at 199.
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continually to revisit such questions as, "Can the federal government regulate the national economy as effectively without a national bank as it could
with it?" or "What is the collective impact of wheat subsidies on the interstate wheat market?" the Court has elected to leave the constitutional dilemmas that might be implicated by those queries relatively unaddressed.39 9
This temporal dilemma would probably be the core of any fact-finding
institutional theory implied by Boerne. I say "probably" because Boerne
and the federalism cases have not really raised any problems of empirical
evidence; they were, as I just mentioned, mostly dilemmas of reconciling
conflicting values. Still, we would not expect the Court to worry much
about facts existing in the world at the time of Congress's enactment. To
the extent that the Court is not confident about its capacity to analyze technical or multivalent information, Congress's own (superior) determination
that the state of the facts merits the chosen response should allay the
Court's worry4°--although the Court may well choose to review at least
the process Congress used in reaching its decision to further assure itself
that the conclusion is accurate. What guarantee does the Court have,
though, that this initial finding will prove accurate over time? Legislative
Once the attention of the coalition that passed a
inertia is pandemic."
piece of legislation has moved on, Congress may lose interest in tracking
the relevant facts.4 °2 But litigants will keep coming back to the courts, demanding that they grant relief. And whether relief is appropriate, and if so
what kind, may well turn on facts that the courts remain inapt at determining.
Unlike the "rhetoric" argument, both of these institutional concerns
have potential applications outside the special context of Section Five legislation. What, for example, will be the ultimate fate of RFRA as applied
to federal law? Is it clear that the Court will agree that Congress has the
399See M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316,421-23 (1819); Wickard v. Filburn, 317
U.S. 111, 128-29 (1942); CHOPER, supra note 24, at 202-03; Christopher L. Eisgruber, The Most
Competent Branches: A Response to ProfessorPaulsen, 83 GEO. L.J. 347, 355-62 (1994). Professor
Magarian claims that these types of cases are justifiable, if at all, by a theory of political accountability.
See Magarian, supra note 358, at 1948-49. Maybe so, but that does not really dispense with the question of expertise; for example, a rational voter unable to monitor every issue might well decide where to
delegate decision making responsibility based on the competence of the decision maker.
40OSee Barkow, supra note 281, at 252-53.
401 See CALABRESI, supra note 79, at 4-6, 93.
402 See Eskridge, supra note 330, at 1524-25. This is the main basis for my disagreement with
Professor Magarian's dismissal of the institutional competence theory of Boerne. Professor Magarian
claims that congressional oversight, and the possibility of congressional modification of the Court's
jurisdiction, ought to remove any worries that a court will bungle administration of difficult constitutional issues. See Magarian, supra note 358, at 1950-51. The trouble, as I have also argued elsewhere,
see Galle, FederalAgencies, supra note 149, at 219-20, is that it is doubtful that Congress in fact does,
or realistically can, keep such close tabs on judicial performance, especially in the lower courts. I also
do not think Congress should have the wide-ranging jurisdiction-stripping power that undergirds Magarian's argument.
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power to dictate, in effect, a special rule of interpretation that federal statutes must be read to provide some latitude for religious exercise? 43 Or
would the Court reject that as a violation of its power to say what the law
is, and, as a practical rationale, cite the accountability dilemma that would
result? On the expertise end, consider the Court's recent decision interpreting the Sherman Act to exclude a cause of action for the failure of local
phone carriers to provide access to their competitors. 4' The Court's ultimate justification was exactly that it (and the lower courts) would be unable to make the demanding factual judgments that would be dispositive of
those claims. 4°5 Quite possibly the Court would be just as reluctant to interpret Commerce Clause legislation in a way that forced it to work beyond
what it views as its core competencies.
It will also be hard to escape this reading of Boerne by the expedient of
labeling a particular piece of legislation "remedial" or "prophylactic."
That approach makes some sense when our worry is whether the public
will confuse congressional lawmaking with the Court's authoritative elaboration of the Constitution. But disparate impact cases, for example, are no
less difficult for courts to resolve because they are only a remedy for unconstitutional discrimination. Quite possibly this is why the evidentiary
standard needed to justify "appropriate" enforcement powers under Section
Five in Garrett seemed so exasperatingly impossible to satisfy-because it
was. But it should still be possible to enact "appropriate" Section Five
legislation based on expansive readings of the Constitution, as long as the
enforcement alternatives do not place competency demands on federal
courts-for example, if enforcement were entirely by federal agencies or
state courts.
Most conditional spending legislation will similarly mitigate any of the
Court's institutional concerns. The day-to-day involvement of federal
agencies in overseeing the administration of federal funds gives courts the
benefit of the agency's technical expertise, and assures that the courts will
have a politically accountable partner in elaborating the meaning of statutes
that further constitutional values. 4°6 In an earlier Article, I built on the

403See Magarian, supra note 358, at 1916-17 & nn.59-60 (summarizing circuit split). See also
Madison v. Riter, 355 F.3d 310, 322 (4th Cir. 2003) (noting unresolved Tenth and Eleventh Amendment challenges to RLUIPA, the spending power reincarnation of RFRA). These cases generally put
aside the question of congressional regulation of federal property, which is directly authorized under
Article IV. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
404See Verizon Communications, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 124 S.
Ct. 872,

875, 883 (2004).
405 Id. at 879, 883. That, of course, is not a constitutional holding, but there is
not much difference between the way that the Court elaborates common law under the Sherman Act as opposed to
under the Constitution.
406See Elhauge, supra note 128, at 2127-28, 2137; Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 126, at 928;
see also Erik Andersen, Note, ConstitutionalizingChevron: Filling Up on Interpretive Equality, 42
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work of Michael Doff and Charles Sabel to show how federal agencies
could, in authorizing suits under 28 U.S.C. § 1983, make judicial resolution of those claims uniquely accountable and well-informed.4 "7 Even
where a right of action is not expressly approved by an agency, various
doctrines of deference to agency decisions (which are especially strong
where the agency is administering a technical or highly complex web of
policy) help to make courts interpretive partners with agencies. Indeed,
one premise of Chevron is that ambiguities in statutory language are presumed to reflect Congress's desire that the agency continually update the
statute to reflect its best current understanding, as read in the light of the
agency's political allegiances and technical knowledge. 0 8 Although courts
may sometimes refuse to defer, as when the court finds the language of the
statute clearly contrary to the agency's view, in these cases the court will
have 'still placed the burden of accountability squarely on someone else's
shoulders: Congress. In many situations, too, the fact of ongoing agency
involvement will provide a record of experience and expert analysis to
educate the court, regardless of whether it ultimately rejects the agency's
findings.'
Alexander v. Sandoval,410 admittedly, may be a doctrinal barrier for my
argument. The Sandoval holding, again, was that agencies cannot expand a
right beyond what is delineated by statute.4 1' As I have suggested, the most
comprehensible explanation for that rule (since it is inexplicable by administrative law principles) is that its absence would weaken the edges of
Boerne, as agencies would be able to adopt interpretations of statutes that
would accomplish what Boerne prohibits to Congress itself. Perhaps, then,
the Court implicitly rejected the possibility that agencies can resolve better
than Congress the Court's inter-temporal problems of expertise and legitimacy. If so, then the Court failed to see that it was missing an opportunity
to do justice without incurring insurmountable political costs. But the better reading of Sandoval, I think, is that its rule ought to apply only when
the court is invoking the rhetorical justification for Boerne: that is, the argument that agencies, no more than Congress, should not be allowed to
"say what the law is."
Finally, agencies aside, the fact that federal spending must continually
B.C. L. REV. 349, 363-64, 380 (2001) (making similar argument for increasing the congressional role
in constitutional interpretation).
407 See Galle, FederalAgencies, supra note 149, at 217, 219-21.
408 See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865-66 (1984).
409JERRY L. MASHAW, GREED, CHAOS, & GOVERNANCE: USING PUBLIC CHOICE TO IMPROVE
PUBLC LAw 177-80 (1997) (arguing that pre-enforcement review deprives reviewing court of agency
insights that might lead to better rules); see Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Agency Authority to Define the Scope
of PrivateRights of Action, 48 ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 1-2 (1996).
410 532 U.S. 275 (2001).
411

Id.at 291.
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be re-authorized, and its terms regularly accepted by states, reduces intertemporal problems. If the federal government is still willing to pay for a
provision, even in the face of the ongoing potential for state holdouts, then
there is little doubt that the measure enjoys continuing popular support.
And, similarly, Congress would be unlikely to keep paying unless it
concluded that judicial application of the statute to date had not done a fair
job of applying the facts of individual cases in a way that furthered the
purposes of the statute.
The bottom line on the clear statement rule, therefore, is that it unjustifiably truncates efforts to give full effect to the Constitution as applied to
state law. At least one aspect of the Boerne rationale, its concern for institutional competence, makes some sense as applied to Section Five or ordinary commerce legislation. But none of the reasoning behind Boerne and
its kindred can explain why we would impose similar limits, whether
through the clear statement rule or otherwise, on conditional federal spending.
VII. CONCLUSION

Despite its widespread acceptance, the clear statement rule for conditions on federal spending is hard to defend. It interferes with one of the
central functions of courts as interpreters of law, and obstructs efforts by
the political branches of the federal government to extend the protections
of the Constitution more fully to those whose rights might be threatened by
state or local government activity. This, despite the fact that the states are
willing-and through holdouts, lobbying, and related efforts more than
able-to protect themselves against potential judicial impositions, whether
before the underlying statute or regulation is enacted or afterwards. And
even if conditional spending is "in the nature of a contract,' 41 2 contract law,
like the law of statutory interpretation, recognizes that complete clarity in
the terms of a bargain is inefficient and likely impossible, and so demands
nothing like the "clarity" of the clear statement rule.
Given the now-vast field of conditional federal spending, this improved understanding of the rules for interpreting the field is an important
recognition for its own sake. But my analysis has implications for several
other significant controversies, as well.
For one thing, we should now be able to lay to rest two significant
challenges to the legitimacy of conditional federal spending itself. One is
David Engdahl's claim that because the purposes of federal spending are
not enumerated in the Constitution, Congress cannot invoke the Necessary
and Proper Clause to authorize conditions aimed at guaranteeing that

412

Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Walsh, 538 U.S. 644,682 (2003).
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granted funds serve congressional purposes.4 13 Engdahl's textual arguments, I have shown, are weak-the Constitution does grant the power to
tax and spend "for the general welfare," after all-and his fallback suggestion (following Madison) that a contrary reading gives absurdly broad
powers to Congress fails to apprehend the force of political constraints on
conditional spending. It is exactly where Congress does not have the ability to legislate other than through the Spending Clause that the states'
power is greatest, because they know that Congress has no alternative but
to pay for their cooperation.
Another is Lynn Baker's argument that conditional spending threatens
the diversity of state law, and the important values, such as individual
autonomy, that draw sustenance from the array of choices that such diversity provides.414 This danger, she has said repeatedly, justifies strong judicial intervention to curtail use of the Spending Clause.4" 5 But buying uniformity with federal funds, I have shown, is prohibitively expensive, in part
exactly because Congress must pay more to those who rue their lost
choices. There is little need for additional judicial checks, and no meaningful criteria on which judges could sort necessary national solidarity
from pernicious conformity. Even if uniformity were costless, if diversity
is really a value, we would expect a rational Congress to build the opportunity for local variation into its national programs. And, sure enough, we
observe just such flexibility in a wide array 4of
federal spending programs,
16
ranging from Medicare to the Clean Air Act.
My examination here of the clear statement rule also is significant for
my earlier work on the enforceability of federal agency regulations under
28 U.S.C. § 1983 .4 " The Supreme Court has repeatedly invoked Pennhurst's clear statement rule for conditional spending as justification for
refusing to find a particular provision of a federal spending statute unenforceable. 4 8 This Article demonstrates that whatever the basis for the clarity demanded by Pennhurst-whetherit be notice to a state, the opportunity to exert the state's political influence to resist creation of a private
right of action, or just general concerns about the expansiveness of federal
413 See Engdahl, supra note 22, at 22,
64-65.
414

See Baker, supra note 11, at 1970-77, 1989; see also McConnell, supra note 92, at 1493-94

(discussing benefits of decentralization); Somin, supra note 205, at 466; Badawi, supra note 193, at
1352-53.
415 See Baker, supra note 11, at 1916; Baker & Berman, supra note 8, at 470.
416 See Jonathan R. Macey, FederalDeference to Local Regulators and the Economic Theory of
Regulation: Toward a Public-Choice Explanation of Federalism, 76 VA. L. REV. 265, 267 (1990)
(noting that federal government regularly agrees to allow states to retain regulatory autonomy in exchange for political benefits of granting that authority).
417 See Galle, FederalAgencies, supranote 149.
418 See Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Walsh, 538 U.S. 644, 682-83 (2003) (Thomas, J.,
concurring); Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 276, 279-80 (2002); Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329,
349-50 (1997) (Scalia, J., concurring); Suter v. Artist M., 503 U.S. 347, 358 (1992).
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law-that demand can be met equally well by language authored by a federal agency. Agencies give better notice to states than does Congress, and
they are at least as open to political influence. Indeed, I have argued that
agency involvement mitigates any concerns we might have about use of the
Spending Clause to restrict state autonomy. Thus, Pennhurst offers no
independent justification for a court's reluctance to look to agency regulations in determining the enforceability of federal norms.
Finally, my revised understanding of the Spending Clause speeds our
efforts to re-imagine constitutional law through the lens of institutional
design. Already commentators have suggested that the Court expand its
tentative efforts at sharing the process of constitutional interpretation and
enforcement with Congress." 9 With the barrier of the clear statement rule
removed, we now can consider also integrating federal agencies, state government, and state courts-more sources of data for courts to draw upon,
and more political support upon which the federal courts can rely.

419 See CASS R. SUNSTEIN,

ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME

COURT 24-27 (1999); Coenen, supra note 190, at 1589-96; Michael C. Dorf, Foreword: The Limits of
Socratic Deliberation, 112 HARV. L. REV. 4, 69-73 (1998); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Foreword: Implementing the Constitution, 111 HARV. L. REV. 54, 141-52 (1997); Post & Siegel, Legislative Constitutionalism,supra note 4, at 1946-50.

